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PSYCHOLOGY, 



OR, 



ELEMENTS 



NEW SYSTEM OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY, 



ON THE BASIS OP 



CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMON SENSE. 



DESIGNED FOB COLLEGES AND ACADEMIES. 



BY S. S. SCHMUCKER, D.D., 

PROFESSOR OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY IN THE THEOLOGICAL 
SEMINARY, GETTYSBURG. 



SECOND EDITION, MUCH ENLARGED. 



NEW-YORK: 

PUBLISHED BY HARPER & BROTHERS, 
NO. 82 CLIFF-STBEET. 



1844. 



«££ 






Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1842, by 

Harper & Brothers, 

In the Clerk's Office of the Southern District of New-York. 



M 



PREFACE. 



As the following publication proposes a system 
of mental philosophy in some degree new, a few 
words in regard to its origin may be due alike to 
the writer and the reader. In general, it owes its 
existence to the author's desire to promote the cause 
of truth and science. That cause he regards as 
identified with the happiness of his fellow-men and 
the glory of his God. At an early age, he was 
deeply impressed with the conviction, which no re- 
flecting mind can fail to feel, that mental philosophy 
is properly the basis of all science, and that a cor- 
rect acquaintance with the properties and operations 
of the mind, would not only facilitate our progress 
in the study of every department of truth, but, 
what to him was a matter of supreme importance, 
would also enable us to acquire a more correct 
view of the moral condition of the soul, and shed 
abundant light on some of the practical doctrines 
of Revelation. This latter consideration is men- 
tioned here, because it was really the writer's prin- 
cipal motive for pursuing this subject, although he 
has by no means mingled religion with metaphys- 
ics in the following treatise ; on the contrary, his 
A 2 



VI PREFACE. 

investigations of the one were conducted altogether 
independently of the other. About sixteen years 
ago, having been called to take charge of a theo- 
logical seminary, he felt it a duty to devote par- 
ticular attention to his instructions in this depart- 
ment, and formed a resolution, which has doubtless 
had some influence on this system. He had con- 
siderable acquaintance with the patriarchs of Brit- 
ish metaphysics, Locke, Reid, Stewart, and Brown, 
as well as with some few German authors ; but 
neither of them seemed to present an entirely nat- 
ural and satisfactory exhibition of his own mental 
phenomena. He then resolved to study exclusively 
his own mind, and for ten years he read no book 
on this subject. During this period, he spent much 
of his time in the examination of his own mental 
phenomena, and having travelled over the whole 
ground, and employed the leisure of several addi- 
tional years to review and mature his views, he now 
presents to the public the following outline of a sys- 
tem, as in all its parts the result of original, analytic 
induction. That he regards it as a more natural, 
faithful, and intelligible exhibition of the operations 
of his own mind than is contained in any other work 
which he has seen, he will not dissemble. Since the 
features of his own system have been settled, the 
writer has looked at various other works, and 
found much that is valuable, especially in the re- 



PREFACE. Vll 

cent publications of his own countrymen, Professors 
Upham, Day, Tappan, and others, yet nothing which 
seemed to invalidate his system, or render dubious 
the propriety of its publication. 

As this work is designed, not only for intelligent 
popular readers, but also for use in colleges and 
academies, the author has abridged his manuscript, 
and made it sufficiently brief to leave ample room 
for the explanatory observations of the professors 
and teachers, as well as written exercises of the 
students. For an experience of more than twenty 
years in teaching has convinced him, that the most 
successful method of imparting a thorough knowl- 
edge of such subjects, is to combine with a brief 
text-book the explanations and illustrations of thein- 
structer, and, at the same time, to require the stu- 
dent to exercise his pen in preparing either essays 
on the most prominent topics, or an analysis, or a 
regular compend of the whole. 

After frequent solicitation from those who heard 
the author's lectures, and from some other gentle- 
men of high literary and scientific rank who exam- 
ined the manuscript, this work is at length submitted 
to the public, with an earnest solicitude that it may 
subserve the cause of truth and human happiness. 
The author does not flatter himself that his views 
on all the topics discussed, have reached entire ac- 
curacy ; he will thankfully receive and carefully 



Vlll PREFACE. 

weigh any suggestions which may be made, espe- 
cially if presented in the spirit of benevolence or 
of literary comity. If the map of the human mind 
here presented is found to be more faithful and 
intelligible than those heretofore in use, if it tends 
to make perspicuous a subject hitherto proverbially 
abstruse and obscure, it will doubtless find friends, 
and the author will rejoice in the assurance that 
he has not toiled in vain. Of the salutary influ- 
ence of the principles and results attained, on the 
grand interests of fundamental Christianity, he en- 
tertains no doubt. 

The influence of the views here presented on lo- 
gic, rhetoric, and a number of related sciences and 
topics, will be evident to the scientific scholar. 
Perhaps at a future day some of these relations may 
be prosecuted by the author, if his health and numer- 
ous other duties will permit. With these remarks 
the work is now commended to the blessing of God, 
and the favour of the friends of true philosophy 
and religion. 



S. S. SCHMUCKER. 



Theological Seminary, » 
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. > 



SECOND EDITION. 

In preparing for the press this enlarged edition 
of his Mental Philosophy, the author faithfully avail- 
ed himself of the suggestions of the principal re- 
views of the work which have met his eye. Among 
these, that in the American Biblical Repository, by 
the distinguished President of Pennsylvania Col- 
lege, exhibited the greatest familiarity with the sub- 
ject and with the work, and presented the most 
numerous suggestions for its enlargement. To that 
gentleman, as well as to the reviewers in the Meth- 
odist Quarterly Review, and the New World, and 
others, the author takes pleasure thus publicly to 
acknowledge his obligations. In all cases he has 
carefully weighed their suggestions, and, in most 
instances, been led to make some farther illustra- 
tions or additions, which, he trusts, will contrib- 
ute to the value of the work. He has been happy 
to find in these writers but little dissent from his 
general system. The principal topics on which he 
has made additions, amounting in all to about one 
third of the whole work, are the following : the 
classification of the different objects or entities in 



PREFACE. 



the universe ; the subject of mnemonics, or the art 
of improving and aiding the memory ; the pro- 
cesses of perception and sensation through the bod- 
ily organs, and the different theories for their ex- 
planation ; the different classes of feeling, especial- 
ly the intellectual and moral emotions ; the nature 
of analytic reasoning, and laws of human belief; 
imagination ; and the operations of conscience. 

The work is again commended to the blessing of 
God and the favour of the public. 
May, 1843. 



CONTENTS. 



INTRODUCTION. 



Page 



On the Methodology of the Science, and the several Points of 
Difference between Mathematical and Metaphysical Reason- 
ing 13 

Definition. Sketch of the Different former Systems : the com- 
mon division into nine faculties, referred by Reid to two 
classes, the Intellectual and Active Powers ; by Stewart to 
three classes, Intellectual, Active, and Social Powers ; and by' 
Brown to External and Internal States of the Mind . . 25 

The German Division, into Sensibilities, Understanding, and 
Will, substantially adopted by Upham 26 

Different System proposed in this Work, into, 1. Cognitive, or 
those Phenomena of the Mind which are Knowledge, our 
Cognitions, not including many Operations of the Intellect ; 2. 
Sentient Phenomena of Mind, including Sensations, Feelings, 
Emotions, and, in part, Passions ; and, 3. Active Operations, 
including not only the Will, but also a large part of what, in 
the other Systems, is embraced under the Intellect or Under- 
standing 27 



PART I. 

COGNITIVE IDEAS. 
CHAPTER I. 
Of Objective Entities ; that is, of the Universe itself, and all the 
various Objects and Existences constituting it, in themselves 
considered — Their Objectivity ; that is, their Real Existence 
— Their Division into Classes 39 

CHAPTER II. 

Of our Cognitive Ideas as Mental Representatives (not images) 
of all the different Objects or Existences known to us in the 
Universe — Exact Nature of these Ideas — Criteria for Distin- 
guishing Ideas of the Cognitive Class — Nature and Sources 
of Error in our Cognitive Ideas or Knowledge — Ancient 
Realists and Nominalists— German Realism and Idealism — 
Transcendental Idealism of Kant — Division of these Ideas, 
1. Into Individual and Relative Knowledge; 2. Into Retro- 
spective (memory, voluntary and spontaneous— mnemonics), 
present (consciousness), and prospective knowledge (bases of 
the latter are, Analogy, Causation, and Revelation) . . 69 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER III. 



Page 



Organic Process by which we obtain these Ideas — Nervous 
Connexion between the different Organs of Sense and the 
Brain — Phrenology. 1. Sense of Vision. The Eye, descrip- 
tion of— Of which Ideas the Eye is the Organ of Perception, 
and of which not — Of Colour, Shape, Extension, Direction, 
apparent and relative Size — Feelings accompanying these 
Perceptions. 2. Sense of Hearing. The Ear, description of — 
Conductors of Sound, or, rather, of Atmospheric Vibrations — 
Number of distinguishable Sounds — Relations of Sound, Con- 
cords, Discords — Their Nature— Difference between our Per- 
ceptions of Sound and the Feelings accompanying them. 3. 
Sense of Touch. The Organ itself— Of the Ideas acquired by 
Touch — Solidity or Fluidity, Shape, Extension, Smoothness 
or Roughness, Heat or Cold — Whether all resolvable into 
Resistance and Extension. Externity : Improvements of 
this Sense — Sanderson — Institutions for the Blind substitute 
the Sense of Touch for that of Vision. 4. Sense of Tasle. 
The Organ of Taste — The Wisdom of its Location— Per- 
ceptions of Flavour, and Feelings connected with them — 
Great Variety of Flavours — Mode of Distinguishing them in 
Language. 5 Sense of Smell. The Organ described — Our 
Knowledge of Odours — Great Variety — In what the Odour 
objectively consists — Feelings connected with the Percep- 
tion of Odours —Improvement of the Senses generally — 
Cases of Mitchell, Dr. Moyse, &c. 

Different Theories on the Mode of Reciprocal Influence of Body 
and Soul in general. Theory of Occasionalism — Of Leib- 
nitz's Pre-established Harmony — Des Cartes's Theory — New- 
ton's View — Dr. Hartley's Theory of Nervous Vibrations in 
particular. Result of the Whole 105 



PART II. 

OF SENTIENT IDEAS. 

Definition of Feelings — Criteria by which this class of Ideas is 
distinguished 146 

CHAPTER I. 

Classification of Feelings, into Individual and Relative. The 
Individual class embraces, 1. Sensations, or those Feelings 
consequent on Perceptions by the Senses. 2. Some Emo- 
tions, intellectual, as Emotion of the Sublime, of the Beauti- 
ful, the Ludicrous, of Surprise, of Wonder, &c. — Moral Emo- 
tions, or those Feelings included in the Operations of Con- 
science. 3. Some of the Affections — Pleasant Affections, 
Painful Affections. 4. Feelings connected with our Bodily 
Appetites. 



CONTENTS. 



P»«e 



Relative Feelings, including, 1. Benevolent Feelings — as Friend- 
ship, Benevolence, Gratitude, &c., Filial. Parental Love, Love 
to God. 2. Malevolent or Defensive Feelings — as Anger, 
Hatred, Ingratitude, Cruelty, &c. 3. Sympathetic Feelings — 
as Pity, Condolence, Compassion, and Sympathy of various 
kinds. 4. Antipathetic Feelings — as Envy, Jealousy, Horror, 
Disgust, Indignation, &c 149 

Other less valuable Divisions of Feeling, into Sensuous, Intel- 
lectual, and Moral — into Present, Retrospective, and Pro- 
spective . . . . . . . . . . 150 

Discussion of the different Branches of the above Classification 151 

CHAPTER H. 

Of the different Tendency of Entities, or the various Objects in 
the Universe, to excite Feeling 178 

CHAPTER III. 

Susceptibility of the Mind for Feeling — its various Degrees, and 
the Laws of their Operation 185 



PART III. 

4.CTIVE OPERATIONS. 
CHAPTER I. 

Criteria by which the Active Operations are distinguished from 
all other Mental Phenomena. Materials on which our Active 
Operations are performed, are External Objects of the differ- 
ent classes, past Mental Phenomena of every class, and the 
Natural Signs by which these Ideas are expressed . . 199 

Division and Discussion of the Five Active Operations : 

I. Inspection. Its Nature, Objects, &c, includes the Active 

Processes of Perception, Consciousness, Conception, 
Judgment, Recollection, Analytic Reasoning, and the 
Impulsive Element of Conscience— Act of Memorizing 

explained 203 

Fundamental Laws of Human Belief Enumerated . . 213 

II. Arrangement. Definition of this Active Process. 

The Purposes aimed at in Arrangement .... 218 
Various Principles according to which the Process may be 
conducted. Arrangement embraces the Processes of 
Comparison, different Arithmetical Processes, Classifi- 
cation, Mental Associations based on any Natural Prin- 
ciple or Affinity, Composition of Music, and Synthetic 
Reasoning. Nature of Evidence Objectively and Sub- 
jectively considered — Syllogisms, the Nature of . . 222 

III. Modification. Definition — Objects of this Process. 

It embraces Abstraction, Generalization, Imagination, 



Xll CONTENTS. 

Fag* 

Fancy ; its results are Geometrical Axioms, Metaphysi- 
cal Axioms, Mathematical Truths, Moral general Truths 
or Principles (the fallacy of Kant and other writers, 
particularly in Germany, who regard these general 
truths as a priori knowledge), Works of Fiction in Wri- 
ting, Painting, Sculpture, &c. 

IV. Mental Direction of our Physical Agency described — Its 

different Kinds — Its several Concomitants. 

V. Intellectual Intercourse with other Minds. Philosophical 

Nature of, described. 1. By Articulate Sounds — Nature 
of Oral Language— Connexion between Words and Ideas 
— How far Language is of Divine Origin. 2. By Ges- 
tures and Features of Countenance. 3. By Written 
Signs — Alphabet of Chinese, of the Cherokees — Arith- 
metic Figures — Musical Notes — The Complex Opera- 
tion of Composition described. 
Attention— why not a separate Power of the Soul. 

CHAPTER II. 

Mode of Occurrence of the Five Active Operations is twofold : 

1. Voluntary— Proof of Man's Voluntary or Moral Agency : 

Motives — The Will — Two Constitutional Inclinations of 
the Soul ; the first, to Obey the Physical, Intellectual, 
and Moral Fitness of Things, Conscience— The second, 
to pursue our Well-being or Pleasure— The latter Incli- 
nation stronger in Man since the Fall— Different Modi- 
fications of these Constitutional Inclinations : love of 
Life, of Property, of Power, &c. — Desires : their Differ- 
ence from Feelings. 

2. Spontaneous Occurrences of the Active Operations — Dif- 

ference between Spontaneous and Voluntary Action — 
Laws of the Spontaneous Active Operations — Laws of 
Association — Why we are responsible also for our 
Spontaneous Action 

Pragmatic View — Dreams 289 

Recapitulation, for Reviews and Examinations . . 295 



INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



INTRODUCTION. 

It has long been a subject of remark, that while 
the science of mathematics, which discusses the 
properties and relations of space and number, is ac- 
companied by the most conclusive evidence, and 
bears conviction with it at every step of its prog- 
ress, the philosophy of the mind still remains en- 
veloped in comparative darkness and uncertainty, 
after the intellect of ages has been expended in its 
investigation. The question arises, Are not both 
similar in their nature, and alike susceptible of de- 
monstrative discussion ? It seems evident, that they 
are not precisely alike, and yet much of the ob- 
scurity enveloping mental science, doubtless arises 
from the unphilosophical manner, in which its in- 
vestigations have been conducted, and the inappro*- 
priate style in which the result of them has gener- 
ally been recorded. The superior force of mathe- 
matical reasoning, arises from three sources. First, 
from an intrinsic difference in the nature of the sub- 
jects discussed. Secondly, from the more rigidly an- 
alytic method of investigation, pursued in the math- 
ematics. And, thirdly, from a less elegant, indeed, 
but more precise and perspicuous method of con- 
veying to others the knowledge we have acquired. 
B 



14 INTRODUCTION. 

A distinguished and popular writer* of the pres- 
ent day, alleges the difficulty of ascertaining with pre- 
cision the operations of other minds, as a prominent 
cause of the uncertainty of mental science. But 
this appears to us to be an erroneous view. All 
minds are, in healthy subjects, constituted essen- 
tially alike ; and as every student of this science 
has access to the phenomena of his own mind, he 
can draw from this source abundant materials for 
the examination of any and of every aspect of the 
subject. We have, moreover, the candid testimo- 
ny of a multitude of writers on these topics, each 
presenting the details of his own mind ; so that 
this science need not labour under obscurity for 
want of the experience of different and independent 
witnesses. The testimony of consciousness in re- 
gard to our individual mental operations separately 
considered, seems also to be distinct and satisfac- 
tory. And the testimony of others concerning the 
clearness of their consciousness, coincides with our 
own experience. But when we attempt to trace 
the unknown cause of these operations which lies 
behind them ; or to determine and systematize their 
relations to each other, which are often diversified 
and obscure, we encounter difficulties on every 
side. And these difficulties encumber the investi- 
gation of our own mental phenomena, as well as 
those of others. 

It is indeed true, that in morbid mental action, 
the operations of different minds are very diverse, 
and the careful collation of these diversified phases 

* Dr. Abercrombie on the Intellectual Powers, p. 15, 16, Harpers' ed. 



METHODOLOGY OF THE SCIENCE. 15 

of mental obliquity, is interesting to the student of 
mental science and essential to the physician ; but 
the true intellectual system must be deduced from 
the phenomena of mind in its ordinary, its healthy 
condition. We return therefore to the position, 
that the causes of superior lucidness awarded to 
mathematical science are chiefly three. 

The first of these causes, namely the intrinsic 
difference between the subjects discussed in these 
sciences, is derived from the Author of our being. 
We are so constituted that the properties and espe- 
cially the relations of space and number, are more 
clearly apprehended by us than those of mind. 
Yet this difference is not so great as might, at first 
view, be supposed. Much of it arises from the fact, 
that from our earliest years we are engaged every 
hour in perceiving and judging of space and num- 
ber, while the phenomena of the mind are seldom 
thought of until we reach the years of maturity, and 
then generally at short periods as subjects of theo- 
retical study. Our perceptions of the former are 
therefore improved in an incalculably higher degree 
than our views of the latter. 

The second source of superior clearness has been 
stated to be a more rigidly analytic method of in- 
vestigation. This has led to greater improvements 
in these sciences, and hence the evidence attending 
their discussion is also greater. The fact that a 
better method of philosophizing has usually been 
pursued in the mathematical sciences is not alto- 
gether adventitious. We believe it to be chiefly 
owing to the peculiar nature of the properties and 



16 INTRODUCTION. 

relations of space and number, and to the fixed and 
simple nature of mathematical language, which 
consists chiefly of a few figures and signs, and a 
small number of well-defined words, while it wholly 
rejects the flowers of rhetoric. 

The same method of inductive investigation is 
the only one, by which real progress can be made 
in mental science, or in any other department of 
human knowledge. It will appear more clearly in 
the sequel, that all those of our ideas which are 
knowledge, are mental representatives of entities ; 
i. e., of things, and their relations, existing in na- 
ture ; and can be obtained, originally, in no other 
way than by the careful examination of entities 
themselves. Hence, however knowledge already 
acquired may afterward be combined and arranged, 
the only accurate method of obtaining its original 
elements is by patient successive examinations of 
those entities of which we wish to obtain a knowl- 
edge. After such a careful examination of all the 
facts in the case has been made, and we have thus 
obtained accurate mental representatives of them 
all ; then, and not until then, can we with certainty 
decide, whether or not any supposed property or 
law belongs to them all. That method of philoso- 
phizing, therefore, which affirms a general law after 
the examination of a few facts, must forever be inse- 
cure, and tend to obstruct the progress of any science. 

The third source of the superior lucidness of 
mathematical discussions, is the simple, literal, 
concise style, in which they are recorded for the 
instruction of others, and the specific numeric no- 



NATURE OF MATHEMATICAL REASONING. 17 

tation of every item of knowledge obtained. It 
will hereafter appear more clearly, we trust, that 
one of the jaiost prolific sources of error in human 
knowledge, is the use of language which does not 
express our ideas with entire, specific exactness. 
But mathematical language, consisting of a few 
figures, letters, and signs, and a small stock of well- 
defined words, the same idea is almost universally 
designated by one and the same term. No attempt 
is made to avoid the repetition of the same word 
in the same sentence, however often the same idea 
may recur ; and the man would expose himself to 
ridicule, who should attempt to imbody the demon- 
strations of Euclid in profuse and florid language. 
Hence arises a degree of perspicuity of style never 
attained and rarely aimed at in the discussions of 
any other science. Nor is the precise separation 
of each item of knowledge from every other, and 
its numerical notation unimportant. It enables 
the reader to know exactly how far an author has 
succeeded in establishing the positions assumed, 
and of which of them the evidence is inconclusive. 
Thus, those positions, the demonstration of which 
appears conclusive to all, become a common stock 
of knowledge. On these others can build, assu- 
ming them as correct, and can then direct their at- 
tention to positions yet doubtful. 

The same inflexible precision of style and the 
distinct separation of the items of our knowledge 
would doubtless tend in a high degree to advance 
the science of mental philosophy ; and ought, so far 
as the different nature of the subjects will admit, 
B2 



18 INTRODUCTION. 

certainly to be introduced. Yet, if even equal pre- 
cision could be attained, the style of discussion in 
Mental Philosophy would still be far more copious 
and diversified, because the subjects of which it 
treats are incalculably more numerous and difficult. 
The question here arises, What is the exact na- 
ture of the demonstration and proof in mathemat- 
ics, and what in mental science ? If a writer wishes 
to produce conviction, which of his ideas relating 
to the subject under discussion, should he exhibit 
to his readers in the language just recommended, 
and what active operation of mind must he per- 
form ? — Geometry discusses the properties and re- 
lations of space. Demonstration in this science 
sometimes consists in bringing the several diagrams 
or figures, between which any relation is affirmed, 
or in supposing them to be brought into such local 
contiguity as will enable the eye to perceive the 
relation at a glance. Such is the nature, e. g., of 
the demonstration of the theorem of Euclid known 
as Prop. IV. of Book I., viz. : If two triangles have 
two sides, and the included angle of the one equal 
to two sides and the included angle of the other, 
they must be identical or equal in all respects. For 
it virtually consists in supposing one of the two 
figures to be placed upon the other, and then con- 
ducting the eye through the successive survey of its 
several parts ; and it is found that in this survey the 
mind intuitively perceives the coincidence of each. 
Sometimes the demonstration consists in reducing 
the diagram into such other elementary figures by 
additional lines, &c, as are intuitively discovered 



MATHEMATICAL DEMONSTRATION. 19 

by the eye to possess the property in question, and 
which exemplify some of those self-evident cases 
termed axioms. Axioms in Geometry consist of 
generic affirmations of certain facts or properties of 
space which are intuitively perceived to be true in 
individual and specific familiar cases. E. g., the 
axiom — things equal to the same thing are equal to 
one another — is first learned from the observations 
of early life. We perceive in the familiar objects 
around us which we touch, see, and handle, that if 
any two of them are equal or like to a third, they 
are also, in the same respects, like each other. The 
observation is extended from one case to another, 
until, finding no exceptions to it, we set it down as 
a universal maxim, and confidently employ it as one 
of the instruments of reasoning. This is the case 
with other axioms. In arithmetic the same obser- 
vation is intuitively made in reference to small num- 
bers, and gradually extended to large ones, in re- 
gard to which the mind could not intuitively see its 
truth, but, after the preliminary process, confident- 
ly and safely assumes it. 

When small numbers are added together, the 
mind can intuitively perceive the truth of the sum 
total. Thus, that 2 + 3=5, every one can perceive 
to be true. But when large numbers, extending to 
many figures, are added, the mind cannot see the 
truth of the sum total by comparing the entire num- 
bers. We are certain of its accuracy only by suc- 
cessively going through the addition of each fig- 
ure, and knowing that this operation has been ac- 
curately performed. So, also, when the multiplica 



20 INTIIOBUCTIOX. 

tion or division of small numbers is performed, the 
mind intuitively perceives the accuracy of the op- 
eration ; but in large numbers our perception is in- 
distinct. Our confidence in these cases rests on 
our assurance of the accuracy of the rule or mode 
of operation, which assurance is acquired in the 
case of small numbers. The same is the case with 
the arithmetical proportions, e. gr., 1 : 3 : : 2 : 6, &c, 
The ocess of reasoning in mental science is en- 
tirely different. The items of proof and the sub- 
jects of discussion are all mental phenomena, of 
which each individual must judge for himself by the 
testimony of his own consciousness. The art of un- 
derstanding the subject well, and of writing upon it 
lucidly and conclusively, consists in the habit of care- 
fully studying the operations of our own minds, and 
of clothing the result of our observations in such 
perspicuous and appropriate language, as will most 
successfully conduct our readers or hearers through 
the same process on the points in question. Discus- 
sions on this subject are successful in producing con- 
viction, just in proportion as they enable the reader 
to verify the writer's assertions in his own mind. 
The reader's own consciousness must respond at 
every step to the truth of the positions advanced ; 
and conviction terminates, as soon as the response 
is doubtful, or the reader cannot perceive, in the op- 
erations of his own mind, the truth of the author's 
assertions. 



THE SUBJECT MATTER AND DIVISIONS 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 



Mental Philosophy may be defined to be that 
science which discusses the properties and opera- 
tions of the human soul. Other objects, that is, 
entities, in the universe, are also the subject of in- 
vestigation ; but only in as far as their influence on 
the phenomena of mind is concerned. Thus, in 
treating of some of our ideas, we find them to be 
mental representatives of external objects around 
us, and we are necessarily led to examine those ob- 
jects or entities, to ascertain what we may and do 
know of them, and what is the process by which, 
through the bodily organs, we obtain this knowledge. 

This science was formerly termed Metaphysics, 
a term barbarously derived from the Greek, in 
which its appropriate primitive metaphusike (jiera. 
(pvoLicog, .7}, -ov) is not found. It is supposed to have 
originated from the misapprehension of the inscrip- 
tion on a work, consisting of fourteen books, con- 
cerning which it is doubtful whether, at least in their 
present form, they belong to the productions of 
Aristotle, among which they are found. It is an 
ancient, though not perfectly substantiated opinion, 
that Andronicus of Rhodes, who arranged the 



22 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

works of Aristotle into classes, after he had thus as- 
sorted the books on logic, ethics, and physics, pla- 
ced together several disconnected tracts on differ- 
ent subjects, and endorsed them " meta taphysica" 
(to be placed or read, after the works on physics). 
Subsequently the discussions contained in those 
books, were united into a science, which from the 
above inscription was termed Metaphysics ; because 
it succeeded, or because it went beyond physics. 

The term Anthropology is used especially in Ger- 
many, to designate that science, which discusses the 
nature of man, as consisting of a body and mind, 
and especially the influence of the former on the 
latter. It is sometimes divided into Somatology 
and Psychology, the former embracing all those 
bodily peculiarities and circumstances, which are 
supposed by some writers to exert an influence on 
the mind. In this department much that is fanciful 
and ridiculous has been written. 

By Psychology is meant everything, that appro- 
priately belongs to the discussion of the nature, 
structure, and operations of the mind, exclusive of 
Logic, which is a more extended exhibition of the 
laws of the mind in one branch of psychology, 
namely, the process of reasoning. It is this latter 
science which we propose to discuss on the present 
occasion. 

An important preliminary question here arises, 
What are the proper materials which ought to be 
embraced in this science ? These we maintain are, 
not so much the supposed faculties, of which we 
know nothing directly, but the known phenomena 



DIVISIONS OF THE MIND. 23 

of the mind, and all those other known entities or 
existences, which exert an influence upon these 
phenomena, or are concerned in their production. 
The proper basis for a division of mental phenome- 
na is another important aspect of our subject. We 
suppose it evident that any correct classification of 
mental operations, must be based on those phenom- 
ena of mind, which are known to us, and not on 
unknown and supposed faculties or essence of the 
mind. The divisions adopted in the various systems 
extant are numerous. The first and most general- 
ly received in the English philosophical world, is 
that into about nine faculties of the mind. This di- 
vision was in the main adopted by Dr. Reid, Mr. 
Stewart, and the other principal metaphysicians in 
England and America, until the recent introduction 
of Dr. Brown's system, which has gained many ad- 
mirers. 

"We shall first specify some of these divisions and 
definitions which have heretofore been received. 
The mind has usually been divided into the follow- 
ing faculties : 

1. The faculty of perception, which is regarded 
as that inherent part of the original constitution of 
the soul of man, by which he obtains knowledge of 
external objects, through the instrumentality of his 
bodily organs. 

2. The faculty of consciousness is that power of 
the soul of man by which, according to Dr. Reid, 
he has " immediate knowledge of all his present 
thoughts, and purposes, and, in general, of all the 
present operations of his mind." 



24 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

3. The faculty of conception is that power of the 
soul of man by which he has knowledge of things 
not perceived through the instrumentality of his 
senses ; or, according to Stewart, it is " that power 
which enables the mind to form a notion of an ab- 
sent object of perception, or of a sensation which it 
has formerly felt." 

4. The faculty of judgment is that inherent pow- 
er of the soul by which we decide that any propo- 
sition is true or not true. It is also termed the fac- 
ulty of understanding. 

5. Memory is that faculty of the soul by which 
we have a present knowledge of our past mental 
operations. 

6. By the faculty of reasoning is commonly 
meant that inherent power of the soul by which 
we infer conclusions from premises. " Reasoning," 
says Dr. Reid, " is the process by which we pass 
from one judgment to another, which is the conse- 
quence of it. In all reasoning, therefore, there 
must be a proposition inferred, and one or more 
from which it is inferred." 

7. The faculty of conscience has by some been 
considered as that power of the soul, by which we 
experience either remorse or self-approbation on a 
review of our conduct ; while others regard it " as 
that internal sense which decides upon the moral 
character of actions." 

8. The faculty of feeling is that power of the 
soul, by which we experience sensations or feelings 
and emotions. 

9. The faculty of volition is that power of the 



VIEW OF FORMER SYSTEMS. 25 

soul by which we choose, determine, resolve, pur- 
pose, or will to perform or not to perform any contem- 
plated action, of which we judge ourselves capable. 

The general division of these powers adopted by 
Dr. Reid was into two general classes, viz. : First. 
Intellectual Powers. Secondly. Active Pow- 
ers. 

By intellectual powers he means those powers by 
which we perceive objects and conceive of them ; 
and remember, analyze, or combine them, and judge 
or reason concerning them. 

By active 'powers he understands all those pow- 
ers of the soul which lead to action, or influence 
the mind to act, such as appetites, passions, affec- 
tions, &c. 

Mr. Stewart, the successor and commentator of 
Dr. Reid, divides the powers of the mind into three 
classes. First. Intellectual. Secondly. Active or 
Moral. And, thirdly, Social Poivers ; which latter 
belong to man as a member of political society. 

The last division, which has obtained much cur- 
rency in the English philosophical world, is that of 
Dr. Brown, who divides the powers of the soul into 
two classes, and designates them by the terms Ex- 
ternal and Internal affections or stales of the mind. 
This division appears to bear a distinct affinity to 
the old classification into sensations and reflections, 
although Dr. Brown expends not a little labour in 
refuting that ancient division. The external af- 
fections Dr. Brown has subdivided according to 
the organs of sense which are employed in their 

C 



26 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

production, viz., Smell, Taste, Hearing, Touch, and 
Sight. These he denominates the more definite 
external affections, while he makes another class 
of a less definite character to embrace hunger and 
muscular pleasures and pains. The internal af- 
fections he subdivides into two orders. Order I. 
embraces the intellectual affections. Order II. } the 
emotions. 

Order I. embraces, First. Simple suggestion. 
Secondly. Relative suggestion, or feelings of rela- 
tions. Order II. he divides into, First. Immediate. 
Secondly. Retrospective. And, thirdly, Prospective 
Emotions. 

In Germany, a different division of the powers 
or faculties of the mind has, for some time past, 
been adopted by many writers on psychology. 
" The greater part of psychologists," says Profes- 
sor Fischhaber, " have arrived at the conclusion, 
that the soul of man possesses three principal pow- 
ers or faculties, viz., the power of sensibility (Ge- 
fuhlsvermogen), the understanding or intellect in- 
cluding the various operations of what are termed 
the intellectual powers (Vorstellungsvermb'gen),and 
the will (Begehrungs or Willensvermogen)." This 
division, which is in many respects a very good one, 
has been substantially adopted by that excellent 
writer of our own country, Professor Upham, if we 
may judge from a brief notice of his recent work 
which we have seen. He, however, very properly 
changes the order of these faculties, placing the in- 
tellect first, which some of the Germans had as- 
signed to the middle ; and by the introduction of 



OUTLINE OF THE NEW SYSTEM PROPOSED. 27 

Dr. Brown's system of suggestions, and of his own 
numerous investigations on other important aspects 
of the subject, he has doubtless prepared a work of 
high and lasting merit. 

After mature deliberation, we are unable to adopt 
either of these divisions, although each of them con- 
tains much that is true and useful ; but we propose 
another which appears to us more simple, more nat- 
ural, more clear and intelligible, and more accu- 
rately conformed to the known phenomena of mind. 
This is a threefold division, into 
I. Cognitive ideas. 
II. Sentient ideas. 

III. Active operations. 

When we strictly contemplate the phenomena of 
mind, apart from the powers from which they re- 
sult, we perceive no other differences of a generic 
character between the intrinsic nature of our ideas 
themselves, than a threefold one. They are all, in 
their own nature, either knowledge, or they are 
feeling, or they are action. Let the reader verify 
the truth of this assertion by an examination of his 
own mental phenomena, and he will be the better 
qualified to judge of its accuracy, and to enter into 
the subsequent discussions. Let him take any one 
within the wide range of his thoughts, and upon 
examination it will be found that it is in its nature 
either knowledge of something in the external uni- 
verse or in the regions of mind, or it is a feeling 
pleasant or painful, or it is an active process of some 
kind or other, in which his mind was engaged. 



28 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Thus, when we examine the ideas designated by 
the terms tree, stone, horse, water, air, electric 
fluid, mind, deity, &c, we find them to be our 
knowledge of certain objects in creation, whose ex- 
istence we believe, because we have, in various 
ways, ascertained some properties of each. Other 
terms, such as joy, contentment, hope, sorrow, love, 
friendship, gratitude, hatred, anger, condolence, 
pity, envy, jealousy, &c, all express, not knowl- 
edge, but feeling ; that is, a certain sentient state of 
the mind, either pleasant or painful, terminating ei- 
ther on ourselves or on others. While a third 
class of terms, such as, to examine, to inspect, to 
arrange, to classify, to speak, to walk, all imply ac- 
tivity^ and, indeed, are most prominently distin- 
guished from the other by the circumstance of their 
being in their own nature different species of activ- 
ity. The only method by which each individual 
can acquire a correct idea of the difference between 
these three kinds of ideas or mental phenomena, is 
by examining the testimony of his own conscious- 
ness. These ideas, whether cognitive, sentient, or 
active, are in their elements simple ideas, and no 
definition can explain them without the testimony 
of consciousness. 

This triple division is marked out by criteria, 
whidfa we shall more fully discuss when we enter 
upon the separate consideration of each individual 
class of our ideas, when we think it will be clear- 
ly seen that all our ideas are resolvable into these 
three classes, either as leading ideas, or appenda- 
ges of such as are. 



OUTLINE OF THE NEW SYSTEM PROPOSED. 29 

This system differs from the one last mentioned 
in its essential features. 

(a.) They differ in the principle on which they 
are constructed, the former being a division of the 
supposed faculties or powers of the mind, of which 
we have no immediate knowledge ; while the one 
we propose is strictly a division of the operations 
of the mind, actually and immediately known to us 
by consciousness. As we know nothing certainly 
of the mind except its operations, it seems to be 
more philosophic and safe to base our divisions on 
these operations, and in a great measure limit our 
discussions to them. 

This feature of diversity is applicable only in 
part to the excellent work of Professor Upham, 
who carefully distinguishes between the faculties 
of the mind and its operations, or, as he terms 
them, states ; yet even he, in his general nomencla- 
ture, divides his subject into the states referring 
to the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will, by 
which latter terms we understand him to mean not 
operations of the mind, but powers or faculties. 
He is thus led, like his predecessors, to class to- 
gether, under one head, operations which are gen- 
erally different in themselves, namely, such as are 
cognitive, with some which are sentient, and others 
that are active. 

(b.) These systems differ in the lines of division 
actually adopted by them, and in the operations of 
mind severally assigned to each. The first division 
of the former system embraces all the operations 
both of our first and third divisions, excepting only 

C 2 



30 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

a subdivision of our third, namely, the voluntary- 
mode in which our active operations sometimes oc- 
cur ; and that which forms but a subdivision of 
our third division, constitutes the whole of it in the 
other system. 

(c.) It will also be found, upon examination of 
the contents of their different parts, that the two 
systems diverge materially from each other. 

Our view of the entire mass of the active op- 
erations of the mind, as resolvable into five ge- 
neric active processes, is, if we mistake not, new ; 
nothing resembling it being found, as far as we 
know, in any other work. In our representation 
of the will, and its relation to the activity of the 
soul, and also in regard to the spontaneous portion 
of our mental activity, our investigations conducted 
us to some peculiar results. But we prefer to let 
the learned reader, who is familiar with other sys- 
tems, judge for himself how far ours differs from 
those that have preceded it, and what may be its 
value, either as a whole or in its particular parts. 
In pursuing our investigations, we have been anx- 
ious that they might conduct us along the paths of 
truth, regardless of the question whether we agreed 
with our predecessors, or differed from them. 



OUTLINE OF THE NEW SYSTEM PROPOSED. 31 



ON THE EXTENT OF THE SEVERAL PARTS OF THIS 
THREEFOLD DIVISION. 

I. The extent of the cognitive class of ideas. 

This class, we suppose, embraces, 

First. "What, are termed Perceptions, which are, 
by the definition itself, evidently " knowledge of 
external objects obtained through the instrumental- 
ity of our bodily organs." 

Secondly. Our acts of Consciousness, According 
to the old definition of consciousness, as being our 
knowledge of all our present mental operations, the 
very existence of this operation has been denied, 
and not without at least partial grounds. May not 
the whole difficulty of writers on this subject have 
arisen from their not observing the grand threefold 
division of all our mental operations on which our 
system is founded ? Of the first class of our ideas, 
viz., the cognitive class, it may justly be said that 
they could scarcely be considered as knowledge at 
all, if we did not know them at the very moment 
in which they are attained. As to the second class, 
that of our feelings, the case is somewhat diverse. 
Yet certainly we have a knowledge of them, that 
is, are conscious of them, and can distinguish our 
knowledge of the feeling from the feeling itself, the 
very moment after it occurs. In reference to the 
third class, it seems, at all times, a matter of great 
facility, to discriminate between an active opera- 
tion, which we are performing, and our knowledge 
of the fact, that we are, at present, engaged in it, and 



32 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of the nature of the operation itself. It is by con- 
sciousness that we have a knowledge of all the op- 
erations of our mind. It is, therefore, an exten- 
sive source, or rather department, of our knowl- 
edge. It embraces our knowledge of all the so- 
called internal states of the mind. 

Thirdly. Our conceptions also manifestly belong 
to the cognitive class of ideas. It cannot fail to be 
perceived, that every conception which we have, is 
a conception of something, is knowledge. It has 
indeed been maintained, that our conceptions are 
" knowledge, not obtained through our bodily or- 
gans." This, so far as their original elements are 
concerned, we are compelled to regard as errone- 
ous. Our system leads us to a different opinion; 
yet, as this subject will meet us at a future stage of 
our discussions, we shall not now enter on it. Con- 
ceptions are evidently knowledge of relations, ab- 
stract truths, &c, and thus belong to the cognitive 
class of our ideas. Thus our idea of virtue is 
termed a conception ; and when carefully analyzed, 
we find it to be a cognitive idea of the relation of 
agreement, between certain actions and the law of 
God, or standard of right. Again, we are said to 
" conceive" the meaning of general propositions. 
Our idea of the proposition : virtue is productive 
of happiness, is termed a conception. When ex- 
amined, this idea is a cognition of the fact learned 
by experience or observation, that actions of a given 
kind are productive, of happiness. The cases in 
which this truth is witnessed, are all individual, but 
by a mental process of frequent occurrence, here- 
after to be explained, which we term Modification, 



OUTLINE OF THE NEW SYSTEM PROPOSED. 33 

we omit the individual actions, or subjects of the 
proposition, and employ the general term, virtue, 
embracing them all. Of this general term virtue 
we affirm the predicate of the proposition, affirm 
the relation of causation, our idea of which is cog- 
nitive, and was learned from individual cases. • 

Fourthly. It embraces our judgments : for what 
are they but a knowledge of the relations between 
propositions ? 

Fifthly. It embraces our recollections. These are 
nothing else than retrospective knowledge, as will 
easily be perceived by all. 

Sixthly. It embraces the results of reasoning, 
such as belief, &c. The process of reasoning is 
itself an active operation, and belongs to our third 
class ; but the result of the process is a distinct 
thing. It is conviction of the truth or falsity of 
some alleged truth, it is belief. This belief, or 
conviction, is evidently cognitive, it forms an item 
in our stock of knowledge. 

Seventhly. It embraces the dictates or decisions 
of conscience, which are nothing else than the re- 
sults of our judgment concerning the propriety or 
impropriety of our own conduct. As acts, or rather 
the results of judgment, are evidently cognitive, 
the dictates of conscience are in part also of the 
same nature. Yet there is also obviously some- 
thing active about the dictates of conscience. They 
contain not only a cognition of duty, but also an 
impulse to obey it. This impulse is active, and 
will be discussed in the third general division of 
our subject, when we treat of our first Constitutional 
Inclination. 



34 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 



II. On the extent of sentient ideas. 

Some objection might, at first view, be made to 
the use of the term ideas, as expressive of this 
second class of mental phenomena, our feelings. 
We therefore request the reader to recollect that, 
throughout this work, we employ the word idea, not 
in its ancient Platonic sense, to signify the supposed 
external and immaterial forms of things ; nor with 
the Peripatetics, to designate certain forms, phan- 
tasms, or sensible species emanating from all ex- 
ternal things, and serving as the object of percep- 
tion to the mind ; but we use it in its popular sense, 
sanctioned by the usage of the present age, to sig- 
nify any and every mental operation or phenomenon 
of which we are capable, and purely and exclusive- 
ly the mental act. " In popular use," says the dis- 
tinguished American lexicographer Webster, " idea 
signifies notion, conception, thought, opinion, and 
even purpose or intention." In like manner, when, 
in the sequel, we speak of the mind's reflecting on 
any particular idea, we again disclaim the belief of 
any images or species of objects, and mean simply 
the past operations of the mind itself. 

This class embraces what are usually termed, 
first, Sensations ; secondly, Emotions ; thirdly, Af- 
fections ; fourthly, Passions, to a certain extent. 

Sensations have been regarded as the feelings 
which are connected with the perceptions of exter- 
nal objects. They are simply pleasant or painful, 
and evidently they are sentient in their nature. The 



SKETCH OF THE NEW SYSTEM. 35 

term sensation, in our language, as well as the corre- 
sponding word, sensus, of the Romans, and alaBr]\ia 
of the Greeks, is used with considerable latitude, as 
designating both the cognitive and sentient result of 
the action of our bodily organs ; that is, as indica- 
ting both the perception of external objects obtained 
through the senses,"and the feelings attending them. 
In the classification here proposed, we employ the 
term in the latter, which must doubtless be admit- 
ted to be its most appropriate signification. The 
perceptions of external objects obtained through 
this source, are discussed in the cognitive depart- 
ment of our work, because they are obviously 
knowledge. Sensations have also sometimes been 
defined " as states of mind immediately succes- 
sive to a change in some organ of sense, or, at 
least, to a bodily change of some kind;" but this 
definition is also applicable to perceptions. 

By Emotions are indicated feelings consequent 
on other mental operations than present perceptions 
of external objects ; yet this distinction is not uni- 
formly observed by the best writers. On the con- 
trary, the term emotion is often used for a complex 
operation of the mind, in which, though feeling of 
a particular species preponderates, a cognitive ele- 
ment is also clearly included, as will, we think, ap- 
pear when the emotions are particularly discussed. 
Emotions may justly be considered as subsequent 
to our intellections, and prior to the desires and 
other active processes connected with them, or with 
the intellections to which thev succeed. 



36 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Affections is a terra applied to emotions of a 
pleasant character. 

Passions also are regarded as emotions, but of a 
painful kind. Yet as all emotions are feelings of 
some kind or other, it is evident that they all belong 
to the second class of ideas according to our divis- 
ion, except in as far as passions fall within the depart- 
ment of our periodical appetites, in which case they 
are active in their nature, and are discussed in the 
third part of this work. Our own division of the 
feelings is different, as will be seen in the second 
part of this work, where other definitions of them 
are also given. 

III. On the extent of active operations. 

This class embraces what are usually denomi- 
nated, 

First, Volitions, in which is comprehended the 
whole extent as well as every variety of the direct 
action of the will. 

Secondly, those operations of the mind termed 
processes of reasoning, but not their results ; for the 
results of reasoning are knowledge, or conviction, 
or belief, and therefore they belong to cognitive 
ideas. 

Thirdly, the act of memorizing, and not its re- 
sults ; that is, the process of mental effort, by which 
we impress upon our memory the contents of any 
portion of a book or manuscript, or of a discourse 
which we have heard. But the impression itself 
thus made upon the mind is cognitive. 



SKETCH OF THE NEW SYSTEM. 37 

Fourthly. The intellectual act of communicating 
our thoughts to others, either orally or by letter. 

Fifthly. Some other active processes, the nature 
of which will hereafter be more fully explained. 

When we term the third class of mental opera- 
tions active, we do not wish to convey the idea, that 
the soul itself, in acquiring either knowledge or 
feeling, is in a state of entire passivity ; for there is, 
doubtless, activity in the soul during all its opera- 
tions. But, it must be remembered, we are here 
classifying and characterizing the ideas or operations 
of the mind, and not the powers of the mind itself. 
Our division is a classification, not of the activity 
of the soul itself, but of the results of its agency. 
The soul is often voluntary and active in seeking 
the excitement of feeling ; yet the feeling itself, 
thus excited, seems to be in its own nature merely 
sentient. It is in itself simply pleasure or pain. 
Thus also the act of acquiring knowledge by in- 
spection is active, and often even voluntary ; but 
the ideas acquired, the knowledge obtained, is not 
active ; but consists simply of mental representa- 
tives of entities, and is best characterized by the 
term cognitive. These ideas are simply knowledge 
and nothing more. 

As all the ideas or operations of the mind thus 
resolve themselves into three classes, viz., Cogni- 
tive, Sentient, and Active, the entire science is most 
aptly divided into three general parts, one of which 
is devoted to each of these classes of mental oper- 
ations. 

D 



38 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 



PART I. 



COGNITIVE IDEAS. 

It is evident, even on a superficial survey of 
those ideas which are knowledge, that at least some 
of them, especially such as relate to material ob- 
jects around us, are mental representatives of things, 
or subsistencies, or entities, which exist without the 
mind. Thus, no one can doubt, when reflecting 
on his idea of an orange, that the fruit, of which 
the idea in question is the representative, had a real 
existence ; for he has often handled, tasted, and 
eaten it. In short, when we carefully examine our 
cognitive ideas, and the source whence we derive 
thern, we find that they are acquired through the me- 
dium of certain parts of our body, called organs of 
sense ; and from the operations and powers of mind, 
of which all men are possessed. We see, also, that 
our mind, which perceives, and the organs, through 
which it perceives, are not in themselves sufficient 
to furnish us with these ideas. It is farther ne- 
cessary, that the organs of sense be brought into a 
particular relation to certain external objects. This 
relation is either that of actual contact, as in the 
case of touch and taste, or, it consists in bringing 
the organ into the direction of the object, with no- 
thing intervening which prevents the rays of light 
from being reflected from that object to the eye ; 



OBJECTIVE ENTITIES. 39 

or it consists in a relation of proximity to the ob- 
ject, so that the vibrations of the air may be con- 
veyed to the ear, as in sound. We, therefore, here 
clearly perceive three distinct things : first, the ex- 
ternal entity, or object, of which our cognitive ideas 
are the mental representatives or knowledge ; sec- 
ondly, the knowledge itself, or the representatives, 
or ideas, which we have of external objects ; and, 
thirdly, the organic process, by which we obtain our 
ideas, or knowledge. The discussion of each of 
these three things will therefore appropriately form 
a subdivision of this part of our subject. 



CHAPTER I. 

OF OBJECTIVE ENTITIES AS SUBJECTS OF OUR 
KNOWLEDGE. 

Before entering on the discussions of this chap- 
ter, we premise an explanatory remark relative 
to our use of the word entity. This term, long 
since naturalized in our language, Ave use with more 
than ordinary frequency, because its signification is 
more generic than that assigned by usage to the 
words more commonly employed, such as thing, 
substance, &c. The latter are ordinarily restricted, 
in the popular mind, to material objects, and pre- 
sent some difficulty, as they excite in the mind the 
impression of inaptitude when applied to some oth- 
er subjects of our knowledge. In the progress of 
our discussions, we need a term of such latitude of 
import as to be applicable to any and every reality 



40 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

in nature. Such is the term entity, in the caption 
of this chapter, which signifies anything that has 
existence, and, therefore, answers our purpose. 

But we proceed with the discussion of the pecu- 
liar topic of this chapter. It is indeed true, that in 
all our reflections on the properties of objects around 
us, it is not the objects themselves, but only our 
ideas or mental representatives of the properties of 
those objects, which are the immediate subjects of 
observation to the reflecting mind. But it may be 
asked, What evidence have we that anything beyond 
our ideas has a real existence ? How do we know, 
that such a thing as even the material universe does 
actually exist ? To this we reply, that if we were 
deprived of the power of bodily action, and capable 
of performing no other mental act than that of reflec- 
tion, and what we, in the sequel, term the process 
of Inspection, it might indeed be impossible for us to 
establish the objectivity of external objects, that is, 
their real existence, out of, and independently of 
the percipient mind. But, when we can take a sup- 
posed object or entity, such as an apple, into our 
hands, and perceive that it has weight ; when we 
feel its shape or relation to space ; when we take a 
knife and cut it in pieces, and eat it, we constitu- 
tionally judge it to be different from our idea of an 
apple, in which idea, we cannot perceive either 
weight, or shape, or divisibility, or capability of be- 
ing eaten. Moreover, all these operations may be 
performed with closed eyes upon an apple which 
we never saw, and of which identical apple, there- 
fore, we never had and can never acquire any far- 



OBJECTIVE ENTITIES. 41 

ther idea than is obtained by touch and taste. In 
short, whenever we are using our bodily organs in 
touching, tasting, seeing, hearing, or smelling any 
object, then the external object itself, either direct- 
ly, or mediately, and not our idea of it, is the sub- 
ject of the operation. But as soon as we reflect 
on some idea, formerly obtained through our bodily 
organs, this idea, and not the entity itself, is the 
subject of the operation. During this reflection, 
we neither do nor can use the bodily organ ; for if 
that organ be employed, and the attention of the 
soul be directed to it, the act of reflection immedi- 
ately terminates. We therefore, through the in- 
strumentality of our senses, perceive in external en- 
tities properties entirely different from those of an 
idea ; and we also judge that the entity or substra- 
tum to which they belong is a different one ; we 
judge that the external entities are possessed of 
real objectivity, that is, have an actual existence out 
of our minds. As to the accuracy of this judgment, 
it would be equal folly either to question it, or to 
attempt its confirmation by fine-spun trains of ab- 
struse ratiocination. All mankind constitutionally 
believe the well-ascertained testimony of their sen- 
ses. Not even the veriest skeptic can bring himself 
to doubt it in the affairs of practical life. Who 
ever heard of one that would walk into a fire which 
chanced to be in his way, believing that what ap- 
peared to be a burning pile, was only an idea of his 
mind ? Or who among these doubting philosophers 
did not instantly forget his sophistical reasoning 
and step aside, when he saw a serpent, or any oth 
D 2 



42 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

dangerous object in his path ? In like manner, all 
men, by a similar necessity of their mental struc- 
ture, judge that combinations of properties which 
are entirely different from each other, appertain to 
different substrata or subjects. Can any person, 
when contemplating the properties of a stone which 
he has in his hand, believe them to be parts or 
properties of a feather, that happens to be lying on 
it ? Neither can any man, while true to the dic- 
tates of common sense, believe them to be mere 
ideas or properties of his own mind, or of that of 
another. 

The universe, as known to us, consists of nothing 
else than infinitely various combinations of proper- 
ties and their relations. We may select any object 
we please, throughout the whole range of the uni- 
verse, and this remark will be found to hold good. 
Examine a tree, a stone, a flower, a gas, a mind, 
and it will be perceived that all the knowledge we 
possess of them is knowledge of their properties 
and relations. Thus of any particular stone, we 
know its colour, its shape, its gravity, its divisibili- 
ty, &c. ; but what the stone is, beyond its proper- 
ties, we know not. We may analyze it, and re- 
duce it to its constituent simple substances, but, in 
this respect, nothing is gained by the process; for 
each individual element is, like the compound, 
known to us only by its properties. Of gases also 
our knowledge is a knowledge of mere properties. 
Take, for example, our atmosphere, which is com- 
posed of two gases, oxygen and nitrogen, or, as the 
older chemists termed if, azote. We do not see it, 



OBJECTIVE ENTITIES. 43 

but we feel its resistance when walking against a 
strong current of air, or, as it is termed, wind. We 
observe its solidity, for we see that water is exclu- 
ded by it from any confined vessel or receiver. So, 
also, we learn its elasticity, its ability to support 
combustion, and various other properties ; but what 
either nitrogen or oxygen is, beyond these proper- 
ties, we know not. And so of mind also ; we know 
its properties or phenomena, its capacity for knowl- 
edge, for feeling, for active operations, and its sus- 
ceptibility of being influenced through bodily or- 
gans ; but what the mind is, beyond these suscep- 
tibilities or properties and phenomena, no man can 
tell. 

Again ; every such combination of properties, as 
found in nature, is individual ; that is, it is in some 
respects different from all others. No two stones, 
or two trees, or any other two objects, are exactly 
alike, in regard to all their properties, and to every 
particle of matter contained in them. 

Still, many combinations have the greater part 
of their properties in common, and differ only in 
the residue. Thus, many animals resemble each 
other in having four legs, others in having two ; 
some by eating flesh, and others grain or grass ; 
some by bringing forth their young alive, and others 
by incubation. In the vegetable kingdom, some 
plants have their stamens and pistils visible, others 
nol,, they being too small to be observed by the na- 
ked eye. In the former of these classes, termed 
phenogamous, the different plants differ in the num- 
ber of their stamens, from one to ten. And thus, 



44 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

by their various points of agreement in- stamens, 
pistils, &c, they are arranged in botany. 

Finally ; the various gradations of similarity in 
all different entities form a just basis for their classi- 
fication. On such a classification is human lan- 
guage founded. No language has a specific name 
for every separate object, for every individual tree, 
or stone, or leaf, or flower. 

Human language ordinarily has words merely to 
express, 

First, our ideas of each property of entities, such 
as black, white, soft, hard, heavy, &c. ; but there 
is not a separate name for these properties as found 
in different objects or entities. No matter what be 
the entity in question, there is ordinarily but one 
name for one property, no matter how many enti- 
ties possess it in common. 

Secondly, words to express our aggregate idea 
of each species of combinations, as stone, tree, bird, 
fish, &c. 

Thirdly, words for our ideas of some other clas- 
sifications and abstractions still more generic, such 
as quadrupeds, bipeds, graminivorous, carnivorous, 
viviparous, oviparous, &c. 

Fourthly, to express our ideas of the relations of 
the different objects or entities in nature, such as 
similarity or diversity of colour or shape in two 
balls, contiguity or distance between two objects, as 
to place, or time, &c. 

On the different degrees of similarity observable 
in the various combinations of properties found in 
nature, that is, on the different degrees of similar- 



OBJECTIVE ENTITIES. 45 

ity in the objects around us in the world, different 
classifications have been based. Sometimes, all 
things are spoken of as divisible into matter and 
mind. This division is good so far as it goes ; but, 
as we shall see in the sequel, is not sufficiently pre- 
cise. Such entities as can be chemically analyzed, 
have also been reduced to their elementary sub- 
stances, and arranged according to them. Yet as 
chemical analysis cannot reach all objects in na- 
ture, such as mind, &c, this classification must 
omit some entities of which we have mental repre- 
sentatives, would omit some of the subjects of our 
cognitive ideas. However accurate and adequate 
this division may be for the purposes of physical 
science, we need another more comprehensive, for 
the more general purposes of mental philosophy, in 
which every object in nature, of which we have any 
knowledge, however slight or limited that knowl- 
edge may be, claims some attention, and is entitled 
to a place. 

In all our reflections on absent entities, and our 
attempts to classify them, our ideas of their proper- 
ties, and not the properties themselves, are the sub- 
jects of our attention. "We spend our whole life 
in acquiring mental representatives of the different 
entities or objects in the universe ; but as only a 
small portion of them can at any time be present 
before us, we cannot classify these objects them- 
selves in any other way than by comparing and ar- 
ranging the ideas of them thus obtained. 

In endeavouring to make a classification of all 
known existences or entities, by examining our cog- 



46 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

nitive ideas, we must be careful to make thorough 
work. We must summon before us the whole mass 
of our knowledge, the entire aggregate of all our 
cognitive ideas in every department of science, 
physical, intellectual, and moral. We must, as it 
were, assemble our ideas of the heavens, and the 
earth, and all the different objects known to be in 
them : not only of those objects of which we have 
personal knowledge, but also of all others, whatev- 
er be the means by which we become acquainted 
with them. Our ideas of God, of angels, of dev- 
ils, of space, of time, of number, of virtue, of vice, 
of similarity, of diversity, of analogy, of fitness, of 
causation, and of every species of agency, mechan- 
ical, instinctive, and voluntary or moral, must all 
be taken into account. We may review the con- 
tents of the most extensive libraries, including dis- 
cussions on every conceivable subject in the wide 
range of human knowledge, and every idea we 
meet, which is of a cognitive character, which is 
in its nature knowledge, must be embraced in our 
classification. 

Numerous and complicated as this immense mass 
of ideas would at first view appear to be, on a 
closer examination they will all be found to resolve 
themselves into three generic classes ; they are ei- 
ther ideas of substantive objects, of objects to which 
a combination of properties appertains ; or they 
are ideas of these individual properties themselves ; 
or, thirdly, they are ideas of relations which exist 
between several such substantive objects or enti- 
ties as wholes, or between the properties belonging 
to them. 



OBJECTIVE ENXlXiES, 47 

After we have removed from our view the latter 
two classes of ideas, namely, those which are mere 
individual properties, and those which are relations ; 
and inquire into what general classes may those 
substantive entities or objects be reduced, to which 
these properties and relations belong, we arrive at 
something like the following list of* objects : 

Solids ; Liquids ; Gases ; the Ethereal or Inco- 
ercible fluids, such as Light, Caloric, Electric Fluid, 
Magnetic Principle ; Mind; Spirit; Glorified Bod- 
ies ; Deity ; together with Time, Space, and Num- 
ber, which are peculiar in their nature. The pre- 
cise number of these classes is not at all material 
to our system ; it can be increased or diminished 
as the future investigations of science may dictate. 
This division we do not propose for the purposes of 
the physical sciences ; but of metaphysical : not as 
adapted to sciences whose discussions are confined 
to material objects ; but to mental philosophy, which 
requires an enumeration of all the objects in ex- 
istence, of which we have any, even the slightest 
knowledge, of which Ave possess any cognitive 
ideas whatever. 

Having thus obtained an enumeration of the ob- 
jects in existence, of which we have some knowl- 
edge, some cognitive ideas, that is, an enumeration 
of the objects to which the combinations of proper- 
ties belong, which are found coexisting in nature, 
let us examine more closely these individual prop- 
erties, that we may more accurately determine their 
nature. 



48 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Of solid bodies we find the properties to be such 
as length, breadth, divisibility, colour, vis inertias, 
gravity, solidity, &c. In regard to other proper- 
ties, such as malleability, solubility, &c, solids may 
be subdivided into different classes. No one of 
these properties is ever found existing alone. There 
are always several of them found together, and these 
coexisting properties we constitutionally attribute to 
one object, as the properties of such object. Thus, 
with our bodily organs, we perceive a combination 
of properties, rotundity of shape, solidity, colour, 
&c, and to the object to which we judge these 
properties to appertain, we give the name ball. 
But we know nothing about the ball itself, beyond 
its various properties. 

Liquid substances, such as water, milk, &c, pos- 
sess many of the properties of solids, excepting al- 
ways solidity itself. They exhibit very little resist- 
ance to the touch, yet enough to inform us of their 
presence by that organ alone, independently of col- 
our. They cannot be accumulated, unless they are 
confined by some vessel, nor be made to retain any 
particular shape, except that of the vessel in which 
they are contained. 

Gases, or aeriform fluids, are in most cases invisi- 
ble ; but their existence is learned from other senses, 
such as touch and smell. No man can doubt the re- 
ality of the atmosphere, when he feels the impulse 
of a strong wind, and attempts to walk against it ; 
or when he witnesses the effects of a hurricane, 
overturning houses and prostrating the loftiest oaks 
of the forest. 



OBJECTIVE ENTITIES. 49 

Of the existence of light, we are convinced by 
the testimony of sight, by the different impression 
made on this organ by light, and its absence, dark- 
ness. In the same way we learn the other proper- 
ties of light, its different colours, its qualities of re- 
flection, refraction, its motion, &c. 

Caloric is, indeed, invisible, but its properties, 
and, consequently, its reality, we learn from the 
sense of touch, and from the various visible effects 
which it produces on other bodies. 

Thus also the Electric Principle, which probably 
stands connected with some common basis of light, 
caloric, and magnetism, is also invisible ; but its 
existence is demonstrated by the interesting and 
important phenomena which it produces. Of these 
phenomena we have certain knowledge by our sen- 
ses, and cannot doubt whether they belong to some 
cause, or object, by which they are produced. 

The principle or fluid of Magnetism is likewise 
not visible to human eyes, but its existence is ad- 
mitted, as the cause or agent, to which we must as- 
cribe a distinct class of phenomena, well ascertained 
by the testimony of our senses. 

Of Mind we learn the existence in various ways. 
We are conscious of the operations of our own 
minds. We know, too, that our bodies are to a 
certain degree under the control of our minds ; and 
that certain definite actions of our bodies are con- 
sequent on the purposes of our minds to perform 
them. Now, as we perceive, in the bodies of all 
other persons, actions of the same character, actions 
as evidently and systematically adapted to intelli- 

E 



50 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

gent ends, as those which in ourselves we know to 
result from the volitions of our minds ; we reason- 
ably infer, that in others, also, there is a mind con- 
nected with the body. This inference is the more 
irresistible, as we cannot perceive in matter, under 
any circumstances, any properties which bear the 
slightest resemblance to an approximation to the 
nature or powers of mind. On the contrary, all 
that we know of the one, is different from all we 
know of the other. Nor is it only in the case of 
man that we infer the existence of mind from the 
actions of the body. In the case of all animals, we 
infer the existence and the grade of intellect pos- 
sessed by them, from the various degrees of intelli- 
gence, design, and forecast, inferable from their 
bodily actions. 

The properties of mind are knowledge, feeling, 
and action ; or cognition, sensibility, and activity, 
together with susceptibility of influence from bodily 
organs. Every mental operation is either knowl- 
edge, feeling, or action ; but no simple operation 
consists of several or all these properties together. 

It has been customary to consider the phenomena 
of mind, as generally different from the phenomena 
of other entities, in their relation to our minds as 
subjects of knowledge. This habit we are com- 
pelled to regard as incorrect. We know generi- 
cally just as much about one entity as about another, 
that is, we know certain properties of each, and 
these properties are the subjects of our ideas about 
them respectively. This much also we know about 
mind, and more we do not know of anything else, 



OBJECTIVE ENTITIES. 51 

even of the grossest forms of solid matter. It is, 
therefore, erroneous to assert, that we know less of 
the essence of mind, than of the essence of other en- 
tities. With regard to solids, liquids, gases, &c, we 
know no more about their essence than about that of 
mind ; neither do we know less, because the substra- 
tum, or essence, of all the things or entities in exist- 
ence, is unknown to us. Our knowledge of each, re- 
gards only its properties or operations. But in all 
other entities except mind, men generally agree in 
admitting that there must be a substratum, to which 
these properties belong. Some, indeed, attempt a 
different explanation, by referring the aggregation 
of these properties into one whole, to a supposed 
plastic power of the mind {nXag-tfcog, irXaooeiv, to 
form, to fashion, to make). But we perceive no 
advantage in this representation, over the old com- 
mon-sense view, which has prevailed among British 
metaphysicians, of a constitutional judgment ; and 
the ideas attached to the phrase "plastic power," 
are entirely too loose and indefinite for metaphysi- 
cal purposes. We regard it, therefore, as an intui- 
tive judgment of the mind, that wherever we ob- 
serve properties, or operations, they belong to a 
subject or agent. All languages distinguish mind 
from its properties, as clearly as they do solids and 
other entities from their properties. The structure 
of the human mind seems to require us to^.ippose 
the existence of such a substratum ; as is evident 
from the fact, that all languages are constructed on 
this principle or supposition. As the Author of our 
nature gave us this mental structure, it is probable 



52 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

that such substrata do belong to all entities. In- 
deed, what are these properties, but properties of 
the entity itself ? What are they but those aspects 
of the substratum, which, by virtue of our organiza- 
tion, are within the reach of our knowledge ? The 
known properties of any object, such as copper, 
lead, silver, gold, are the several aspects, in which 
these metals are perceptible to us, with our present 
organization. In a different state, with more organs 
or senses than we now possess, we might perceive 
additional properties of these metals ; but those 
properties perceived by us, prove that the subject, 
or substratum, to which they belong, is actually 
known to us, as far as these properties extend. 
Hence, as there is no difference in this respect be- 
tween mind and other entities, we are compelled to 
regard the views of Hume and others, who regard 
the mind as merely a bundle of ideas, and of Brown, 
who considers all ideas as the mind itself in certain 
states,* as unphilosophical in themselves, independ- 
ently of their tendency to foster a skeptical or in- 
fidel disposition. The habit of regarding the phe- 
nomena of mind as generically different from those 
of other entities, has probably arisen in part from 
the old imperfect division of all entities into matter 
and mind, into material and immaterial, and from 
the maxim thence inferred, that mind is indivisible. 
But the different properties, operations, and powers 
of the mind, which are the subjects of all the ideas 
we possess of this entity, are as distinct from each 

* See some excellent observations on the fallacy of Brown's view, in the 
Biblical Repertory of Princeton, for 1830, p. 186. 



OBJECTIVE ENTITIES. 53 

other in their nature, as are the different properties 
of solids and liquids. Hence, it is evidently unphil- 
osophic to assert, that the unknown, ulterior some- 
thing, supposed to belong to mind, as the substratum 
of its phenomena or properties, is or is not possessed 
of indivisibility. 

Of Spirits, that is, disimbodied minds, or minds 
that have never been associated with bodies, our 
only certain knowledge is derived from revelation ; 
although tradition and analogy may afford some 
probable arguments in favour of their existence. 
The cardinal known distinction between mind and 
spirit, is the connexion of the former with a body 
as the organ of its action, and its susceptibility of 
being influenced by the body in various ways. To 
this class of entities belong the spirits of departed 
saints, whose bodies shall slumber in the grave till 
the resurrection, as also the angels, archangels, and 
devils ; in short, all created spirits, of which we 
have any knowledge, or which may exist, unknown 
to us, in the boundless empire of Jehovah. 

To Glorified Bodies we assign a separate class, 
because, although we know only that little about 
them which the Scriptures teach us, the Apostle 
Paul evidently represents them as different from all 
other objects, as " spiritual" bodies (au^aTa nvev- 
fiariKa), "celestial bodies," and "incorruptible," 
which predicates necessarily imply an entity radi- 
cally different from ordinary matter. 

The Divine Being-, though a spirit, differs from 
all other spirits, as the Creator from the creature, 
the Infinite from the finite. The ideas we possess 
E 2 



54 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

concerning God, are derived partly from the works 
of Nature, and partly from revelation. Mortal eyes 
have not seen him, mortal ears have not heard him, 
but that the reality of his existence may be deduced 
from evidences of various kinds, establishing his 
agency and attributes, is admitted by all except the 
atheist. Our knowledge of the attributes and ex- 
istence of God, so far as it is derived from nature, 
consists of ideas of virtues, which we observed in 
good men, separated by a mental process from every 
imperfection, with which they are mingled in human 
beings, and elevated to the highest conceivable de- 
gree. We thus acquire our ideas of the incompara- 
ble excellences of the Divine Being. Perceiving, 
in the structure and operations of the universe, the 
evidences of these incomparable attributes, we con- 
stitutionally judge (know) that they appertain to 
some substratum or being- ; which being, we in the 
same constitutional manner judge to exist. We 
do not affirm, that we actually obtain our knowledge 
of the Divine character and existence by such a 
process of reasoning ; but suppose, that by this pro- 
cess we can verify and confirm these truths, which 
are ordinarily taught us by tradition, long before 
we reach the maturity of mind necessary for such 
trains of ratiocination. 

Our additional knowledge, derived from revela- 
tion, concerning the Divine Being, his works, his 
will, and his moral government, likewise consists 
of ideas, the constituent elements of which were 
originally derived from human beings and human 
institutions. Through the medium of these ideas, 



OBJECTIVE ENTITIES. 55 

and their various and new combinations and appli- 
cations, together with anthropopathic representa- 
tions, the most minute and detailed account of the 
will, the providence, and the moral government of 
God is represented to us, and we are instructed by- 
precept and example, what the Author of our being 
would have us to do. 

Whether the human mind, if left wholly to itself, 
would have discovered the existence of God, from 
the contemplation of the works of Nature, is some- 
what uncertain ; as it is much easier to perceive the 
truth, propriety, and excellence of an invention or 
discovery after it has been made, than to make it. 
But there is obviously an aptitude in the human 
mind to see the evidences of the Divine existence 
and attributes after they have been revealed to us, 
which is generally done either by tradition, or the 
written revelation. 

That we have some knowledge of Space, Time, 
and Number will be admitted by all, although the 
precise nature of these entities has been the subject 
of much disputation. Into these disputes we shall 
not here enter ; and we therefore, for the present, 
leave it undetermined, whether these entities are 
objective, that is, have existence either out of our 
minds, as independent entities, or as forms of ex- 
istence of other entities, or as limitations, or neces- 
sary forms of our perceptions ; or are mere subject- 
ive conceptions of the human mind, having no ex- 
istence out of the mind itself. In regard to space, 
our ideas of its properties seem to be principally 
those of length, breadth, divisibility, and capacity. 
Our ideas of time seem to be r^"-^ 1 * to duration 



56 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

(or length), augmentability, and divisibility; while 
the properties of number seem to be its capability 
to be added, subtracted, multiplied, and divided. 

Number comprehends an indefinite series of 
units. The decimal system of designating and cal- 
culating numbers is arbitrary, and seems to have 
been adopted fortuitously. It is neither based on 
anything peculiar in the intrinsic nature of numbers 
themselves, requiring ten figures, and calculation 
by tens, rather than by any other number ; nor is 
it, by any means, as the ancient Pythagoreans sup- 
posed, the most perfect system that could be de- 
vised. The dodecadal (duodecimal), having twelve 
different figures, would be far more convenient ; 
as the number twelve can be divided more fre- 
quently without a remainder, and, consequently, cal- 
culations by the dodecadal, or duodecimal system, 
would be far less encumbered by fractions, than 
when conducted on the decimal plan. The Roman 
method of quintal calculation, having only five fig- 
ures, is virtually the same as the decimal. They 
employed the letters I and V ; and then double V 
thus I, forming X ; then C (centum) for hundred, 
M (mille) for thousand, &c. 

SECTION II. 

Division of these Classes of Entities. 

All these classes of entities, when attentively ex- 
amined, appear to be of two distinct kinds, and 
may, therefore, with propriety, be referred to two 
generic classes : 

I. Absolute (or universal, or subjective). 

II. Concrete (or individual). 



DIVISION OF ENTITIES. 57 

Absolute entities, are those of which we can con- 
ceive, without any reference to those of the con- 
crete class. To this class belong Time, Space, and 
Number. The properties and relations of the ab- 
solute entities are, in their very nature, more defi- 
nite and clear than those of the concrete. They are, 
moreover, immutable in their character ; hence the 
sciences discussing these entities, such as arithme- 
tic, geometry, and mathematics in general, are more 
certain, conclusive, and immutable. Accordingly, 
they are termed " exact sciences,' 5 and not with- 
out obvious reason. Between the absolute or uni- 
versal entities time, space, and number, the mind 
perceives some points of difference ; but they are 
rather specific than general, and all three properly 
belong to one general class. 

Concrete entities are those, of which we cannot 
conceive, except as existing in the absolute class, 
or, as being related to it. To this class belong 
Solids, Liquids, Aeriform substances, and, in short, 
all the different classes of known entities, except 
Time, Space, and Number. 

SECTION III. 

Subdivision of Individual Entities. 

All entities of every class may naturally be di- 
vided into substantive, adjective, and composite, be- 
cause all objects perceived by us in nature, are 
either entire individual objects, or they are one or 
more properties of such object, or they are rela- 
tions of some kind or other, perceived to exist be- 



58 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

tween the perceived properties of objects, or per- 
formed by one entity or another. As every entire 
individual object has in reality substantive exist- 
ence for itself, it may, with propriety, be designa- 
ted a substantive entity. There is an additional ad- 
vantage in the adoption of this term, which will ap- 
pear in the sequel, when we make some applica- 
tion of this subject to the structure of language and 
universal grammar. 

A substantive entity, then, is that in which prop- 
erties cohere, or coexist ; or, we might say, a sub- 
stantive entity is that to which any number of co- 
existing properties appertain. Accordingly, every 
simple substance, or chemical or ential element, sep- 
arately viewed, as also each aggregate of all these en- 
tial or chemical elements found coexisting, is a sub- 
stantive entity ; such as wood, water, tree, horse, &c. 
These ential elements are known to us only relative- 
ly ; we know their properties and their relation to 
time, space, and number, and to each other. In the 
case of solids and liquids, and such other substances 
as can be subjected to chemical analysis, the ential 
elements and chemical elements are the same. 
But the term chemical, in this application, is not 
so well adapted to metaphysical purposes, because 
the usage of our language confines it to a certain 
portion only of entities, such as solids, liquids, gases, 
&c. It is not improbable, that all the classes of 
entities have ential elements, as well as those which 
chemical analysis can reach ; though of course they 
are very different from them in their nature. En- 
tial element is a more suitable term, and designates 



SUBSTANTIVE, ADJECTIVE, COMPOSITE ENTITIES. 59 

the substratum, to which any set of properties, 
found coexisting in any class of entities, belongs. 

The idea which we have of a substantive entity, 
is the aggregate of our ideas of all those essential, 
permanent properties, which are found coexisting 
in the same entity, and, without any one of which, 
the residue could not be designated by the substan- 
tive name, which they collectively bear. 

If I am asked what idea I have of a stone, a tree, 
an apple, or an orange, I must admit that my only 
knowledge of them is knowledge of the properties 
which habitually belong to them. I perceive their 
colour, their solidity, their shape, &c, but what 
their intrinsic nature or essence is beyond these 
properties, I know not. Thus also no man ever saw, 
or tasted, or touched a mind. Yet every one is 
conscious of his own mental operations, knows the 
phenomena of his own mind, and constitutionally 
judges, that the mental operations of which he is 
conscious, must belong to a mental agent, which 
agent he calls himself. ^ 

Yet our idea of an object, of a substantive entity, 
does not embrace every property it may chance to 
possess. Thus, trees and stones may differ in col- 
our, shape, or size, and yet be appropriately desig- 
nated by the same name. Those properties only 
are embraced in our ideas of a substantive entity 
which permanently and invariably belong to every 
individual object to which the name in question can 
appropriately be applied. If language furnished a 
word to designate every particular individual tree 
and stone, then every property and circumstance 
belonging to each stone or tree, and necessary to 



60 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

its identity, would properly be represented by such 
word. But this is not the character of any lan- 
guage on earth. Therefore it is our ideas of only 
those properties common to all the individual trees 
or stones of a particular species, which form the in- 
gredients of the collective idea that we attach to a 
word designating a substantive entity, that is, they 
are our idea of the substantive entity itself. 

An adjective entity is any one property of a sub- 
stantive entity considered individually ; as length, 
breadth, colour, gravity, or any other known prop- 
erty. Human language, in most cases, contains 
words to designate each individual property of an 
entity of which we have an idea, and also names or 
words, by which those properties, which are found 
coexisting, are collectively designated, not, indeed, 
as individuals, but as entire species, such as stone, 
tree, house, &c. 

A composite entity consists of two or more ad- 
jective entities, viewed together, and considered in 
regard to some relation subsisting between them. 
Sometimes, several properties of the same entity, 
constitute a composite entity, between the parts of 
which some relation is observed. Thus, different 
parts of a painting may have different colours, and 
may be viewed in relation to this difference. These 
relations of entities exert a very important influence 
on some of the active operations of the mind, and 
an acquaintance with them, belongs to the most im- 
portant branches of our knowledge. These rela- 
tions are not the properties of either part of the 
composite entity alone ; nor have they a separate 
existence of their own apart from the related enti- 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 61 

ties ; but they are relations existing between them, 
and perceivable by the mind. Still, in this case 
also, our knowledge is a knowledge of relations 
which actually exist independently of our minds. 
Thus, we behold two beautiful, dark, Arabian hor- 
ses, and perceive a similarity of colour between 
them. Who can doubt, that this similarity would 
have existed, whether we had seen it or not ? Or 
whoever imagined, when contemplating the exact 
adaptation of the wheels of a watch to act upon one 
another, that this supposed adaptation existed only 
in his own mind ? Our ideas of relations, like our 
ideas of substantive and adjective entities, do not 
resemble the entities themselves, but are only the 
divinely appointed mental representatives of them. 
Yet, the relation of similarity of colour between two 
gray horses, is as certainly seen by the eyes, as is 
the colour of either horse alone, and the constitu- 
tion of our minds compels us to believe the similar- 
ity of colour between them to be real ; that is, we 
just as invariably believe our idea of the perceived 
similarity to be an idea of an objective truth, of a 
reality, as we do believe our idea of the colour of 
each horse individually to be such. 

SECTION IV. 

Relations of Entities. 

I. What are the perceptible relations of Absolute 
Entities to each other ? 

II. What are the perceptible relations of Con- 
crete Entities to each other ? 

III. What are the perceptible relations between 
Concrete and Absolute Entities ? 

F 



62 RELATIONS OF ENTITIES. 

The relations which the human mind is capable 
of perceiving between entities, both absolute and 
concrete, are exceedingly numerous, and may be 
variously divided. The following division may 
serve as a basis of a comprehensive and accurate 
classification. 

I. The relations of absolute entities to each 
other. 

(a.) Equality, diversity, antecedence, subse- 
quence, &c, of different portions of Time. 

(b.) Equality, difference, progression, or ratio, 
plurality (plus), minority (minus), &c, of different 
Numbers. 

(c.) Equality, diversity, contiguity, remoteness, 
superiority (above), inferiority (below), of different 
portions of Space. 

In reference to each of these relations, language 
embraces a vast multitude of words, expressing 
them in different methods and different aspects. 

II. The relations of concrete entities to each 
other. 

(a.) Similarity and diversity of any of the different 
classes of entities, in regard to any one or more of 
their properties. 

{b.) Contiguity of any of the concrete entities to 
each other in regard to Space, Time, or Number. 

(c.) Fitness, physical, intellectual, and moral. 
Physical fitness includes the relations which are the 
basis of beauty, symmetry, taste, &c, in the mate- 
rial world. To this class must be referred the rela- 
tions of harmony or discord, perceived between 
different sounds. The relation exists between the 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 63 

atmospheric vibrations themselves, and even in the 
vibrating chords which produce the undulations of 
the atmosphere. The reason why discordant vibra- 
tions produce unpleasant feelings in us, while those 
which accord are pleasing, is unknown to us. But 
these vibration"? themselves are well understood, 
and their chords and discords are the subject of the 
most obvious mathematical calculation. Intellectual 
fitness embraces our perceptions of fitness in the op- 
erations of the mind, in all the various departments 
of its agency. Moral fitness embraces all our duties 
to God, to ourselves, and our fellow-men. They 
are all fitnesses perceived by the mind to exist 
objectively between us and God, and our fellow- 
men. The whole field of moral and religious obli- 
gation, of philosophic and Christian ethics, is em- 
braced in this relation. Thus, a dictate of con- 
science is our knowledge of a composite entity, 
viz., a law; that is, the expressed will of the law- 
giver or his acknowledged representative, and some 
action of a person under obligation to this law. 
The relation perceived between them, is that of 
moral fitness or agreement, or of unfitness or dis- 
agreement. 

In virtue of our constitutional activity we must 
act somehow. By inspection we perceive the moral 
fitness of some actions, viewed in relation to the 
law, and the unfitness of other actions ; and the 
first Constitutional Inclination of the soul (see part 
iii. of this work) urges us to that which is morally 
fit, which is right. This complex operation, when 
referring to our own actions, constitutes the dictates 



64 RELATIONS OF ENTITIES. 

of conscience. There is, therefore, in the dictates 
of conscience, something that is impulsive and 
something that is judicial ; both a judgment and 
an impulse, and also a feeling. 

(d.) The relation of analogy. This relation is 
based on past experience. The maxim, " Every 
effect must have a cause," is an analogous judg- 
ment, resulting from experience. Stated at length, 
it would read thus : Every effect we ever knew had 
a cause, hence all others probably will have. 

(e.) Causation, or agency in general. That caus- 
ation differs from mere antecedence is evident. 
They can often be distinguished by the following 
circumstances : 1. The cause also produces such 
consequents, under other circumstances ; whereas 
the mere antecedent, is, on other occasions, and un- 
der other circumstances, not attended by the con- 
sequent. 2. By some known, intelligible aptitude 
in the cause to produce the effect, while this is not 
found in the mere antecedent. The light and heat 
of the rising sun, are both antecedents to the 
melting of the snow on a winter morning. That 
the heat and not the light, is the cause of the effect, 
is demonstrated by the fact, that caloric without 
light will produce the same effect ; as when snow 
is brought near to a dark but heated stove or other 
iron; while light, with little or no caloric, produces 
no such effect, as is exemplified in the case of a 
candle borne over the snow. Thus also in the ma- 
chinery of a watch, there is a perceptible adapta- 
tion between the parts to act upon one another, and 
to produce the effects for which they are designed. 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. Q5 

But even this judgment of perceptible adaptation, 
is the result of former experience in similar cases. 
And this experience amounts only to a knowledge of 
the fact. In any new case, not embracing percepti- 
ble adaptation on which former experience has in- 
structed us, our belief of the existence of a causative 
relation is purely the result of present observation, 
and strong or weak according to the extent and uni- 
formity of that observation. These facts appear 
clearly to prove, that our confidence in the uniform- 
ity of the operations of nature, and of the relation 
of cause and effect, is not, as has sometimes been 
affirmed, an original instinctive principle in the 
mind ; but is a general abstract belief or confi- 
dence, derived from our experimental observation 
of individual cases. Experience teaches us, that 
the world is governed by general laws, or, rather, 
that God causes the properties of all objects in our 
world, to act in uniform ways or modes, termed 
laws of nature. Many of these we learn in youth. 
To these laws, we refer all the phenomena, for 
whieh they will account. If we meet with an 
event or effect which the known laws do not ex- 
plain, we look for another law. Thus additional 
laws are occasionally discovered, and thus our con- 
fidence in the uniformity of nature's laws, is ac- 
quired without the supposition of any instinctive, or 
original, or a priori principle or knowledge in the 
mind. The relation of causation, or agency, is very 
comprehensive and embraces three different species : 

(1.) Mechanical agency. 

(2.) Instinctive agency. 

F 2 



66 MECHANICAL, INSTINCTIVE, AND MORAL AGENCY. 

(3.) Rational or moral agency. 

By Mechanical agency we mean all the unintelli- 
gent and merely physical changes of inert matter, 
such as the motions and changes of the heavenly 
bodies, of solids, liquids, &c. The mechanical 
changes may be divided into two classes: First, 
the uniform or universal changes, viz., gravitation, 
attraction, cohesion, repulsion, &c. These are 
termed laws of nature, by which phrase, however, 
cannot properly be meant an agent or cause of ac- 
tion ; but it is merely a statement of our cognitive 
idea of a uniform mode of action or of changes ob- 
served in entities, of which action or changes God 
is the agent or cause. Secondly, mechanical agen- 
cy includes contingent changes, such as those ac- 
tions, motions, or changes which are occasioned by 
the impulse or influence of other bodies. 

The second kind of general agency, viz., the in- 
stinctive, embraces all those actions of irrational an- 
imals, which result from what is termed instinct, 
that is, a propensity prior to experience and inde- 
pendent of instruction ; such as the incubation of 
hens, &oc. 

The third species of agency is rational or moral 
agency. To this class belong all those actions of 
men, either voluntary or spontaneous, which are 
free, for which we are accountable, and which may 
be termed moral actions. This class is of the very 
utmost importance, and embraces in it the entire 
field of all that diversified agency, which is pecu- 
liar to man, as a rational and accountable creature 
of God. 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. ' 67 

III. Relations between absolute and concrete en- 
tities. 

{a.) In reference to number ':' addition, multipli- 
cation, subtraction, and division of numbers (not 
of concrete entities). These operations are active 
relations of agency, performed by the concrete en- 
tity man, on our ideas of the absolute entity number. 

(6.) In reference to space : mensuration of its 
parts by the concrete entity man ; and fitness or 
unfitness of any concrete entity to occupy any giv- 
en portion, or form of it. 

(c.) In relation to time: calculation of its parts 
by man ; and the relation of fitness or unfitness 
of a given portion of it to any specified purpose. 

The relations of entities may be divided into 
transitive and intransitive. The first, or transitive 
class of relations, embraces the relation of causation 
or agency in general, mechanical, instinctive, and 
moral. The second, or intransitive class, embraces 
the relations of similarity, diversity, contiguity, and, 
in short, all the other relations excepting those of 
causation and agency in general. 

These two classes may again be subdivided into 
absolute or indicative, and hypothetical or subjunc- 
tive. These relations are, in human language, most 
naturally expressed by verbs. Those words ex- 
pressing transitive relations are in their primitive 
nature active verbs ; those expressing intransitive 
relations are in their original form neuter verbs, 
verbs expressing a state of being. Passive verbs 
appear to be an improvement in language, and are 
not based on any separate distinction in the rela- 



68 DIVISIONS OF RELATIONS. 

tions themselves, but refer simply to the entities 
between which they exist, and determine whether 
the speaker was the agent or recipient of the active 
influence, which they always express. This is beau- 
tifully illustrated by the Hebrew verbs in the Kal 
voice. The radical word throughout expresses the 
relation of action; the appendages prefixed and 
suffixed only designate the relations of the speak- 
ers and others, as the agents or recipients of the 
action. The same is also true, in a certain degree, 
of Latin and Greek verbs. 

The subdivision of both classes of relations into 
retrospective, present, and prospective, is obviously 
natural, and is expressed in language by the past, 
present, and future tenses of verbs. Each of these 
is again twofold ; the relation is either absolute or 
hypothetical. In the former case the verb express- 
ing this relation is in the indicative, and in the latter 
case it is in the subjunctive mood. The imperative 
mood is the annunciation to an individual, of his 
relation of obligation to perform a prescribed act ; 
whether this obligation results from his relation to 
the speaker as authorized to command him, or to 
some other human being, or to God. 

The other parts of speech express ideas, which 
may probably be reduced to appendages of the 
above-named three. Thus the prepositions " to," 
" in," &c, express relations of the verb, and are 
often incorporated with it ; as Produce, induct, 
^os^pone, swZ>ject, &c, &c. Adverbs stand for 
ideas which qualify adjectives or composite enti- 
ties, that is, adjectives or verbs. 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 69 



CHAPTER II. 

OF OUR COGNITIVE IDEAS, OR MENTAL REPRESENTA- 
TIVES OF ENTITIES. 

SECTION I. 

What is the exact nature of those of our ideas which 
are knowledge ? 

In reply to this inquiry, we remark, that it is 
probably impossible to describe the intrinsic nature 
of our ideas in any other way than by stating that 
they belong to the class of entities termed mind ; 
and that every individual knows for himself what 
his ideas are, by the testimony of his own con- 
sciousness. One cardinal feature of the first class 
of ideas, by which they are clearly distinguished 
from all others, is, that they are representatives of 
either the properties or relations of things actually 
existing. It is, indeed, true of many of our cogni- 
tive ideas, that they do not represent actual realities 
with exactness. Thus those ideas formed by the 
active process of the mind, hereafter explained un- 
der the name of Modification, such as abstractions, 
generalizations, mathematical, moral, and metaphys- 
ical axioms, do not correspond exactly to realities, 
to real entities ; yet the elements of which they are 
composed are all derived from the contemplation 



70 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of individual realities, and whatever is affirmed in 
them, however generic it may be, is true of all 
the objects embraced in their terms : though it 
does not constitute a specific or distinguishing 
representative of any one of them. Thus the 
proposition, " things equal to the same thing are 
equal to each other," contains a cognitive idea, 
viz., the relation of sameness between three or 
more objects. It is true, this general proposition 
does not affirm this relation of any particular ob- 
iect. Nevertheless, it was originally learned by 
observing its truth in numberless individual ca- 
ses, even in our earliest years, and it is in reali- 
ty true of every object embraced in its terms, 
that is, it is a correct mental representative of ev- 
ery specific object embraced in its generic terms, 
so far as the particular relation affirmed is con- 
cerned. Thus, if two triangles or circles are 
equal in capacity to a third triangle or circle, they 
are equal to each other. The disputed question, 
whether our ideas are to be considered as some- 
thing distinct from the mind itself, we feel con- 
strained to answer in the affirmative ; while we, oi 
course, must reject the old Peripatetic notion, that 
these ideas are literal images, resembling the enti- 
ties, which are the subjects of them. 

SECTION II. 

What are the criteria by which the cognitive class 
of ideas is distinguished ? 
The following criteria may, we think, be clearly 
perceived, and should be regarded as characteristic : 



CRITERIA OF COGNITIVE IDEAS. 71 

I. The. cognitive ideas have for their objects en- 
tities existing out of the mind, that is, things of any 
and of every description. As we regard the mind 
as distinct from its operations, it is evident that this 
language does not exclude from the list of cognitive 
ideas the knowledge of our own mental operations. 
In short, our knowledge of mental phenomena of ev- 
ery sort is embraced in this class, whether they be 
past, present, or prospective ; whether they be the 
operations of our own, or of other minds. 

II. The cognitive ideas derive their form and are 
dependant for their character on the entities them- 
selves which are the subjects of them, which have 
existence independently of us, and would be what 
they are if we had not this knowledge of them. 
We, of course, do not mean, that there exists any 
literal resemblance between our ideas of entities, 
and these entities themselves. Thus, our idea of a 
peach or a pear, does not resemble the object itself, 
in any one particular. But we mean, that there is 
a correspondence between the difference subsisting 
among different objects in nature, and the intellec- 
tual representatives of them, which, by the consti- 
tution of the mind, these objects produce, when 
brought within its observation. The same entities, 
when fairly viewed, always produce the same rep- 
resentatives in the mind of the same person ; but it 
also affords the same idea to all other persons, or 
rather an idea exactly similar. All men have the 
same uniform representatives of entities ; hence 
they can converse intelligibly about them. If the 
same entity afforded to different persons different 



72 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

representatives of itself, men could no more con- 
verse intelligibly about it, than if they did not un- 
derstand the same language. Our idea of an en- 
tity, accordingly, is not what we please that it shall 
be, but is such, as, by the constitution of our minds, 
is naturally produced by the entity itself, when 
brought under the observation of the mind. Nor 
is our knowledge of the relations of entities, what 
we choose to make it ; but what God has made it 
by our mental structure. Thus, whether a land- 
scape, or any other object, shall appear to us beau- 
tiful, or otherwise, does not depend upon our wish- 
es. Beauty, and the reverse, are properties and re- 
lations inherent in the objects, to which they belong, 
and our apperception of them depends on their ex- 
istence in the object, which is the subject of our ob- 
servation. 

Our knowledge of the truth or falsity of a propo- 
sition no more depends upon our previous wishes, 
if the examination was impartial and faithful, than 
does the shape of a book, or the colour of an apple, 
when presented to our eyes. How often are not 
men called to attend the examination of a friend, 
who has been charged with some heinous crime, 
which, if established, would hurl him from the re- 
spectable eminence which he occupied in society, 
and prove him unworthy of the confidence which 
they had reposed in him, and of the affections of 
which he had been the subject. These friends pro- 
test his innocence, and gladly lend him every aid 
in obtaining able counsel, and the attendance of 
every desired witness, to wipe away the odious stain 



CRITERIA OF COGNITIVE IDEAS. 73 

from his character. With intense feeling they en- 
ter the halls of justice, anxiously wishing that their 
friend may succeed in proving himself still worfhy 
of their affections and respect. But, alas ! one wit- 
ness after another is heard, one item of evidence 
after another is brought to light, until the guilt of 
their former friend no longer admits of any doubt. 
They hear the testimony in his favour, they listen 
to the arguments of his counsel, and find nothing 
but subterfuge and conjecture ; find, indeed, even 
in the nature of the efforts made to save his charac- 
ter, collateral evidence of his guilt, and are com- 
pelled, though with bleeding hearts, to believe that 
he who stands before them convicted as a criminal, 
is no longer the upright man, whom they loved and 
respected as a friend. Here the result of the in- 
vestigation was the knowledge, that the charge al- 
leged against their friend was true ; a knowledge 
of the relation of probation (proof or evidence), be- 
tween the facts adduced in the trial and the guilt 
of their friend. Surely no one would contend that 
the nature of the result depended on their wishes, 
or on anything else than the nature of the testi- 
mony itself, that is, on the facts, the entities and 
their relations, of which they acquired knowledge 
during the trial. 

III. The entities which are the subjects of our 
cognitive ideas, must have an existence previously 
to our knowledge of them. When we make a vo- 
lition, the subject of that volition is the intended 
future exertion of some physical or intellectual 
power, and the subject of the volition has no previ- 
G 



74 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ous existence. But when we have a knowledge 
of an apple, a stone, a mind, of space, or number, 
these cognitive ideas, or knowledge, are mental 
representatives of entities previously existing ; and, 
according to universal consent, they presuppose 
such previous existence. Thus, even in a fictitious 
narration, all the elements, so far as they are cog- 
nitive, are made up of ideas of entities which sepa- 
rately had a real existence. 

SECTION III. 

The nature and sources of error in our cognitive 
ideas. 
In order to obtain a correct view of this extreme- 
ly important subject, it is necessary first to advert 
to the exact nature and divisions of truth. All 
truths may be divided into three classes : 

I. Real or objective truths, that is, entities them- 
selves, existing in nature. 

II. Idealistic or subjective truths, that is, correct 
mental representatives of objective entities, that is, 
of objects in nature. 

III. Nominal or verbal truths, that is, proposi- 
tions or sentences, expressing in accurate language, 
correct ideas of things, correct mental representa- 
tives of objective entities. 

This division is evidently based on the nature of 
things, and affords us no small aid in understand- 
ing the sources, whence sprung the former philo- 
sophical sects of Realists and Nominalists, as well 
as the modern Idealists. 

The rancorous contentions of the former sects, 



REALISM AND IDEALISM. 75 

about the metaphysical question, whether our ge- 
neric ideas are mere names (nomina rerum, seu fla- 
tus vocis) as the Nominalists contended, or realities 
existing in nature, generic archetypes according to 
which all individual entities are formed, as was 
maintained by the Realists from the days of Aristo- 
tle till the time of Roscellinus, in the eleventh cen- 
tury, were continued through subsequent ages, and 
rose to such a height, that the blood of several dis- 
tinguished leaders was shed in the contest. It was 
in no small degree the hatred of the Nominalist 
priests and bishops, who greatly preponderated in 
the Council of Constance, which induced them in 
1415, to commit to the flames the innocent Huss, 
who was a learned and distinguished leader of the 
Realists ; and, for the same reason chiefly, the Re- 
alists in return obtained the condemnation of the 
Nominalist, John de Wesalia, doctor of theology 
in Erfurt, in 1479, who ended his life in prison. 

Philosophers of modern days, especially in Ger- 
many, have used the terms Realism and Idealism 
in a somewhat different sense, as characteristic of 
their several systems of philosophy. 

By Realism they designate that system of philos- 
ophy, which not only admits the existence of some- 
thing real or actual, something objective in nature; 
but also regards this real something as the original 
material, anterior to the ideal, and out of which the 
ideal (that is, consciousness, conception, knowledge) 
was deduced. The principle of this system is " re- 
ale prius, ideale posterius" the real existed first, the 
ideal is posterior to it. But to the various modifica- 



76 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

tions of this system, it may justly be objected, that 
the derivation of the ideal, that is, of mental action, 
from the real, that is, from the organization of mat- 
ter, necessarily results in materialism. There is, 
moreover, no necessity whatever of deriving either 
mind from matter, or matter from mind, either the 
ideal from the real, or the real from the ideal. 
Both are realities created by God, and it is one of 
the idle conceits of philosophy, falsely so called, to 
suppose, that a system, to be complete, must have 
some one element to start from, out of which every- 
thing else can be evolved. 

By Idealism they designate that system of phi- 
losophy which regards " the real" (das Reale), that 
is, the actual or material world, as merely ideal or 
imaginary, and assumes that there exists nothing in 
nature corresponding to our ideas of the material 
world ; but that we ourselves confer objectivity on 
those ideas, that is, conceive the existence of some- 
thing real as corresponding to our ideas (to the 
ideal), because by a necessity of our nature we find 
ourselves possessed of those ideas. This system 
regards " the ideal" (das Ideale) as first, and the 
real as posterior to it, yea, admits the existence of 
the real or material universe, only because and as 
far as, the belief of it is the necessary result of our 
mental structure. The real (say they) is the mere 
product of the ideal. But this system is after all 
not what it boasts to be, a system of pure ideal- 
ism, for it begins by assuming the " reality" of the 
" ideal," that is, it assumes the existence of the 
mind which is the subject of the ideal, the mind in 



IDEALISM. 77 

which the ideas of the universe are found. To es- 
cape from this difficulty, some idealists have sup- 
posed, these ideas of the material universe, to be 
produced in us immediately by God, the infinite 
mind. Fichte and others suppose the mind itself 
to be the originator of these ideas, acting by virtue 
of its original activity, according to certain laws or 
limitations of its nature, which are incomprehensi- 
ble to itself (to the ego). This system is termed 
by German philosophers Egoistic Idealism. 

The transcendental Idealism of Kant is, however, 
materially different from this. He admits or as- 
sumes the existence of " the real," that is, of the 
material world ; but maintains that it cannot be 
known to us as it is in itself objectively, apart from 
our views of it, but only as it appears to us through 
the medium of our senses. 

But our present design does not permit us to en- 
large on the opinions of these writers ; yet we think 
the view of this subject to which our system natu- 
rally leads us, will enable the reader to form a clear 
conception of the extent to which each system ad- 
heres to the truth. The exact truth in the dispute 
between the ancient Realists and Nominalists, will 
fully appear in the discussion of the third active pro- 
cess of the mind, modification, in the last part of 
this work ; where abstraction or generalization is 
discussed as a part of that process. The mind 
doubtless does possess the power of framing gen- 
eral ideas, which, though derived from real objects 
in nature, do not exactly correspond to any spe- 
cific one. Yet are these not merely names, as the 
G2 



78 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Nominalists held, but actual generic conceptions, as 
the later Conceptualists more correctly maintain. 

But we return to the discussion of the nature of 
truth. 

We have said, that all entities in the natural, in- 
tellectual, and moral world, and their relations, 
are realities or truths objectively considered. The 
word truth is indeed not often used precisely in this 
sense. Most generally it has a reference to our 
ideas of entities, and is therefore used subjectively ; 
but, if we wish to begin at the ultimate ground of 
our subject, we may be permitted to employ the 
word in this signification. The objective realities 
exist out of the mind, and would be what they are 
if we knew nothing about them. They are the 
subjects of our knowledge, and the ultimate basis 
of truth. 

Our cognitive idea of each objective reality, or 
entity, if it accord with the original, that is, if it be 
what by divine appointment and the constitution of 
our minds, that entity is designed to give, is an 
idealistic truth, or a truth subjectively considered, 
and evidently differs from objective truths. Sub- 
jective truth is more limited in its extent than 
the objective, and is of different extent in different 
minds. There is an immeasurable difference be- 
tween the extended and diversified knowledge of 
a Mosheim, a Leibnitz, or a Newton, and the lim- 
ited stock of ideas found in the mind of an igno- 
rant, unlettered savage ; but doubtless the knowl- 
edge of the most deservedly celebrated universal 



IDEAL AND NOMINAL TRUTH. 79 

scholar, falls short of the entire range of real exist- 
ences in an inconceivably greater degree. 

The manner in which God determined the na- 
ture of our representatives of entities, is by the 
structure of the human mind itself ; so that if we 
have freely and impartially examined an entity with 
all the light attainable, the idea then formed of it 
in the mind, is that appointed by God as its repre- 
sentative. 

A nominal or verbal truth, is a sentence or prop- 
osition, spoken or written, in which a correct idea 
of a real entity is expressed by the precise words, 
which, according to the usage of language, are em- 
ployed to designate those very ideas. 

All error in statements, whether oral or written, 
must be situated in one of these two latter depart- 
ments. There may be an error in regard to the 
entire objective entity. Thus a timid individual, in 
a dark night, indistinctly beholding a stump before 
him, may believe it a robber, and so relate his story ; 
but he has made a premature and gratuitous infer- 
ence from the indistinct testimony of his senses, and 
thus obtained a false idea of an entity. The er- 
ror here is evidently in the idealistic department. 
Though the error in this case concerns the objec- 
tive entity, it specifically consists in the want of 
conformity of the subjective idea or mental repre- 
sentative, to the objective or real entity. In short, 
the error can never lie in the first department, 
namely, that of real or objective truth. Objective 
truths, or entities, are and must ever be, just what 
they are independently of our knowledge of them. 



80 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The fact that our mental representatives of them 
are correct or incorrect, cannot affect them in any 
degree. 

But, if an individual, who has a correct idea of an 
entity, either inadvertently, or through design, or 
through ignorance of language, describes his idea 
in terms which express either more than his precise 
idea, or something radically different from it, the 
error will be a nominal or verbal one ; it will con- 
sist in the incorrect selection of words to express 
the ideas. In addition to these two locations of 
error in statements, there is another in the hearer 
or reader. Error may be seated in the incorrect 
association in the mind of the reader or hearer, 
between the words which he reads or hears, and his 
own ideas. Thus, a sentence describing correct 
ideas in accurate language, might be mistaken by 
an ignorant person. With these preliminary views, 
we can find no difficulty in tracing the following 
sources of error : 

SOURCES OF ERROR IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 

Involuntary Error embraces, 

I. Incorrect original mental representatives of en- 
tities. These may arise from the following sources : 
(a.) From a hasty, superficial inspection of entities. 
(J).) From forgetfulness of the exact mental repre- 
sentative originally obtained, and a consequent mis- 
statement of it. (c.) From listening to one part of 
a statement, and neglecting to listen to the whole. 
This remark applies not only to substantive and 
adjective entities, but also to composite. The re- 



INVOLUNTARY ERROR. 81 

lations of sameness and contrariety may be easily 
observed by attentive inspection. But haste and 
inattention may also lead to error. The relation 
most difficult to be accurately discerned is that of 
causation, which is often prematurely admitted, 
where there was mere sequence. 

II. Involuntary error may arise from incorrect 
selection of sounds and written ivords, to express to 
others the true mental representative which we re- 
ally have. Thus we may select a word more or 
less specific than it ought to be ; as, for example, 
when we charge many with a crime which belongs 
only to few ; or, our expression may convey differ- 
ent circumstances from those which actually exist ; 
we may incautiously denominate that self-interest, 
which was really gratitude, and that pride, which, 
in fact, was vanity. 

III. Involuntary error may arise from the real 
imperfection of language, which does not furnish 
words to express our ideas with precision on all 
subjects. Thus, in translating a work, and giving 
an account of foreign countries, we find offices, 
coins, &c, different from any found in our own 
country, for which we have no exact name in our 
tongue. In the New Testament, denarius is trans- 
lated a penny, and daifiov, devil ; not because the 
English words were supposed by the translators 
exactly to correspond in meaning to the Greek, 
but because our language furnishes no words of 
precisely the same meaning. We have no coin 
exactly corresponding in value to the denarius, and, 
therefore, no word in popular use to designate it. 



82 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

IV. Involuntary error may arise from mistakes 
in judging of the motives of others. We may sup- 
pose we perceive the relation of causation, between 
ambition and certain conduct of an individual, 
whereas that conduct results from a sense of duty 
in him. 

V. Involuntary errors may arise from uninten- 
tional, illogical reasoning, from fallacy either in the 
major or minor proposition, or in the conclusion. 
This embraces also premature generalization, in 
which the conclusion is more general than the ex- 
tent of our induction justifies. In short, it embra- 
ces every species of sophism, which can occur in 
any form of the syllogism. But it is unnecessary to 
specify these minutely at this time. 

VI. Another source from which involuntary error 
may arise, is the misapprehension of a correct sen- 
tence, through ignorance of language. 

SOURCES OF VOLUNTARY ERROR. 

I. Intentional misstatement of entities, simple or 
composite ; that is, of things or actions, from mal- 
ice or any other motive. In these cases, men in- 
tentionally use words which recall or suggest to 
others erroneous mental representatives, words 
which excite in them the idea of some evil proper- 
ty or relation, in connexion with an individual, to 
whom that property or relation does not belong. 

II. Voluntary error may arise from indulgence in 
the habit of mere high colouring, without directly 
stating a falsehood. 

III. Voluntary error may consist in voluntary ig- 



VOLUNTARY ERROR. 83 

norance, resulting from the neglect of the means of 
information within our reach. It is obviously the 
duty of man to avail himself of all the opportunities 
appropriately within his reach, to extend the sphere 
of his knowledge, and to correct any errors which 
he may have adopted, either innocently or through 
neglect. Whoever, therefore, remains in error 
from this cause, may be justly charged with volun- 
tary error, and will doubtless be held responsible for 
it by the omniscient Judge. 

IV. Voluntary error may arise from the indul- 
gence of prejudice in regard to persons or things. 
So strong, indeed, is the influence of our personal 
feelings upon us, that every friend of the truth 
should incessantly be upon his guard, lest he be led 
captive by it. 

V. Voluntary error may result from the indul- 
gence of passion. Passion prompts to speedy and 
premature action, and thus prevents deliberate in- 
vestigation, and enlightened, conscientious choice. 
When error has been detected in our knowledge, or 
when we have reason even to suspect the accuracy of 
any of our opinions, it becomes us to institute inquiry 
and settle the point. The generic method of recti- 
fying any mistaken views, is to pass successively 
and carefully through the several steps by which, 
according to the laws of mind, we obtain our in- 
formation on the point in question. Truth may 
justly be regarded as that which the constitution of 
our minds compels us to believe, when its evidences 
are fairly presented, and impartially weighed. We 
may assume it as an undeniable position, that the 



84 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

evidences of truth are stronger than those of error, 
and will, when carefully pondered, produce on a 
well-balanced mind a conviction precisely as strong 
as it was designed by the Creator to be, and as it 
is our duty to entertain. 

From the above considerations we see, at a 
glance, the fallacy of the favourite sentiment of free- 
thinkers, that man is not responsible for his opin- 
ions, that they are what they are by a constitution- 
al necessity of our minds, and lie beyond the 
sphere of human responsibility. 

SECTION IV. 

Division of our Cognitive Ideas. 

All our cognitive ideas may be divided into Indi- 
vidual and Relative : and again into Retrospective, 
Present, and Prospective. 

I. Of Individual knowledge. To this class be- 
longs our knowledge of every individual substan- 
tive entity in nature, and also of every individual 
property belonging to any entity. Our retrospect- 
ive knowledge of individual entities is also of the 
same individual class ; as is, in like manner, our 
prospective knowledge of them. 

II. Of Relative knowledge. To this class be- 
longs all our knowledge of composite entities, that 
is, of two or more adjective entities viewed in con- 
nexion, in respect to some particular relation be- 
tween them. Of this kind are our perceptions of 
all the different relations of sameness or difference 
in size, colour, shape, local contiguity, &c, of all 
perceivable objects. They are nothing else than a 



RELATIVE KNOWLEDGE. 85 

knowledge of two or more of these adjective enti- 
ties viewed together, and viewed in reference to 
some one or more of their relations to each other. 
Thus, I see before me a father and his son ; my 
perception of each of them alone is individual 
knowledge ; but the father is twice as tall as the 
son. I view them in connexion, to ascertain their 
relative magnitude, and my knowledge of this rela- 
tion of difference is relative knowledge. It is a 
knowledge of something really existing, not in ei- 
ther of them alone, but in both taken together. 

To this class, also, belongs the greater part of 
our conceptions. Many individual, abstract terms, 
when rightly examined, are nothing else than signs 
of such composite entities. What do we mean by 
the terms virtue and vice, more than our knowledge 
of the relation of agreement or disagreement, be- 
tween human actions of a certain kind and the law 
of God, or the structure of the universe. Just as 
the mind, though it at one view acquires a knowl- 
edge of the size, form, and colour of an object, 
may make either of these items of its knowledge 
the exclusive subject of reflection, or of other men- 
tal operations ; so it may, by the process of abstrac- 
tion, make these items of its knowledge of the 
characteristics of human actions the subject of re- 
flection, without connecting with them the idea of 
individual persons. Of this kind, evidently, are our 
ideas of virtue and vice ; and language affords us 
words to designate these items of knowledge, as 
well as others. 

Geometrical axioms also belong to relative knowl- 
H 



86 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

edge. Thus the axiom, " Things which are equal 
to the same thing, are equal to one another," ex- 
presses our knowledge of the relation of sameness 
in dimensions or number, between three given enti- 
ties. The axiom, " When equals are added to 
equals, the wholes are equal," more definitely sta- 
ted, would stand thus : If to quantities, dimensions, 
or numbers already equal to each other, equal addi- 
tions be made, the results will also be equal : and in 
this form what does the proposition express but our 
knowledge of the relation of agreement in quanti- 
ty, dimension, or number between several entities 
viewed together as one compound entity under the 
specified circumstances. Thus we might review all 
the twelve axioms of Euclid, and would find them 
all to confirm the statements we have made. 

To the same class of relative knowledge belong 
all the relations (not properties) of numbers in arith- 
metical calculations. Thus, " twice three are six," 
when fully stated, means, that the number three 
twice taken, or counted, bears the relation of equal- 
ity to the number six. 

Metaphysical axioms, when rightly examined, also 
belong to this class of relative knowledge. Thus, 
"Every effect must have a cause," or, more fully 
stated, every effect we ever knew had a cause, 
hence all other effects most probably have, seems 
to be nothing else than our knowledge of the rela- 
tion of analogy, between two or more given sub- 
stantive or adjective entites, viewed in relation to 
each other. Self-evident truths consist mainly of 
relations between entities. 



BELIEF, IMMEDIATE AND ACQUIRED. 87 

Moral abstract propositions are also resolvable 
into expressions of our knowledge of some relation 
or other. Thus the maxim, " Vice is productive 
of misery," may be regarded as an abstract express- 
ion of the relation of causation, subsisting between 
sinful actions and misery ; or it may be changed 
into the knowledge of the relation of analogy by 
thus altering the terms : " Vicious actions have, so 
far as we have been able to observe, always sooner 
or later produced unhappiness, therefore they, in all 
probability, will do so also in future." 

Dictates of Conscience, or Moral Judgments, 
that is, judgments concerning the morality of ac- 
tions, concerning their conformity or non-conform- 
ity to the law of God, are also relative knowl- 
edge. The operations of conscience, when cor- 
rectly analyzed, consist of three distinct elements, 
the judicial, the sentient, and the impulsive. The 
judicial element is cognitive, and consists in a judg- 
ment of the mind concerning the relation of our ac- 
tions to our ideas of the law of God, as being con- 
formed to them, or in violation of them. If the 
views of men concerning the Divine law were al- 
ways correct, the decisions of conscience would in- 
variably be accurate as to the moral character of 
human actions. This judgment concerning the 
morality of the action always precedes as well the 
emotion of pleasure or pain, approbation or disap- 
probation, as the impulsive dictate of obligation, to 
perform or not to perform the act contemplated. 
Hence, as the views of the heathen concerning the 
law of God are very erroneous, they approve of 



88 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

many actions, such as parricide, infanticide, sacri- 
fice of human beings, which are highly sinful, al- 
though their intention in all these cases may be to 
do right. And even Paul, so long as he consider- 
ed Christianity a violation of the law of his God, 
says, "I verily thought with myself that I ought to 
do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of 
Nazareth," although after his judgment of the char- 
acter of the act was changed, he deeply regretted 
his conduct.* 

Belief of a relation, is also relative knowledge. 
Belief may be divided into immediate and acquired ; 
the former embracing what are usually termed con- 
stitutional or intuitive judgments, and the latter, 
acquired or deduced judgments. There is no other 
difference between immediate and acquired judg- 
ments except that the relation subsisting between 
the two entities is so obvious in the one case, that 
the mind immediately perceives it to exist ; and in 
the other, that the relation is so indistinct, that other 
additional related entities, must be examined be- 
fore the mind perceives it to be true. 

Both intuitive and acquired truths may be divided 
into those, relating to our own minds, and those 
which refer to other entities. To the first class of 
truths, belong such as these : that the testimony of 
our senses fairly ascertained, is true — that we exist 
— that the several operations of our minds may gen- 
erally be relied on — that we are possessed of per- 
sonal identity. The second class embraces truths 
relating to the absolute and to the concrete entities. 

* See Part II., Moral Emotions, and Part III., First Constitutional In- 
clination. 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 89 

Among them are the truths, that every effect must 
have a cause — that the laws of nature, i. e.,the es- 
tablished modes of the Divine agency, are uniform 
— metaphysical axioms — moral truths, &c. 

All belief, therefore, of whatever degree, whether 
presumptive, or probable, or certain, differs in de- 
gree, but not in kind. And the all-wise Creator has 
so constituted the mind, that when the evidences of 
any truth are fully exhibited and impartially weigh- 
ed, the strength of our belief will be proportionate 
to the degree of evidence. 

Retrospective, Present, and Prospective Knowledge. 

Our cognitive ideas may again be divided into 
retrospective, present, and prospective. 

I. Retrospective knowledge is our knowledge of 
all our former cognitive, sentient, and active ideas, 
and is usually termed recollection or acts of memo- 
ry. It embraces all our past operations. This spe- 
cies of knowledge may be subdivided into sponta- 
neous and voluntary retrospective knowledge. By 
the former, or spontaneous retrospective knowl- 
edge, is meant that, which is not produced in the 
mind by a volition to recall it. By the latter is 
meant those recollections of former mental opera- 
tions, which are produced by a voluntary effort to 
recall them. This effort consists in an active review 
of related things, times, and places, and sometimes 
in a review of the letters of the alphabet, in expec- 
tation that the sight of the first letter of a word, 
will recall the whole word, and with it, our knowl- 
edge of the thing or entity. The extent of our 
H2 



90 EXTENT OF RETROSPECTIVE KNOWLEDGE. 

spontaneous retrospective knowledge and the extent 
to which, and the facility with which we can volun- 
tarily recall it, depend on the following circum- 
stances. 

1. On the natural aptitude of the mind for this 
exercise ; or, in other words, the natural retentive- 
ness of memory. This differs in different persons, 
but is, among all the powers of the mind, the most 
susceptible of improvement by practice. Some 
men appear to have at constant command an intui- 
tive retrospect of the great mass of the former inci- 
dents of their life, and of the sciences which they 
have studied. Doubtless this superior and abun- 
dant mass of materials, must necessarily give supe- 
rior scope and success to those active operations of 
the mind, which are based on them. It is thus, 
that men of genius, having the vast experience of 
former ages, and an extensive acquaintance with 
the laws, properties, and relations of entities at 
command, can produce much more accurate speci- 
mens of prospective knowledge, and make more 
able vindications of the positions they assume with 
regard to any subject. 

2. The second ground of difference in the extent 
and facility of our retrospective knowledge, is found 
in the different degrees of logical accuracy, with 
which our knowledge is arranged, on paper or in 
the mind, according to the different relations them- 
selves which subsist between the entities. It is a 
well-established fact, that our knowledge of those 
entities, which are clearly connected by some ob- 
vious relation, such as sameness, contrariety, genus, 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 91 

species, &c, are most easily and most extensively 
recollected. Hence, one method of facilitating our 
voluntary recollections of former entities is, habitu- 
ally to classify our knowledge according to the most 
obvious relations of the entities themselves, which 
are the subjects of them, or with some principle or 
fact, confirmed or illustrated by them. This habit 
we strongly recommend to the young student. If 
early formed, and steadily persisted in, it will lead 
to the gradual and easy accumulation of an amount 
of useful knowledge, far greater, more various, and 
more readily at command, than would otherwise 
be retained. One important method of aiding us 
in committing a speech, or sermon, or any other 
composition to memory, is to write it in such a lo- 
gical manner, according to the objective relations 
of the subjects themselves. 

3. The third ground of difference, is found in 
the different degrees of frequency, with which the 
knowledge to be retained was revised by the mind, 
and the feeling or interest which was felt in it. 

Our retrospective knowledge will be increased 
by the following methods : 1. By thinking fre- 
quently of the ideas intended to be recollected. 
2. By reviewing those ideas together, which we 
wish to recollect together ; and in the very same 
order in which we desire to remember them. 3. 
By connecting them, in the act of memorizing, with 
some principle or fact, which we will be sure to re- 
member at the intended time. 4. By the habit of 
studying subjects rather than books. This is an ex- 
tremely important habit, which, as it is of constant 



92 STUDY OF SUBJECTS RATHER THAN OF BOOKS. 

application, and may be continued through life, 
exerts a very perceptible influence on intellectual 
character and attainments. The man who reads 
through, even the more important works to which 
he has access, not only vainly expends his time in 
perusing much that he knew before, but also pur- 
sues an intellectual habit not the most profitable. 
It is not even every good book that deserves to be 
read through. Far better is it for the student, to 
keep up merely a general acquaintance with the 
publications which he deems worthy of his atten- 
tion, by an examination of their table of contents, 
and a tasting of them on some of the most impor- 
tant topics, so as to form an estimate of the char- 
acter and strength of the author, and then lay them 
by for future use ; while he devotes the greater part 
of his time to the systematic study of subjects, ex- 
amining, on each such subject, all the valuable au- 
thors to which he has access, and tracing the sub- 
ject through all its various ramifications and rela- 
tions. The selection of these subjects should be 
influenced by the professional duties of the individ- 
ual ; and, while collateral matters of taste and sci- 
ence should not be excluded, yet the more exten- 
sively the choice of subjects coincides with our 
daily duties, the greater will be the eminence at- 
tained. 5. Our retrospective knowledge will be 
increased by interesting our feelings in the subject, 
by viewing its relations to some of the constitution- 
al inclinations of the soul, hereafter to be explained. 
Scarcely any bounds can be affixed to the degree 
of improvement which the retentive powers have 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 93 

sometimes attained. Kepler, the celebrated Ger- 
man mathematician, could repeat the whole of Vir- 
gil's iEneid, and even specify the first and last lines 
on every page of the copy which he used. Henry 
de Mesmes could repeat the whole of Homer ; and 
of the celebrated Pascal it was said, that he very 
rarely forgot anything which he had ever known. 
Cyrus, we are told, knew the name of every soldier 
in his army ; and Themistocles could call by name 
the twenty thousand inhabitants of Athens. Even 
admitting that these accounts must be received, as 
we suppose they must, with some qualification, they 
are remarkable and most interesting examples of 
mnemonic power. These were instances of per- 
sons in health, who exhibited these extraordinary 
powers through life. But there are other facts, 
which shed a new light on the retrospective power 
of the soul, and seem to prove that persons of the 
most ordinary talents, yea, that the soul of every 
man naturally possesses equal and even greater 
mnemonic powers, which are now confined by the 
organs of the body, but will be fully developed in the 
eternal world. Different diseases have called forth 
temporary exhibitions of this superior power of mem- 
ory. " A case occurred at St. Thomas Hospital, of 
a man who was in a state of stupor in consequence 
of an injury of the head. On his partial recovery, 
he spoke a language which nobody in the hospital 
understood, but which was soon ascertained to be 
Welsh. It was then discovered that he had been 
thirty years absent from Wales, and, before the ac- 
cident, had entirely forgotten his native language. 
On his complete recovery, he entirely forgot his 



94 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Welsh again, and recovered the English language. 
A lady, mentioned by Dr. Pritchard, when in a state 
of delirium, spoke a language which nobody about 
her understood, but which also was discovered to be 
Welsh. None of her friends could form any concep- 
tion of the manner in which she had become ac- 
quainted with that language ; but, after much inquiry, 
it was discovered, that in her childhood she had a 
nurse, a native of a district on the coast of Brittany, 
the dialect of which is closely analogous to the 
Welsh. The lady had, at that time, learned a good 
deal of this dialect, but had entirely forgotten it for 
many years before this attack of fever."* But the 
most interesting case with which we have met, is 
that mentioned by Coleridge, of a young woman in 
Germany, some time before 1798. Though she 
could neither read nor write, yet, when labouring 
under a nervous fever, she uttered numerous senten- 
ces in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew. Her case excited 
great attention, and was, for a season, regarded as 
inexplicable. At length it was discovered that, in 
early life, she had lived in the family of a learned 
Protestant minister, who was in the habit of walk- 
ing up and down the passage of his house, into which 
the kitchen door opened, and reading aloud his fa- 
vourite authors in these languages. And it was also 
found, that the passages which she recited corre- 
sponded with these authors. In these cases it is 
evident that the impression made upon the memory, 
though the persons had not the power to recall them 
in health, were, nevertheless, not lost, but still re- 
mained engraven, as it were, on the tablets of the 
* Abercrombie on the Intellectual Powers, p. 123. 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 95 

soul, and disease wrought such a change in the 
bodily organs, or exerted such a stimulus upon the 
brain, that the soul had more free scope for action. 
Why, then, may we not indulge the amazing, the 
appalling, yet highly probable conjecture, that 
thought is indestructible in its nature, that every in- 
dividual idea we have ever had, though now for- 
gotten by us, is indelibly impressed upon the soul, 
is, as it were, locked up in its inner recesses, and at 
the great day of eternity will stand in full view be- 
fore us, will be recollected as vividly as the occur- 
rences of yesterday ? It seems, indeed, highly prob- 
able, that such an increased recollection will bring 
the whole agency of our present life into close con- 
nexion with the eternal world, and that, in the prov- 
idence of God, this whole accumulated mass of our 
thoughts will be the basis of our future retribution, 
will be the occasion, or will give some peculiarity 
to the circumstances of the happiness of the righ- 
teous and misery of the wicked. 

Various attempts have been made, both in ancient 
and modern times, to aid the energies of this im- 
portant power of the soul by artificial contrivances, 
not one of which has commanded the permanent 
approbation of the wise and judicious. Some em- 
pyrics recommended sundry medicinal prescrip- 
tions, which are, however, all eventually injurious 
to both body and mind. Others invented different 
artificial systems of mnemonics, some of which ap- 
pear in a few instances to afford an advantage ; but 
all of which are eventually of little or no benefit, 
and some of them positively injurious to the real 
improvement of the mind. The credit of having 



96 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

invented the first system of this kind is attributed 
to Simonides, the poet and philosopher of Ceos, an 
island in the iEgean Sea, who lived B.C. about 
557. On one occasion, as Cicero informs us,* 
while dining in company with some of his friends, 
he was called out of the house, but, on coming out, 
found no one. Just as he was about to return, the 
house or hall suddenly fell and crushed his friends 
to death. When the rubbish had been removed, 
they were found so much disfigured, that they could 
not be recognised ; but Simonides could distinguish 
them all, because he recollected the place in which 
each one had reclined around the table. By this 
incident he was led to reflect, that order, or a prop- 
er disposition of the objects to be recollected, af- 
fords the greatest aid to memory, and that those 
who desire to cultivate this talent should select cer- 
tain places, and picture upon their minds the things 
which they wish to recollect, and arrange them into 
these places. Thus the order of the places would 
enable them to recollect the order of the things, 
and the pictures or images of these things would 
point out the things themselves. The same prin- 
ciple of associating our ideas with certain symbols, 
or images, or hieroglyphics, and arranging these 
in various ways, seems also to be the basis of the 
principal systems of mnemonics of modern times. 

Different methods have likewise been invented to 
facilitate the recollection of dates and figures gen- 
erally. The most popular is, perhaps, that of Fein- 
agle, who framed the following table, which is first 
to be committed to memory with much accuracy. 
* Cicero, De Oratore, lib. ii., $ 86, p. 197. 



MENTAL 






97 



The number in question is then to be expressed by 
the letters of this key table, taken either from the 
consonants or vowels, as may seem most suitable, 
and annexed \o the end of the word to which the 
figures refer. 



a 


e 


i 





u 


au 


oi 


ei 


ou 


y 


1 


- 


3 




J 


6 


7 


8 


9 





b 


d 


t 


f 


1 


s 


P 


k 


n 


z 



Thu , to recollect the date B.C. 46, when Julius 
Csesar obtained supreme command at Rome, take 
the letters o(=4) and s( = 6), and put them in place 
of the last letters of his name. We then have Julios, 
which is easily recollected, and cannot fail to indi- 
cate the date 46, unless the alphabet is forgotten. 
After all, the best general rule, in addition to those 
given above, is daily practice continued for years, 
and not entirely omitted even in after life. Quintili- 
an remarks, " Si qnis unam maximamque a me ar- 
tem memorise quaerat, exercitatio est et labor. Mul- 
ta ediscere, multa cogitare, et si fieri potest, quotid- 
ie, potentissimum est." 

We conclude our observations on memory by 
adding the excellent practical directions to teachers 
and younger pupils, compiled from Dr. Niemeyer.* 
1 . We should begin at a very early age to teach our 
pupils to retain and to repeat what they have heard. 
Their internal organs thus acquire a certain degree 
of firmness, and their frequent exercise forms a hab- 
it. 2. They should be taught to retain signs, espe- 

* Grundsatze der Erziehung uud des Unterrichts, vol. i., p. 124. On this 
subject see also an excellent work by Professor Smith, Education : its His- 
tory and Practice, p. 214. 



98 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

cially words, as well as things. That which is nat- 
urally most easy for them, requires less practice ; 
that which is more difficult, should receive the more 
attention. 3. If they retain words with facility, 
even without understanding their import, they 
should be exercised the more faithfully in recollect- 
ing ideas and things, both individually, and in their 
several relations. Otherwise the memory will be 
cultivated at the expense of the judgment. Thus 
the pupil should be called on to repeat the substance 
of a discourse which he has heard ; or, after he has 
read one page of a book, let him close the volume, 
and repeat to you the train of ideas contained on 
it ; or let him trace the thread of a discourse back- 
ward to its first idea. As a remarkable instance 
of the proficiency attainable by this kind of train- 
ing, we would mention the case of the late Rever- 
end Uhlhorn, pastor of the German Lutheran 
Church in Baltimore, and one of the most finished 
scholars that have crossed the Atlantic, who, after 
twice or thrice perusing any hymn of six or eight ver- 
ses, was able to repeat it backward, word for word, 
from end to beginning. 4. If, on the contrary, the 
pupil finds it easy to retain and repeat a multitude of 
ideas, concerning that which he has heard, or seen, 
or read, but cannot preserve their particular or- 
der or connexion, or repeat particular expressions ; 
this also requires special attention. For it is, on 
many accounts, advantageous to be able to retain 
names, numbers, and passages out of letters or 
books, and to repeat them verbatim. A number 
of words should, therefore, daily be assigned, but 
only such whose meaning the pupil understands, to 



PRESENT KNOWLEDGE. 99 

be committed in a given time, and that number 
should be gradually increased. Subsequently, se- 
lect passages from different authors may be assign- 
ed, and the interest of the pupils kept up by the 
matter of the extracts committed, as well as by em- 
ulation among the scholars, and explanations of the 
importance of the exercise. 5. Let not a day pass 
without some exercise of memory for all the pupils. 
6. Let those of defective memory not be discoura- 
ged by harshness ; but let various methods be em- 
ployed for their encouragement, by calling to aid the 
principles of association. Associations of time and 
place will assist their recollection. Generic ideas 
will recall the specific one embraced in them, &c. 

II. Present knowledge embraces the testimony of 
consciousness, by which is meant that knowledge 
which we have of all our present mental operations 
of every class. Of course, if the lines of division be 
strictly adhered to, that portion of our knowledge 
which can correctly be called present, is compara- 
tively small ; for the moment after any act of present 
cognition is past, it belongs to the retrospective de- 
partment. 

Still, even when circumscribed by these narrow 
limits, consciousness embraces all the operations of 
our minds, at the precise time of their performance, 
such as our perceptions, our sensations, our emo- 
tions, our passions, our judgments in general, our 
acts of conscience, and, in short, all our mental 
operations. So soon, however, as any mental op- 
eration of which we are conscious is past, it be- 
comes, as it were, the property of memory, and falls 
into the retrospective department. Consciousness 



100 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

is an important source oj" new ideas to us. By it 
we acquire all our knowledge of the inner man, of 
the powers, properties, and relations of our own 
minds, of that thinking, conscious subject myself. 
It is by consciousness that we obtain our knowledge 
of those mental operations expressed by the words 
thinking, believing, doubting, reflecting. &c. 

The term consciousness is strictly confined to the 
operations and processes which take place in the 
mind itself, and cannot with propriety be applied 
to any material object, or, indeed, to any other en- 
tity whatever except the phenomena of our own 
minds. We cannot be said to be conscious of the 
existence of the earth, or planets, or mountains, or 
trees, or even of our own bodies. We are con- 
scious of certain perceptions and sensations which 
these external objects produce in the mind, when 
they are at the time acting on us through our bodily 
organs, but not of these entities themselves. Ev- 
ery act of consciousness also, by a constitutional 
judgment of our mind, implies the existence of a 
conscious being, of myself, from whom it proceeds ; 

III. Prospective knowledge. By this we mean 
all our knowledge of the probable future existence 
of entities and their relations. That God has ac- 
tually bestowed on us some knowledge of futurity, 
is evident from an examination of our ideas them- 
selves, and even from the structure of human lan- 
guage. Every individual instance in which we use 
the future tense of a verb, is an exemplification of 
our remark. The vast sphere of human expecta- 
tions, of hopes and fears, is distinctly embraced 



PROSPECTIVE KNOWLEDGE. 101 

within the limits of prospective knowledge. In- 
deed, calculations and expectations of a prospective 
nature enter into all human pursuits and occupa- 
tions. Without them, all business would be at a 
stand, the principal motive to human action would 
be destroyed, and the world itself would cease to 
be what it is. But here the question arises, Is our 
prospective knowledge also a knowledge of entities, 
and their relations really existing ? To this we re- 
ply, that in part it is ; and we suppose the follow- 
ing to be a correct view of this subject : 

The subject of our prospective knowledge, ob- 
jectively considered, seems always to be a com- 
posite entity, viz., a present entity and another sup- 
posed, future entity of some given character, as ex- 
isting at some future time more or less distant. 
The relation between these two, observed by the 
mind, is that of fitness, or analogy, or causation, 
&c. Thus our prospective knowledge or belief of 
the probable future existence of the material world, 
and of all existing classes of entities and their rela- 
tions, is nothing else than a knowledge of the rela- 
tion of fitness or causation, as existing between 
present entities and the same entities as existing at 
a future time. Thus, also, we behold a drunkard, 
fast hastening to the grave, and believe that he may 
yet live six months, but not six years. In both in- 
stances, the subject of our belief, is a composite en- 
tity. We observe, in one case, the relation of fit- 
ness between the entity, a drunkard, now existing 
with materially injured health, and his being still 
alive six months hence ; but we also perceive the 
I 2 



102 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

relation of unfitness, between his present state, and 
his existence six years hence. Or we might say, 
we see between his present conduct and his death 
before six years, the relation of probable causation. 
"We see that intemperance will cause his death in 
less than the specified time. Our prospective 
knowledge of future human actions, under given 
circumstances, is nothing else than a prospective 
knowledge of the relation of suitableness, or causa- 
tion, between a given character of an individual, 
and a particular course of probable conduct. Of the 
many relations, perceivable between the different 
classes of entities, a few only seem to serve as bases 
of our prospective knowledge ; viz., fitness , by 
which we mean suitableness, reasonableness, or ac- 
cordance with the nature of the entity, analogy, 
causation, and revelation. Analogy, causation, and 
revelation may be regarded as the arches of the 
bridge, over which we pass from the present to a 
knowledge of the future. The relation of fitness is 
general in its nature, and seems to embrace analo- 
gy and causation ; yet there are cases in which the 
mind cannot clearly determine how far the antece- 
dent is really the cause of the consequent, or wheth- 
er it be merely the antecedent. The revelation, 
which God has given us, is another totally distinct 
basis of prospective knowledge. In many items 
of prospective knowledge derived from this source, 
we can now clearly perceive also the relation of 
fitness and causation, since that knowledge has 
been communicated to us ; although we were total- 
ly unable, a priori, to discover it. Our belief in a 



PROSPECTIVE KNOWLEDGE. 103 

Divine revelation is a knowledge of a composite en- 
tity, viz., the Divine character, as known to us, and 
certain superhuman actions, termed miracles, of 
some kind or other. The relation perceived be- 
tween them, is that of suitableness or exclusive 
causation ; that is, causation which creatures could 
not exert. 

Our prospective knowledge of the future opera- 
tions and states of all inanimate entities, would be 
as certain as our present and retrospective knowl- 
edge of them, if we possessed a present, omniscient 
acquaintance with all their properties ; and if their 
circumstances and relations were not changed by 
the voluntary agency of animated beings, and if we 
knew that the Divine Being would not withdraw or 
change these properties. Or, in other words, in a 
world purely mechanical, in which no voluntary 
agency was mingled, an omniscient present knowl- 
edge, would necessarily imply an omniscient pro- 
spective knowledge to beings, endowed like our- 
selves, with the ability to perceive these relations. 
In such a world, the prospective knowledge of any 
creature constituted like man, however limited it 
might be, would probably be of equal extent with 
his present knowledge. Yet in our world, the oper- 
ations of inanimate nature are constantly influenced 
by the agency of animate beings, rational and irra- 
tional ; and therefore our prospective knowledge, 
even of the inanimate world, is, in many cases, very 
uncertain. Our prospective knowledge of the fu- 
ture conduct of animate beings, especially those of 
the higher class, must, for obvious reasons, be still 



104 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

more indistinct and uncertain, on account of the 
voluntary agency possessed by man. Yet here also, 
whatever prospective knowledge we do possess, is 
strictly a knowledge of composite entities. Thus, 
the late sagacious politician Talleyrand had a pro- 
spective knowledge of the French Revolution, of 
1830, some time at least before it occurred. What 
else was this knowledge, than a knowledge of the 
relation of causation between the arbitrary meas- 
ures of the French king and his cabinet, and a rev- 
olution, that is, resistance to these measures on the 
part of the discontented French people ? In short, 
every individual has a certain sphere of intellectual 
vision all around him, which, like the torch of the 
benighted traveller, enables him safely to steer his 
course through the circumstances and pursuits of life. 
This subject is one of great interest to every re- 
flecting mind. The principles above detailed, seem 
to present a definite and intelligible view of all our 
knowledge of futurity. It is nothing else than a 
knowledge of composite entities, one part of which 
is present, and the other future. In the present 
part we see the relation of fitness, of causation, of 
analogy to the supposed future part. On our 
knowledge of these relations in present entities, de- 
pends our power of prospection. All our knowl- 
edge of futurity, which is so important in human 
life, and is the basis of all our plans and enterpri- 
ses, may be reduced to the simple view, that it is a 
knowledge of the relations of causation, analogy, 
and revelation, seen by us in some existing entity, 
or learned from the inspired volume. On this pro- 



ORGANIC PROCESS. 105 

spective knowledge, the politician bases his calcu- 
lations, the man of business and the Christian their 
arrangements for future operations. We know al- 
most with certainty, that the physical universe, the 
properties and tendencies of material things, will 
continue : and it is probable, that the other circum- 
stances of our situation will, in the main, remain 
unchanged. Thus, we have a highly probable fore- 
knowledge of the future continuance of nine tenths 
of the circumstances and prospects of our situation. 
We also know, that the changes which may occur 
will be limited by the powers of the different 
agents, and the laws of nature. Hence, the possi- 
ble changes cannot materially affect our prospects, 
or alter the propriety and wisdom of our course, 
and the principles of our action. Relying on all 
these circumstances, we pursue our course of busi- 
ness, secular or sacred, with confidence and de- 
light. 



CHAPTER III. 

ORGANIC PROCESS BY WHICH WE OBTAIN OUR IDEAS. 

The entire human body, considered as an organ 
for the influence of entities, may be viewed in a 
twofold light, as a general organ, and as a collec- 
tion of several organs. The effects produced in the 
mind through the bodily organs are a knowledge 
of the shape, colour, odour, flavour, and sound of 
entities, together with feelings more or less pleasant 



106 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

or unpleasant, attending the operation of each or- 
gan. These organs, it need scarcely be observed, 
are not themselves the percipient agents ; but the 
mere unintelligent instrumentality, through which, 
by divine appointment, the soul acts. The invert- 
ed image of any object within the sphere of vision, 
is made on the retina of an ox's eye, after it has 
been taken from the head of the slaughtered ani- 
mal ; but, of course, the eye has no vision. The 
eyes of animals are mere instruments, like the tel- 
escope of the astronomer. Although it is indispen- 
sable to the perception of those celestial bodies, 
which are beyond the reach of the naked eye, yet 
no one could for a moment imagine that the tele- 
scope itself had a perception of these objects. Phil- 
osophically speaking, it is, therefore, not the eye 
which sees, but the soul. 

We might divide the results of the soul's action 
through bodily organs, into those produced through 
the medium of every part of the surface of the 
body, such as shape ; and, secondly, those for which 
only particular parts of the body, such as the eye, 
the ear, the nose, serve as organs, viz., colour, 
odour, sound, &c. I have knowledge of the sun by 
my eye, of music by my ear, of the flavour of an 
orange by my palate, of the odour of a flower by 
my olfactory organs, of the solidity of a ball by 
my hand, or some other part of my body which 
touches it. And, in each instance, this knowledge 
is more or less pleasant or unpleasant, or, in other 
words, is accompanied by some degree of feeling, 
which is in a greater or less degree either pleasing 
or the reverse. 



ORGANIC PROCESS. 107 

In all cases, the influence of entities is exerted 
by the actual contact of the organ ; nor does auy 
u operatio in distans," so far as we know, take 
place. Thus, in taste, the palate and tongue are 
touched by the article tasted ; in hearing, the tym- 
panum of the ear is struck by the vibrations of the 
atmosphere ; in smelling, the olfactory nerves are 
touched by the particles emanating from the odorif- 
erous body ; as is proved by the fact, that the most 
fragrant rose or shrub, if placed under a glass cyl- 
inder, cannot be smelled. In vision, the eyes are 
touched by the rays of light, proceeding from the 
object which is seen, either by reflection, or refrac- 
tion, or repulsion, as the case may be. We are, 
therefore, under no necessity of having recourse to 
the exploded theory of animal spirits, or nervous 
fluid, or of intervening cerebral vibrations, in order 
to form a connexion between the mind and the ob- 
ject of its perception. And, in all these cases, the 
nerves of sensation and of motion, which are im- 
bodied in the organ of sense, or constitute a part 
of it, are connected with the brain, of which they 
are all branches, and which is the ultimate and 
principal physical organ, through which the mind 
acts and is acted upon, in its connexion with the 
material world. Whether the brain is one general 
organ, or, as phrenologists contend, consists of a 
collection of individual organs 2 each corresponding 
to a separate faculty of the mind, lias been much 
disputed. But from the harmony of universal sci- 
ence in all its ramifications, we may confidently 
predict, that the results of Phrenology, when brought 



108 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

to a satisfactory degree of certainty, will not con- 
flict with the true system of Psychology. 

The mental results, both cognitive and sentient, 
of our sensorial action through these organs, are, in 
general, termed, in popular language, Sensations. 
Thus, we speak of the sensations of sight, of smell, 
of touch, of taste, &c, meaning principally those 
cognitions which we derive through these organs, 
and which are more specifically termed perceptions. 
This vague use of the term we derive from the Ro- 
mans, who employ in the same general manner both 
sentio and sensus, from which our word sensation 
is ultimately derived. Yet, as this term is, in com- 
mon language, more generally used as expressive 
of feeling's, and as the related terms, sensibility, 
sensitive, and sentient, are employed exclusively 
with a similar reference, a laudable desire of rigid 
precision, and consistency in metaphysical phraseol- 
ogy, would dictate the constant discrimination be- 
tween those results of our organic action which are 
cognitive and those that are sentient, and the em- 
ployment of the term perceptions, rather than sensa- 
tions, to designate the former. 

The eye, or organ of vision, is an instrument con- 
structed with the most perfect accuracy, in accord- 
ance with the ascertained principles of optics. The 
most perfect optical instruments fall far short of it 
in accuracy and excellence. Indeed, a more stri- 
king and intelligible exhibition of the knowledge 
and wisdom of the Creator, cannot be imagined. 
The ball of the eye itself is a species of camera 
obscura. Its exterior consists of two membraneous 



ORGANIC PROCESS. 109 

coverings, the outer one called sclerotica {gkXtjpotl- 
it7]g, hard), on account of its superior firmness, and 
the inner, choroid {xopoeidTjg, like a skin), from its 
cuticular appearance. Within this inner coat, and 
expanded over its surface, is the optic nerve, which 
receives the rays of light, and on which they form 
an image of the external object, which reflects 
them to the eye. In the front part of the eye, which 
is exposed to view, is the cornea, so called because, 
when dried, it has nearly the consistence of very 
fine horn. It is transparent, and projects from the 
eyeball, like the segment of a smaller sphere. Back 
of the centre of the cornea, is a small opening in the 
choroid, termed the pupil, through which the rays 
of light enter. And in the rear of this, are the 
aqueous humour, then the crystalline lens of a 
dense texture, both nearly of the same size with the 
cornea, and, lastly, the vitreous or glassy humour, 
which fills the remaining cavity of the eye. These 
several pellucid humours collect the rays of light 
into a focus on the retina. 

The eye affords us the knowledge of colour, local 
direction, and expansion. When I open my eyes, 
I behold the different objects within the range of 
my vision, and instantly derive not only the idea of 
colour, but also of direction or location in space, of 
every one of them, as I successively direct my at- 
tention to each. And, by the improvement result- 
ing from practice, I also become able to judge of 
the shape and distance of objects through the in- 
strumentality of the eye. All objects of vision oc- 
cupy relative positions in space, and a perception 

K 



110 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of this position is one of the primary and original 
items of knowledge derived through the visual or- 
gan. By touch and locomotion, we may obtain 
similar knowledge, even if divested of sight. Yet 
the process is more tardy, and can be applied only 
to such objects as we can personally reach. 

Vision is performed through the medium of light, 
or, more properly speaking, light is the object of 
vision. It consists of rays of different colours and 
of different degrees of refrangibility. When we 
permit a portion of light to pass through a prism, its 
different colours are separated, in consequence of 
the shape of that instrument, by which the rays are 
refracted in different degrees out of a right line. 
We thus perceive the regular series of colours from 
red to violet. 

The superficial texture of all visible objects may 
be reduced to precisely as many varieties as are 
found in colour. Each of the textures reflects, or, 
according to a different theory, repels the light, in 
a manner somewhat different from every other, and 
reflects or repels a surface of rays equal to its own 
bulk. These rays light upon the lens of the eye, 
and are converged with the peculiarity of every dif- 
ferent texture to the retina ; and thus, by divine con- 
stitution, we have the knowledge of different colours. 
So that the rays of light, coming from the objects 
in different degrees of spissitude, and in the partic- 
ular state of reflection or repulsion corresponding to 
the particular texture of the objects, are as much, 
and in the same sense, the cause of our knowledge 
of colour, as the particles emitted by the rose and 



ORGANIC PROCESS. Ill 

touching our nostrils, are of smell, or the peach 
touching the palate and tongue, is of taste. 

In vision we see nothing, originally, but colour 
and location, or direction and extension. Distance 
is not the direct object of vision, because children 
will stretch out their little hands to catch the moon, 
until experience teaches them the futility of the at- 
tempt ; and a person cured of congenital blindness, 
by an operation for the cataract, will for some time 
hold out his hand and feel his way, lest he strike 
against the stove or table at the other end of the 
room. That we do form some original judgment 
of extension and peripheral shape by the eye, seems 
very clear. For, it can be demonstrated that the 
images formed on the retina, vary and correspond 
to the different outline and extension of the objects 
which they represent. Now, as the mind has a cor- 
respondent and different idea for every cognoscible 
diversity of objects, it must have one for this also. 
It is doubtless true, as Mr. Locke and others have 
maintained, that a blind man, who had learned by 
touch the difference of shape between a cube and 
a sphere, could not, on being restored to sight, dis- 
cover by his eye, which was cubical? and which was 
spherical. But this fact does not, we think, prove 
that we obtain no idea of extension and shape by 
the eye. It only establishes the position, that the 
man suddenly restored to sight/ could not at once 
decide which of the two different outlines of which 
he had an idea by sight, corresponds to the one, to 
his ideas of which, as obtained by touch, he had 
given the name either of cube or sphere. Both 



112 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

sight and touch give us distinct and definite ideas 
of the peripheral shape of objects, but we cannot 
tell which one of the properties learned by one 
sense, corresponds to a given property learned by 
the other sense, until we have ascertained the fact 
by the conjoined action of both. It must also be 
remembered that the association between words and 
our ideas of objects is arbitrary, and is formed only 
by practice or usage. The blind man has long been 
accustomed to associate the ideas of touch, which 
he acquires from those objects, with the words cube 
and sphere ; but when his first vision also gives him 
the ideas of these objects appropriate to sight, there 
is no association existing between these ideas and 
the words cube and sphere. If, therefore, he be 
asked, which of the two is the figure which he had 
been accustomed to call either cube or sphere, he 
could not tell. He could only reply that they ap- 
pear evidently different ; but the association of these 
new ideas with sounds or names is yet to be formed. 
As yet, neither of these names will recall or desig- 
nate his newly-acquired ideas, and he can no more 
tell which is the cube, and which the sphere, than 
if you were to ask him in Greek, which is the avpog 
and which the ofyaipa. He has not yet learned the 
correspondence of the ideas themselves, much less 
of the terms which usage has employed to designate 
them. 

That the eye does not originally give us any 
knowledge of shape, excepting the mere outline, 
or extension, is evident; because a well-executed 
painting will deceive even an adult ; and all effort 



ORGANIC PROCESS. 113 

to represent the shape of objects in portraits or other 
paintings, is based upon this fact, and demonstrative 
of it. Many of our readers may recollect, that on 
entering Peale's Museum in Philadelphia, at one end 
of the long hall, they saw at the other a flight of 
stairs, and an aged gentleman just in the act of as- 
cending, but, as if attracted by the noise of their 
entrance, looking back at them, full in the face. On 
nearer approach, however, the deception was dis- 
covered, and the whole proved to be a most suc- 
cessful effort of the artist's pencil, a lasting monu- 
ment of the high eminence attained by Mr. Peale, 
in his favourite pursuit. In short, the entity which 
is the object of our knowledge in vision, is not the 
external person or thing said to be seen, but is 
merely the rays of light. No man has ever literally 
seen his nearest friend, his father or mother-) his 
brother or sister. He has seen the light reflected 
from them on the retina of his eye, and nothing 
more. What we see is nothing else than those rays 
of light which actually enter into the pupil of the 
eye ; and it is experience which teaches us, that 
there are external objects corresponding to them, 
from which they proceed. It is the different tex- 
tures or affinities, corresponding to these different 
colours seen by us, of which we thus acquire a 
knowledge. 

For the idea of apparent and relative, but not of 
actual size, we are also indebted to the eye. The 
image formed on the retina is large or small ac- 
cording to the magnitude and distance of the ob- 
jects. Thus the apparent magnitude of objects va- 

K2 



114 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ries, but their real size is of course unchanged. 
When we first perceive a vessel at sea in the distant 
horizon, it appears very small ; but as it approaches 
us, its magnitude seems to increase, until it has at- 
tained its natural size in proximity ; yet the actual 
size of the vessel was of course unchanged. Of ob- 
jects equidistant from the eye, vision will give us a 
correct idea of the relative magnitude. Thus, as 
we know that the balloon and the basket attached 
to it are nearly equidistant from us, however far or 
near they may be, we can form an accurate judg- 
ment of the relative size of each, so long as both are 
visible to us. After we know the distance of any 
objects, practice enables us to judge of their actual 
size, by sight. Yet this is, originally, the combined 
result of touch and vision. Experience teaches us 
to judge of the diminution which distance makes, 
in the apparent magnitude of objects ; and optical 
science explains the causes on which these appear- 
ances depend. We are so accustomed to see ob- 
jects diminish in size as they recede from us, that 
daily observation confers considerable accuracy on 
our practical judgment ; and thus, by a rapid pro- 
cess, we learn to judge of the actual magnitude of 
all objects, whose distance we know. We form an 
estimate of the diminution, which the known dis- 
tance would make in the apparent size of an ob- 
ject, and thus judge of its actual magnitude. The 
idea, which the mind acquires of the images formed 
on the retina by different objects, does of course 
not resemble that image in any known property ; 
yet, for each image, the mind obtains a definite idea, 



ORGANIC PROCESS. 115 

both as to colour, peripheral shape or outline, and 
size. It is on this principle, that in the science of 
perspective, we indicate on canvass the increased 
distance of a known object, by a diminution of its 
size. And, when we view an object through a spy- 
glass, and judge it to be brought nearer to us, 
this effect is produced in accordance with the same 
principles, the only change being that the lenses of 
the instrument make the rays of light fall on the 
retina in a more dilated or expanded form, thus ac- 
tually making on it a larger image. 

When objects are near at hand, or in the vicinity 
of others of whose distance we have some idea, 
we can form a judgment from the degree of incli- 
nation on the axis of vision and the angles formed 
with surrounding objects. For this purpose, the 
Creator has kindly given us two eyes, while for all 
other purposes one would suffice, as the action of 
each is separate and independent. 

The degree of distinctness with which objects 
are seen by us also leads us to form some judg- 
ment of their distance ; as we know that near ob- 
jects always appear more clearly visible than those 
afar off. For this cause, objects seen through a 
mist are judged to be more distant than they really 
are. The standard by which we judge is the degree 
of clearness in an ordinary atmosphere, and then 
our judgment is correct ; but when we apply the 
same standard to the appearance of objects seen 
through a mist, it is calculated to mislead us. 

When a strange object is in the vicinity of an- 
other of known size, we can judge of the size of 



116 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the former by its apparent relative size, even when 
the distance of both is unknown. On this princi- 
ple, painters show the size of a house by locating a 
man, or horse, or fence in its vicinity. As the 
size of these latter objects varies but little, it forms 
a standard by which to judge the magnitude of the 
others. 

It is an interesting fact, that objects appear to us 
in their natural position, while it can be proved 
that their image formed on the retina is inverted. 
Nor has any solution been given of this phenom- 
enon, other than that it is the appointed law of the 
mind. And of similar inexplicable nature is the 
fact, that though we see objects with two eyes, they 
appear to a person of sound organs as single ; 
while to persons who are affected with a disease in 
one eye, which prevents it from being acted on 
precisely like the other, objects are seen double, 
that is, images somewhat different are made on the 
retina of the two eyes, and ideas somewhat differ- 
ent are thus excited in the mind by the same object. 

In addition to the perceptions obtained through 
vision, the eye is also, at the same time, one of the 
media through which pleasing feelings are excited in 
the mind by external objects. It is through this or- 
gan that the pleasant feelings excited by the beauties 
of a landscape, that is, by the varieties and combi- 
nations of its colours, are produced in the mind. 
In short, this is the organ through which a benev- 
olent God designed to confer, and actually does 
bestow upon us, a large portion of the incidental 
happiness belonging to our pilgrimage on earth. 
Even the light of the returning day is calculated it- 



ORGANIC PROCESS. 117 

self to inspire the mind with pleasure ; and whith- 
ersoever we direct our steps, objects meet the eye 
calculated to afford us delight. The vegetable 
kingdom presents to us the flowers of the field and 
garden, in their numberless varieties and shades of 
colour transcending the array of Solomon in all his 
glory : the grain fields, waving like the ocean be- 
fore the passing breeze ; and the trees of the- forest 
bending majestically before the still more powerful 
storm, are all calculated to excite feelings of the 
most interesting and pleasing nature. The mineral 
and animal kingdoms, in like manner, abound in 
objects calculated to delight the observer. Yea, 
so susceptible are we of pleasure from this source, 
that there is need of caution, lest we take so much 
delight in the creature as to overlook the Creator, 
by whom all these objects were made, and to whom 
they are all designed to conduct us. Who among 
my readers has not seen some naturalist to whom the 
words of nature's favourite, Pollok, would apply ? 

" One made acquaintanceship with plants and flowers, 
And happy grew in telling all their names ; 
One classed the quadrupeds ; a third the fowls ; 
Another found in minerals his joy : 
And I have seen a man, a worthy man, 
In happy mood conversing with a fly ; 
And as he, through his glass, made by himself, 
Beheld its wondrous eye and plumage fine, 
From leaping scarce he kept, for perfect joy." 

But in regard to vision, and to perception through 
any of the senses, the attention of the mind is ne- 
cessary to the perfection of the process. The rays 
of light may be reflected from an object to the eye, 



118 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and form an image on the retina ; but we have no 
recollection of a perception, unless our attention be 
directed to the object. The rays of light are at all 
times as fully reflected to the eye from all other ob- 
jects within the entire field of vision before us, as 
from that one to which our attention is at any given 
time directed ; and yet we recollect only the one 
which has attracted our attention. In short, there 
are hundreds of images formed on the retina at all 
times ; but it is a law of the soul that, although we 
have an indefinite simultaneous vision of several ob- 
jects before us, we take cognizance only of one at 
a time ; and of our perceptions of that one alone 
do we retain any recollection. 

As to the question which has so much puzzled 
philosophers of all ages and nations, how this per- 
ception is effected through the organs ; what, for 
example^ is the connexion between the image on 
the retina and the perception of the soul ; our re- 
ply is, that it is the constituted order of things, as 
appointed by God, and inexplicable to us. The 
image on the retina is as indispensable a link in the 
chain of instrumentality as the presence of light, 
and its passage through the lens of the eye ; but 
we can no more comprehend the connexion of the 
intelligent percipient action of the soul with the 
last link of instrumental organism, than with the 
first. In this, as in a thousand other instances, the 
facts are known and understood, but the mode of 
their occurrence, or the causal relation between 
them, is beyond our comprehension. 

The ear, or organ of hearing, is likewise a com- 



ORGANIC PROCESS. 119 

plicated and very delicate member, whose structure 
is not as easily illustrated as that of the eye. Like 
the latter organ, it is placed in an elevated part of 
the body, so as to have a more extended sphere of 
sensorial action. The external ear is expanded, so 
as to receive a large surface of vibrations of the air, 
which it conveys to the point of entrance. Thence 
a tube, termed the auditory passage (meatus audi- 
torius), conducts the vibrations to the tympanum or 
drum, which is an expanded nerve analogous to the 
retina of the eye. From the tympanum, these 
vibrations are communicated, by the means of four 
little bones, to the water contained in the cavities 
of the labyrinth. By means of this water, they are 
conveyed to the auditory nerve, and finally to the 
brain. In order that the drum of the ear may act 
more freely, there is a communication, termed the 
Eustachian tube, extending from the drum to the 
back part of the mouth, freely admitting the air. 
Still, hearing may take place, though less perfectly, 
when the drum has been perforated, as is proved in 
the case of those persons who can, by taking smoke 
into their mouth, express it through one or both 
their ears, and yet are not deaf. In some cases, 
also, where suppuration had destroyed the continuity 
of the chain of little bones, the sense of hearing was 
not destroyed. The principal medium for the con- 
veyance of these vibrations is the air ; yet any other 
body possessing some elasticity, whether it be solid, 
liquid, or aeriform, which forms a connexion between 
the sounding body and the ear, may become the 
medium of sound. Thus our American Indians 



120 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

apply their ears to the ground, to discover the ap- 
proach of their enemies, whom they could not yet 
hear through the air. Yet, in a vacuum, sound 
cannot be communicated, that is, these vibrations 
cannot be propagated to the ear except by some 
intervening body. The susceptibility of the audi- 
tory organs is different in different persons, but no 
one can hear the vibrations of a cord which vibrates 
less than about thirty-two times in a second. The 
whole range of distinguishable sounds forms upward 
of nine octaves. 

Sound is therefore an idea of the mind, caused 
by the vibrations of some stricken object, which 
vibrations are communicated through the air, or 
some other elastic medium, to the ear. When we 
hear the discharge of a distant cannon, the noise is 
not at the cannon, but in our minds. The discharge 
of the cannon causes a tremendous agitation in the 
atmosphere around it, which is extended, like the 
undulations of a pond when a stone is thrown into 
it, until they reach the ears of all animals within 
their circumference, and produce in every one of 
them the idea of sound. 

The number of sounds which we can distinguish 
is very great, both as to variety of tone and strength 
of utterance, amounting to many thousands. The 
mind also perceives a number of relations between 
sounds, and it is the discussion of these sounds and 
their relations, as well as the calculation of the caus- 
es, nature, and number of the vibrations, by which 
they are produced, which constitute the theoretical 
science of music. These vibrations are actions of 



ORGANIC PROCESS. 121 

sounding bodies or entities, and our perceptions of 
them, and of the relations between them, are cogni- 
tive ideas. The relations of concord and discord 
are the coincidence or confusion of the vibrations 
of the sounding instrument. Thus, those different 
strings of a piano, which, owing to their length, 
thickness, weight, and tension, vibrate in the same 
time, are said to be in unison. If one string vibrates 
in exactly double the time of another, every alter- 
nate vibration of the one will coincide with the 
vibrations of the other, and form the concord of an 
octave. 

The ear is the medium not only of our knowl- 
edge of the vibrations of the atmosphere called 
sound, but also of the feeling of pleasure or pain, 
which the different combinations of these sounds, 
either harmonious or discordant, are intrinsically 
calculated to produce. When we listen to a piece 
of music, we find no difficulty in distinguishing be- 
tween the different notes, that is, the different vi- 
brations of the air, of which we obtain a knowledge 
through the ear, and the pleasant or unpleasant 
feelings excited by these vibrations or notes. Nor 
can we for a moment hesitate in believing, that the 
difference in the feelings excited by the harmonious 
or discordant combinations of sound, arises from a 
difference in the notes themselves, considered as 
simple entities, or from the relation of concord or 
discord subsisting between them. These notes, or 
rather the ideas of them, are the subjects of mathe- 
matical calculations in the science of music. But 
who ever heard of a writer on this subject, speak- 

L 



122 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ing of a chord or discord of feeling, that is, a chord 
of pleasure or a discord of pain ? Or who ever 
heard a musician speak of an octave of pleasure or 
pain ? Common sense, and the structure of the 
mind, have led men to distinguish between these 
things, and to acknowledge our perception of each 
note individually, and of the relations existing be- 
tween them, as entirely different from the feelings, 
pleasant or unpleasant, excited by them. Although 
the ear originally affords us only ideas of sound, 
yet, by practice, we learn to judge of many other 
things by this organ. There is but little doubt, that 
an impression somewhat different is made on the 
tympanum, not only by the different degrees of force 
with which the undulating atmosphere touches it, 
but also by the fact of its striking that organ in a 
direct or oblique manner. Of this difference we 
have a distinct idea by the ear alone ; yet, by that 
exclusively, we could never know that the difference 
in the loudness of the sound resulted either from the 
degree of force with which the atmosphere is agi- 
tated by the sonorous body, or from its proximity 
or distance from our ear : nor that the difference 
in our idea, produced by the directness or obliquity 
with which the undulations of air strike the ear, 
was indicative of the local direction of the sounding 
body whence they proceeded. It is by the com- 
bined use of sight, touch, and locomotion, that the 
distance and direction of the sonorous body are 
originally learned, and practice then enables us to 
judge of these circumstances by the ear alone. 
Yea, we even go farther, and apply these results to 



ORGAxNIC PROCESS. 123 

objects which could not be reached by touch. It 
is thus that, having learned the velocity of sound, 
we judge of the distance of clouds, by the length of 
time intervening between the flash of lightning in 
them and our hearing the thunder. An interval of 
half a minute, we know, proves the cloud to be 
about six and a half miles distant. Children hear 
persons addressing them, and at the same time see 
whether they are in front, at their side, or in their 
rear ; and thus early learn to associate the peculiar 
sounds produced by persons speaking from different 
directions, with that direction itself. What this 
peculiarity about any sound is, it is not easy to de- 
scribe ; yet every person is familiar with it from 
experience. Nay, so obviously do we thus judge 
of direction by the ear, that if the vibrations pro- 
ceeding from a sounding body fall on some smooth 
and solid surface, and are reflected to our ear, thus 
causing what is termed an echo, we judge the cause 
of that echo to be in the direction not of the original 
sounding body, but of that smooth and solid sur- 
face which reflected them. In the same indirect 
manner, the loudness of a sound becomes an index 
of the distance of the object whence it proceeds. 
By the combined use of different organs, we become 
familiar with the ordinary loudness of any customary 
sound at a given distance, and also learn to distin- 
guish and recognise these different sounds, such as 
those produced by different musical instruments, by 
the voice of man, and other animals, &c. ; and these 
data being known by experience, we can form a 
judgment by the ear alone, of the distance of the 



124 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

sounding body. By these results of experience, a 
kind of practical commutation of the senses takes 
place, and in the daily occurrences of life, though 
many objects are within the reach of only one or- 
gan, we at once acquire an amount of knowledge 
of them, which originally belongs to several. In 
the first volume of the Manchester Philosophical 
Memoirs is contained the following statement con- 
cerning a blind man in that city, quoted by Profes- 
sor Upham : "I had an opportunity of repeatedly 
observing the peculiar manner in which he arranged 
his ideas, and obtained his information. Whenever 
he was introduced into company, I remarked that 
he continued some time silent. The sound directed 
him to judge of the dimensions of the room, and the 
different voices, of the number of persons that were 
present. His distinction in these respects was very 
accurate, and his memory so retentive, that he was 
seldom mistaken. I have known him instantly to 
recognise a person on first hearing him, though 
more than two years had elapsed since the time of 
their last meeting. He determined pretty nearly 
the stature of those he was conversing with by the 
direction of their voices ; and he made tolerable 
conjectures respecting their tempers and dispositions 
by the manner in which they conducted their con- 
versation." 

The organ of touch is the whole body, wherever 
nerves extend, either over its surface, or through 
its interior. It has been a subject of dispute, wheth- 
er the nerves of the hand have naturally greater 
acuteness of sensibility than those of the other parts 



ORGANIC PROCESS. 125 

of the body. As the acuteness or strength of all 
our local organs is confessedly much increased by 
practice, and, as in the case of this general organ, 
those parts of it which are found to be most acute, 
are also those which, from their position, are most 
used, it is highly probable that the difference be- 
tween the sensitiveness of the hand and the other 
parts of the body, as organs of touch, may also 
be attributed to that cause. From early life our 
hands are almost incessantly employed to pick up, 
to hold, or to move objects, and, in short, to per- 
form all the operations of physical agency, of which 
that important organ is capable. And as the atten- 
tion of the mind is ordinarily directed to these man- 
ual operations, we have the greater reason to ex- 
pect great improvement in the mental results ac- 
companying them. It is probably to this want of 
attention that other portions of the body which are 
often brought into contact with various objects do 
not improve proportionably in sensibility ; or, to 
speak more correctly, that the mind does not im- 
prove more in sensibility through them. 

Whether the organ of touch should be separated 
from that of muscular effort, has been disputed. 
Perhaps they may, with more propriety, be regard- 
ed as one organ exerted in different degrees. The 
slightest possible contact, although it could not af- 
ford us the same amount of knowledge which we 
derive from stronger contact, and from the muscular 
tension caused by firm resistance, yet does seem to 
include in it the elementary idea of resistance in a 
small degree, and, therefore, also of muscular action. 
L2 



126 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

By the organ of touch we obtain a knowledge 
of the different degrees of solidity or fluidity of 
bodies, their shape, extension, smoothness or rough- 
ness, heat or cold. The ideas embraced in this 
knowledge may probably be reduced to modifica- 
tions of resistance and extension. We know that 
the ideas popularly expressed by these terms, as 
well as the feelings accompanying them, are deri- 
ved through the organ of touch; and we know, too, 
that in obtaining them our organ meets with re- 
sistance perfect or imperfect, continuous or irregu- 
lar. By the organ of touch combined with motion, 
we also acquire an idea of extension and shape ; but 
individual touch does not afford us a general idea 
of the object causing it. The terms heat and cold 
properly designate our perception or cognitive idea 
of a greater or less degree of caloric in the atmo- 
sphere, or any other body with which we come into 
contact. Cold is a negative term, implying the 
absence of heat. In winter we perceive but little 
caloric in the atmosphere, and term the weather 
cold. In summer, when the reverse is the case, 
we term it warm. What caloric is we do not ex- 
actly know ; but we employ the term to express 
the perception we have of it. Nor are we to sup- 
pose in this, more than in any other case, that ei- 
ther the perception of caloric, or the feeling at- 
tendant on it, has any resemblance to the caloric 
itself. This perception, however, does not teach 
us the nature of the radiating body, independently 
of the other organs of sense. It is a philosophic 
question, belonging to Pyronomics, rather than 



ORGANIC PROCESS. 127 

Mental Philosophy, to determine the precise nature 
of caloric itself. But whether we suppose it to be 
an independent subtile fluid, or a mere modifica- 
tion of other bodies, all have the same perception 
of its influence on the human body, and of the feel- 
ings caused by it. The terms heat and cold, as 
expressing the sensation produced by this agent 
on our frame, are merely relative, the one being 
produced by our touching a body that has more 
caloric, and the other one that has less than our 
hand at the time possesses ; and if, after having 
immersed one hand in hot water and the other in 
cold, we put them both into water of a medium 
temperature, to the one hand this water will feel 
warm and to the other cold at the same time. 

In some cases of touch the contact may be so vi- 
olent that the organ becomes injured, and that the 
feeling of pain is so great as to make us lose sight 
of the perception connected with it. 

The feeling of exhaustion and fatigue, conse- 
quent on continued or violent exertion, seems not to 
belong to the sense of touch, but rather resembles 
the periodical appetites, and is a provision of the 
Creator to admonish us of the necessity of rest. 

It has been denied by some recent metaphysi- 
cians that the idea of externity is a result of touch, 
and, consequently, affirmed that our idea of the 
real existence of the external world is not derived 
from this or any other organ of sense. This view 
we consider erroneous. Yet those who maintain 
it, admit that the idea of externity and of an exter- 
nal world occurs on occasion of the use of these or- 



128 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

gans, especially that of touch ; but affirm that it 
then occurs by a separate law of the soul. We see 
no reason for the admission of such a separate law 
in this case, any more than in that of the ideas ob- 
tained by the other senses, and prefer regarding it 
as the appropriate information obtained by this or- 
gan. Neither of the other senses could afford us 
the idea of externity. By the ear alone we could 
obtain only ideas of sound ; by the eye, only of col- 
our, expansion, and direction ; by the nostrils, only 
ideas of odours ; but by neither, nor all of these 
combined, could we have learned the idea of ex- 
ternity in general, or of the existence of the exter- 
nal world. It is to touch and locomotion that we 
are primarily indebted for our knowledge of the 
objective reality of these objects. 

The sense of touch has been improved to a most 
surprising degree by practice, and especially by the 
concentration of the powers of the mind upon it, in 
consequence of the loss of other senses. It ap- 
pears to be well ascertained, that some blind per- 
sons have been able to judge of their distance from 
solid bodies by the action or pulsation of the air 
upon their face, to distinguish spurious coins from 
such as are genuine, and to distinguish and separ- 
ate garments and other articles with which they 
were familiar, from a multitude of others of similar 
shape and texture. We are told that " Mr. San- 
derson, the blind mathematician," could distinguish 
by his hand, in a series of Roman medals, the true 
from the counterfeit, with a more unerring discrim- 
nation than the eye of a professed virtuoso ; and, 



ORGANIC PROCESS. 129 

when he was present at the astronomical observa- 
tions in the garden of his college, he was accustomed 
to perceive every cloud which passed over the sun. 
This remarkable power, which has sometimes been 
referred to an increased intensity of particular sen- 
ses, in many cases evidently resolves itself into an 
increased habit of attention to the indications of all 
those senses which the individual retains. " Two in- 
stances have been related to me," proceeds Dr. Ab- 
ercrombie, " of blind men who were much esteemed 
as j udges of horses. One of these, in giving his opin- 
ion of a horse, declared him to be blind, though 
this had escaped the observation of several persons, 
who had the use of their eyes, and who were with 
some difficulty convinced of it. Being asked to give 
an account of the principle on which he had deci- 
ded, he said it was by the sound of the horse's step 
in walking, which implied a peculiar and unusual 
caution in his manner of putting down his feet." 

Thus, also, in the various institutions for the blind 
in this country and Europe, the sense of touch is 
employed as a substitute for sight, and by the use 
of uncial letters, elevated above the surface of the 
page, these unfortunate beings are enabled to dis- 
tinguish the letters by following them with their 
fingers, and by practice to spell and read with tol- 
erable facility. A communication has thus been 
opened for therrw-to the world of intellect, and the 
literature of the past and present ages may eventu- 
ally be brought within their view. 

The organ of taste consists of a number of papil- 
lae, distributed over the surface of the tongue, and 



130 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

particularly over its sides and extreme point, as well 
as the roof of the mouth or palate. This organ is 
thus wisely located by a benevolent Providence at 
the very entrance, through which all articles of food 
must pass, the healthy or unhealthy character or 
condition of which may by this means, in most ca- 
ses, be tested. It serves as a guardian over the 
character of everything which finds access to the 
alimentary canal ; and it is probable, that in its 
natural state, unvitiated by luxury and the artificial 
habits of civilized life, this organ, together with 
that of smell, would be an almost infallible safe- 
guard against unhealthy food. It is. indeed, true, 
that these organs alone could merely teach us to 
distinguish the various odours and flavours of differ- 
ent objects, and to discriminate between the pleas- 
ant and the unpleasant feelings excited by them. 
But experience teaches us that articles of certain 
odours and flavours are healthy, while others are 
the reverse; and thus these flavours and odours be- 
come indices of the healthiness or noxiousness of 
edible objects. The pleasantness or unpleasant- 
ness of different flavours and odours is somewhat 
arbitrary and variable. What is pleasant to one 
man is often unpalatable to another ; and a flavour, 
which at first was unpleasant, may become agreea- 
ble by use. Yet, Providence has wisely ordered 
that the staple articles of food, bread and meal, 
and also the natural beverage which springs from 
the mountain rock, and is everywhere met with by 
digging into the earth, are pleasant to all mankind. 
It is, indeed, true, that if, with our eyes closed, 
we introduce a peach or apricot into the mouth, 



ORGANIC PROCESS. 131 

we obtain not only the idea of the flavour which 
those species of fruit are calculated to excite, but 
also some knowledge of their solidity and shape. 
By flavour is meant that adjective entity (property) 
in the fruit itself, which is the subject of our knowl- 
edge, and the excitant of feeling pleasant or un- 
pleasant. The word taste is used to designate our 
knowledge of the flavour, and the words pleasant 
and unpleasant express the feeling- excited by it. 
Thus also the word odour means the adjective en- 
tity (property) in objects, of which the term smell 
expresses our knowledge, and the words pleasant 
and unpleasant the feelings excited by the odour. 

But the knowledge of solidity and shape is, in 
the above-named instances also, obtained by touch, 
and the only thing of which the organ of taste is the 
medium is, 1. A knowledge of the flavour of the 
fruit ; and, 2. A feeling, pleasant or unpleasant, con- 
nected with it. Oftentimes several of the bodily or- 
gans are acted upon simultaneously. Thus in eat- 
ing a peach the several senses of smell, touch, and 
taste may be affected at the same moment, and each 
organ be the medium of the appropriate feeling and 
knowledge, which the entity peach is capable of 
producing. The flavours of different esculent enti- 
ties are almost as various as the entities themselves ; 
but it has not been found necessary in human lan- 
guage to distinguish many of them in any other 
way than by the name of the object itself. Thus, 
we speak of the taste of an orange, of a tomato, 
of an onion, of a peach, without having any other 
term to designate each. 



132 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Of Smell, The organ of this sense consists of 
numerous and minute ramifications of nerves, dis- 
tributed over the interior surface of the nostrils, and 
the sinuses connected with them. The bony bridge 
of the nose, and the cartilaginous projection beyond 
it, serve as a protection to these delicate organs, 
and their location in the immediate vicinity of the 
mouth, through which all that is eaten must pass, 
affords peculiar facility for the exercise of their 
power in the choice of our food. 

The odours of different objects are almost num- 
berless in kind and degree. Indeed, almost every 
entity, that has any perceptible odour, has one in 
some respect different from all others. But, except- 
ing a few general terms, such as fragrant, putrid, 
musty, &c, they are all designated by the name of 
the object by which they are emitted, and their 
precise nature learned by experience. Thus, we 
speak of the odour of a shrub, of a rose, &c. 

Some odours are perceptible both to taste and 
smell. Those who have visited regions abounding 
in bilious miasma, well know that, on entering the 
infected region, the miasma may sometimes be 
tasted on the tongue, as well as smelled by the ol- 
factories. The odour itself appears to consist of 
innumerable small particles, emitted in every direc- 
tion from the object to which it belongs, and borne 
upon the surrounding atmosphere. When this at- 
mosphere is inspired through the nostrils, the olfac- 
tories, wisely located by Providence, are touched 
by the odorous particles, and thus the smell is ob- 
tained. That such minute particles are emitted by 



SENSE OF SMELL. 133 

the odorous body, is demonstrated by the fact, that 
if the most fragrant flower be placed under a glass 
receiver, no odour will be perceived by those 
around it, however near they may be to the glass, 
which is therefore impervious to these particles. 

Although these particles cannot penetrate glass, 
and are therefore not so small as light, they are in- 
conceivably minute ; for a grain of musk will fill, the 
surrounding atmosphere for years with a pungent 
odour, without itself experiencing the least sensible 
diminution of weight. 

This sense gives us no knowledge of the colour 
or shape of the entity to which the odour belongs, 
but only of the odour itself. In odours of a fa- 
miliar kind, Ave instantly recognise the entity by 
which it is excited. But this Ave do by a recollec- 
tion of the fact, that whenever Ave saw or felt a 
shrub or rose near us, Ave perceived the same 
odour ; and hence Ave discover the relation of anal- 
ogy between the cases, and believe that the same 
entity is again the exciting cause of the odour. It 
is thus, that Ave can, by taste and smell, infer the 
entities by which they are excited, because almost 
every entity Avhich can act on these two organs, 
excites a different idea or mental representative. 
That the organ of taste is the medium of knoAvl- 
edge, as Avell as feeling, is evident, 

1. Because our ideas of the flavours of different 
objects, are almost as numerous as the objects 
themselves ; AA r hile the feelings excited by them are 
simply tAvo, pleasant or unpleasant. There are 
some odours concerning which, though totally dis- 
M 



134 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

tinct from all others, and easily distinguished from 
them, as they have something very peculiar and 
striking in them, we may scarcely be able to deter- 
mine, whether they are pleasant or unpleasant. 
But this does not arise from the fact of their having 
but little flavour ; on the contrary, their flavour may 
be very strong. 

2. While all men agree in the knowledge, con- 
veyed by the terms sweet or acid flavour, they very 
often differ entirely as to the question, whether a 
particular flavour, such as that of the tomato, is 
pleasant or unpleasant. Yea, the very same arti- 
cles of food will at one time be pleasant, and at 
another unpleasant to the same person ; and yet, to 
that same person the flavours of these and other en- 
tities, will appear as distinct from each other as they 
ever did. In short, we perceive, that all these sev- 
eral organs are the vehicles both of knowledge and 
feeling to the mind. 

The acuteness of our perceptions by any one or- 
gan, is. not only augmented in a surprising degree 
by continued practice and the force of habit thus 
formed ; but is also greatly enhanced by the loss 
of one or several other senses. Indeed, when one 
organ is destroyed, the improvement of the residue 
often amounts to a virtual compensation for its loss. 
So acute does the sense of touch become in the 
blind, that some of them have been able to distin- 
guish colours by it. And the sense of smell has 
been so wonderfully improved, that James Mitchell 
could distinguish by it the presence and location of 
a stranger in a room, and Dr. Moyse the black dress 
of his friends. 



ACQUIRED PERCEPTIONS. 135 

The different professional pursuits of men, as they 
give direction to the action of the individual during 
a large portion of his life, naturally lead to a corre- 
spondent improvement of particular organs. Thus, 
says Dr. Reid, " Not only men, but children, idiots, 
and brutes, acquire by habit many perceptions which 
they had not originally. Almost every employ- 
ment in life hath perceptions of this kind, that are 
peculiar to it. The shepherd knows every sheep 
of his flock, as we do our acquaintance, and can 
pick them out of another flock one by one. The 
butcher knows by sight the weight and quality of 
his beeves and sheep before they are killed. The 
farmer perceives by his eye very nearly the quanti- 
ty of hay in a rick, or of corn in a heap. The sailor 
sees the burden, the build, and the distance of a ship 
at sea, while she is a great way off. Every man 
accustomed to writing distinguishes acquaintance 
by their handwriting, as he does by their faces. 
And the painter distinguishes in the works of his 
art, the style of all the great masters. In a word, 
acquired perception is very different in different 
persons, according to the diversity of objects about 
which they are employed, and the application they 
bestow in observing them."* 

In concluding this part of our subject we may yet 
remark, that although the body of man exerts so im- 
portant a part in his perception of external objects, 
that any material derangement of the bodily organ 
often impedes, and sometimes entirely precludes the 
specific action of mind, to the perfection of which 

* Vol. i., p. 286. 



136 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

it is constitutionally necessary ; these two parts of 
our being are nevertheless separate and distinct. 
That a degree of mind, even remotely approxima- 
ting to that of man, is not necessary to the health 
or perfection of the mere animal economy, is dem- 
onstrated in the case of irrational beings. That 
mind can exist and prosper separate from body is 
also evident from the decided testimony of revela- 
tion concerning disimbodied spirits. Hence, it is 
by no means a necessary inference, that because 
body and mind co-operate in man, to qualify him 
for the purposes of his existence on earth, there- 
fore they are amalgamated into one substance, or 
have undergone a reciprocal transfusion of prop- 
erties ; or are of such a nature, that the dissolution 
of the one, implies the death of the other. This 
fact is fully confirmed by the phenomenal appear- 
ances of every day's experience. The properties of 
the mind and those of the body, remain as perfectly 
and evidently distinct and different, in the most in- 
tricate and involved operation of which man is capa- 
ble by their joint action, as they are in those of the 
simplest character. Often also we find the mind 
exhibiting its greatest vigour, after the body has 
been mutilated in every possible manner, yea, even 
after the greater part of the brain itself has been de- 
stroyed. On the other hand, the body is often found 
to vegetate best, after almost the last ray of intellect 
has been extinguished by misfortune or disease. 
Now a single case of this kind demonstrates, that 
mind and body cannot, as the materialist affirms, be 
one and the same substance : while all contrary 



CONNEXION OF MIND AND BODY. 137 

cases only establish the fact of a strong sympathy 
between them in their present connexion. 

As to the questions, how the soul, which is a spir- 
it, can act upon the body, and also how the condi- 
tion of our bodily organs can affect (as we know it 
does) the operations of the mind, it is not probable 
that a satisfactory solution of them will be furnish- 
ed in this life. For, whatever progress we may 
make in ascertaining the minor ramifications of our 
bodily organism in the brain, there is just as great, 
as total a difference between the finest perceptible 
branch of nerve and the mind, as between the 
mind and the foot or hand. Nor has the finest nerve 
one single property in common with mind, any more 
than has the hand or foot. The most philosophic 
view of the subject, Ave think, is the following: As 
the fact of the reciprocal influence of mind and 
body on each other in this life is taught us by the 
testimony of our senses and of consciousness, we 
should admit it. As God is the author as well of 
our mind and body, as of their connexion with each 
other, we should refer their reciprocal influence on 
each other to his will. It is the Divine will that 
mind and body should, in this world at least, con- 
stitute one being, man. And He who formed them 
thus, established just such a connexion between 
them as was necessary to His purpose, as was ne- 
cessary to make them act in unison, to make the 
material organ obey the mental impulse, and to sub- 
ject that mental agent to sundry influences from the 
material organs. If, then, it be asked why, when 
I resolve to raise my hand, do the muscles of the 
M 2 



138 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

arm obey the volition of my mind, the only philo- 
sophic, that is, reasonable and true, answer is, be- 
cause God has so appointed, has so formed me. 

The several theories of former days to account 
for the co-operation of soul and body, now find few 
advocates. Some writers of the seventeenth centu- 
ry contended that the soul and body have no im- 
mediate connexion, nor immediate control or in- 
fluence over each other, but that God, when he be- 
holds certain changes in the one, causes the corre- 
spondent changes to take place in the other by an 
immediate exertion of his power. But this hypoth- 
esis denies the reality of the reciprocal influence of 
soul and body on each other, instead of explaining 
it ; and, moreover, by making God the immediate 
author of all human actions, necessarily represents 
him as the author of sin. It was termed " Occa- 
sionalism," because it represents God as causing 
human actions from time to time, as occasion re- 
quired. Its author, as Dr. Krug informs us, was 
Arnold Geidinx, professor of Philosophy at Leyden, 
who died about 1664, or, according to another ac- 
count, 1669 ; and Des Cartes embraced a modifica- 
tion of it. 

Equally untenable, though for a season far more 
popular, was the theory of Leibnitz, termed the 
" pre-established harmony" (harmonia prasstabilita). 
According to this system, soul and body were from 
eternity designed by the Creator for a series of per- 
fectly harmonious changes, or actions, or phenom- 
ena. These changes or phenomena, both of the 
soul and body, are evolved separately in each, by 



THEORY OF LEIBNITZ. 139 

virtue of an inherent necessity, without any con- 
nexion with the other ; and these phenomena of 
the soul and the body do coincide or harmonize 
with each other in this life, so as to lead to the 
opinion of there being a reciprocal influence be- 
tween them, not because they actually exert such 
a reciprocal influence on each other, but simply in 
consequence of the original purpose of God, that 
they should so coincide. To this hypothesis, Leib- 
nitz was led by his well-known system of monads, 
according to which every monad, or ultimate atom, 
in the universe was thus separately predetermined ; 
and he illustrated it by the supposition of two 
watches, both of which kept perfect time. They 
moved on together, they coincided in their indica- 
tions of time, yet each moved by a separate intrin- 
sic force, and there was no real connexion what- 
ever between them. It must be obvious that this 
theory also denies instead of explaining the recip- 
rocal influence of mind and body on each other, 
and by reducing everything to a state of predeter- 
mined fatality, destroys all moral agency and ac- 
countability in man. 

We may, therefore, with the greater propriety 
recur to our first position, and while we, on the best 
of evidence, admit the fact of the reciprocal influ- 
ence of the soul and body on each other, at the 
same time refer it wholly to the Divine constitution 
of our complex nature. 

Of similar and equally unsatisfactory character 
are the later theories, which were designed to ex- 
plain a part of the general connexion and influence 



140 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

between soul and body, namely, those intended to 
explain the manner in which thought results from 
cerebral action, from impressions made on the bod- 
ily organs, and conducted by the nerves to the 
brain. 

Pes Cartes, adopting the ancient notion of ani- 
mal spirits circulating in the nervous fibres, con- 
jectured these fibres to be so many tubes pervading 
the body, and thought he could show how the pas- 
sage of these animal spirits through these tubes to 
and from the brain give rise to not only muscular 
motion, but also perception, memory, and imagin- 
ation. Yet, as anatomical investigations demon- 
strate that the nerves are not hollow, and as the 
very existence of these animal spirits is yet unes- 
tablished, this theory has naturally and justly found 
few advocates. 

Near the close of the seventeenth century, Sir 
Isaac Newton, who always carefully distinguished 
between the truths and facts which he considered as 
established by inductive evidence, and the mere con- 
jectures which he uttered as subjects of future in- 
vestigation for himself and others, proposed the in- 
quiry, " Whether there may not be an elastic 
medium, or ether, immensely more rare than air, 
which pervades all bodies, and which is the cause 
of gravitation ; of the refraction and reflection of 
the rays of light ; of the transmission of heat 
through spaces void of air ; and of many other phe- 
nomena." To these other phenomena he refers in 
" the 23d query subjoined to his optics, where he puts 
this question with regard to the impression made on 



THEORY OF DR. HARTLEY. 141 

the nerves and brain in perception, Whether vision is 
effected chiefly by the vibrations of this medium, ex- 
cited in the bottom of the eye by the rays of light, 
and propagated along the solid, pellucid, and uni- 
form capillaments of the optic nerve ? And whether 
hearing is effected by the vibrations of this or some 
other medium, excited by the tremour of the air in 
the auditory nerves, and propagated along the solid, 
pellucid, and uniform capillaments of those nerves."* 
On this conjecture, Dr. Hartley, regarding the 
nerves as solid and elastic substances, built his fanci- 
ful system, by which he accounts for the transmis- 
sion to the brain of the impression made on the exter- 
nal organ, by the supposition that " such impression 
causes vibrations of the small, and, as one may say, 
infinitesimal medullary particles, first in the nerves, 
and then in the brain ;"f and farther, that " the vi- 
brations are excited, propagated, and kept up partly 
by the ether, that is, by a very subtile elastic fluid ; 
partly by the uniformity, continuity, softness, and 
active powers of the medullary substance of the 
brain, spinal marrow, and nerves." But, if it were 
even true that the nervous fibre, which is now 
known to be unelastic and incapable of tension, 
were susceptible of vibrations, and that there is 
such a substance as this ether, of which there is no 
evidence, and that these vibrations were continued 
to the brain, does all this afford us the least assist- 
ance in understanding how the perception or sensa- 
tion of the mind succeeds or is occasioned by the 
impression on the external organ ? Certainly not. 

* Dr. Reid's Works, vol. ii., p. 85, 86. t Idem, vol. ii., p. 86. 



142 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

That there is some communication of influence be- 
tween the outward organ and the brain, through the 
medium of the nerves, seems to be certain, for the 
ligature to the nerve, or its total abscission, at once 
interrupts this communication, and destroys the sen- 
sibility of the nerve below the point of ligature or 
separation. But what the nature of this influence 
is, or how it is conveyed along the nerve, we know 
not. And if we did, this also would still leave us 
in the dark as to the mode of occurrence of the 
mental impression. For the brain itself, and the 
finest possible filament of it, is still matter, and ap- 
proximates no nearer the attributes of mind than 
does the external organ, the hand or foot. 

The last theory, which claims a passing notice, is 
that of ideas, as something intervening between the 
external object and the percipient mind. This 
view, with various modifications, has had numerous 
advocates both among the ancients and the moderns. 
The original term itself [idea, from Ideiv, to see) sig- 
nifies an image or form. In the Aristotelian phi- 
losophy, this term signified the original types or 
images of all created things in the Divine Mind, 
and also those higher conceptions of the human 
mind which correspond to these types. Subse- 
quently among the ancients, and also by some mod- 
erns, the word idea was used to designate certain 
images, or shadowy films, sometimes also termed 
species, forms, phantasms, and, by Mr. Hume, im- 
pressions, which all objects were supposed to be 
constantly sending forth in every direction. These 
images, it was believed, came in contact with the 



THE IDEAL SYSTEM. 143 

brain through the organs of sense, and were the 
immediate object of perception to the mind. The 
particulars of this view are thus described by Male- 
branche :* " I suppose that every one will grant 
that we perceive not the objects that are without us, 
immediately or of themselves. We see the sun, 
the stars, and an infinity of objects without us ; and 
it is not at all likely that the soul sallies out of the 
body, and, as it were, takes a walk through the 
heavens to contemplate all those objects. She sees 
them not, therefore, by themselves ; and the imme- 
diate object of the mind, when it sees the sun, for 
example, is not the sun, but something which is in- 
timately united to the soul ; and it is that which I 
call an idea. So that by the word idea I under- 
stand nothing else here, but that which is the imme- 
diate object, or nearest to the mind, when we per- 
ceive any object. It ought to be carefully observed, 
that, in order to the mind's perceiving any object, 
it is absolutely necessary that the idea of that ob- 
ject be actually present to it. Of this it is not pos- 
sible to doubt. The things which the soul per- 
ceives are of two kinds. They are either in the 
soul or without the soul. Those that are in the 
soul are its own thoughts ; that is to say, all its dif- 
ferent modifications. The soul has no need of 
ideas for perceiving them. But with regard to things 
without the mind, we cannot perceive them but by 
means of ideas." How far this theory has pre- 
vailed in past ages is a matter of some uncertainty, 
in consequence of the confused and often figurative 

* Payne's Elements, p. 123. 



144 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

manner in which writers on the subject often ex- 
pressed themselves. Dr. Reid supposed it to have 
been common till the days of Mr. Locke, and to 
have been received even by that illustrious writer 
himself. The language of Mr. Locke on this sub- 
ject is, doubtless, less perspicuous and discrimina- 
ting than it might be. Speaking of Jnis frequent 
use of the word idea, he says, "It serves best to 
stand for whatever is the object of the understand- 
ing when a man thinks. I have used it to express 
whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or 
whatever it is, which the mind can be employed 
about in thinking. I presume that it will be grant- 
ed me that there are such ideas in men's minds; 
every man is conscious of them in himself, and 
men's words and actions will satisfy him that they 
are in others." The former part of this quotation, 
it must be confessed, looks much like the ideal 
system, while the latter appears to sustain Dr. 
Brown, Dr. Beasley,* and others, who deny it, and 
to imply that by idea Locke may have generally 
meant, not any images or phantasms extraneous 
to the mind, and emanating from the objects per- 
ceived, but the perceptions of the mind itself, which 
inhere in the mind, and subsequently become the 
subjects of reflection. This ideal system was so ful- 
ly exposed by Dr. Reid, that, at least since his time, 
it has found no advocates. Properly considered, it 
affords no real advantage in explaining the phenom- 
ena of sensation. As these images or phantasms 

* See an excellent article by the Rev. Dr. Beasley, late Provost of the 
University in Philadelphia, in the Methodist Magazine for October, 1842. 



THE IDEAL SYSTEM. 145 

emanated from external objects, they must have 
been material ; and, however great their tenuity and 
refinement, they must have been matter still, and 
the transition from them to mind as difficult as that 
of any other matter. Nor is this theory at all ap- 
plicable to some of our perceptions, such as those 
of sound and smell ; for in what respect could these 
images resemble their original ? But the fallacy of 
this theory is most conclusively seen from the fact, 
that we have not the least shadow of evidence for 
the existence either of these phantasms, or of the 
impressions which they were supposed to make 
upon the brain. We must, therefore, revert to the 
view already given, that, in all our perceptions of 
external objects through any one of our bodily or- 
gans, it is the external object itself which is either 
directly or mediately the object of perception. And 
although we cannot explain the mode of communi- 
cation between the external object and the mind, 
yet the mystery attendant on this subject is not 
greater than that belonging to ten thousand other 
objects and processes around us, the truth of which 
is certain, while the mode of their existence or oc- 
currence is incomprehensible to us. 

N 



146 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 



PART II. 



SENTIENT IDEAS. 



Having completed the discussion of the first spe- 
cies of mental operations, to wit, the Cognitive class, 
we now proceed to call the reader's attention to what 
we have ranked as the second general class, namely, 
Sentient Ideas, or feelings. We stated on a former 
occasion, that entities bear a threefold relation to 
the human mind ; first, as subjects of our knowl- 
edge : secondly, as excitants of our feelings ; and, 
thirdly, as motives or materials for our action. As- 
suming, for the present, that entities are the ulti- 
mate excitants of feeling in us, we describe feeling 
as follows : By Feeling' is meant those sentient 
states of the mind mediately or immediately excited 
by. entities simple or composite. This influence is 
immediately excited, when the objective entities 
themselves, are at the time acting on us through 
the appropriate organs ; and it is excited mediate- 
ly, when our feelings are either retrospective or 
prospective. In the case of present entities, which 
are, at the time, the subjects of our attention, the 
entity itself is the excitant of our feeling. But 
when the entity is retrospective or prospective, our 
cognitive idea of it seems either to be itself the ex- 
citant, or, in some way, the medium or conductor 



CRITERIA OF THE FEELINGS. 147 

through which the external entity acts. Very often 
feelings accompanying our knowledge of some en- 
tities, are so feeble and indifferent, that we can 
scarcely pronounce them either pleasing or pain- 
ful ; yet, whenever they are sufficiently increased 
in degree, they will be found to assume this char- 
acteristic. 

The criteria, by which feelings are distinguished, 
are such as these : 

I. They have no object beyond themselves. If 
we have knowledge, it is a knowledge of some- 
thing — of some entity. But, in feeling, we can 
distinguish nothing but the simple state of the mind 
itself, to which we attribute the name feeling. If 
we form a volition, that volition has for its subject 
some action, physical or intellectual, of which we 
judge ourselves capable. But in feeling, we can 
discover no such subjects. 

II. Our feelings are not so absolutely dependant 
for their character on entities without us, as our 
knowledge is. Thus acids, when tasted, afford to 
some persons a pleasant feeling, and to others a 
contrary one ; thus, also, the entity man, in the act 
of falling from his horse, excites a painful feeling 
in the breast of his friend, and, perhaps, a pleasant 
one in that of his inveterate and bitter enemy. 

III. Feelings are always preceded by a cogni- 
tion of the entity which mediately or immediately 
produces them. 

In the farther discussion of our sentient ideas, we 
invite your attention to the following three topics : 
I. To the classification of Feelings. 



148 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

II. To entities as their ultimate excitants ; and, 
III. To the susceptibility of the mind for feeling ; 
that is, to the laws of feeling. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE CLASSIFICATION OF OUR FEELINGS. 

The ideas expressed by the term feelings, being 
simple and primitive ideas, cannot be logically de- 
fined, but are learned by every individual through 
consciousness. All feelings are in their intrinsic 
nature much alike, and hence great difficulty has 
presented itself in all attempts to classify them. 
They are, however, distinguished by a variety of 
circumstances attending them and their occurrence, 
and these may furnish a basis for their division. On 
this principle, all the feelings of which the human 
mind is susceptible may be divided into two classes 
— Individual and Relative Feeling. 

By individual feelings are meant those which 
have reference exclusively to ourselves ; such as 
joy, contentment, cheerfulness, hope, sorrow, grief, 
despair, &c. By the phrase relative feelings we 
would designate those which have a relation to 
some other sentient being, or other object ; such as 
love, hatred, friendship, compassion, gratitude, an- 
ger, envy, &c. We, therefore, present the follow- 
ing tabular analysis of human feelings. 



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INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS. 149 



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150 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

A division of relative feelings might also be 
made, into, 1. Those which refer to animate, and, 2. 
Those relating to inanimate objects. But this divis- 
ion would be based on the difference in the objects 
of the mental operations, rather than in the opera- 
tions themselves. 

Feelings may again be divided into the following 
three classes : 

I. Sensuous ; by which we mean those feelings 
obtained immediately through the bodily organs. 

II. Intellectual or Reflex, or those resulting from 
the reflex operations of the mind ; including the 
pleasures of taste, the feelings connected with our 
views of the beautiful, the sublime, the ludicrous, 
&c. 

III. Moral or Religious ; viz., those resulting 
from the consideration of the actions of moral 
agents in reference to the laws of man, and ulti- 
mately of God. 

Feeling has frequently been divided, in relation 
to time, into Present, Retrospective, and Prospective. 
This division is clear in its nature, and distinct in 
its lines of separation ; although we do not consid- 
er it so useful as the one first given, nor at all in- 
consistent with it. It labours, however, under the 
difficulty of requiring us to assign feelings of essen- 
tially the same kind to different classes. Thus, 
those feelings of approbation or disapprobation 
which attend the judicial act of conscience, as to the 
agreement or disagreement of our actions with the 
law of God, that is, with our duty, will belong to 
one class when they relate to present actions, but 



INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS. 151 

to a different class if they refer to our past conduct. 
Upon the whole, we consider the first division as 
the most natural and the best, and therefore have 
adopted it. 

Remarks on the different branches of the above 
classification. 

CLASS I. OF INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS. 

I. Of Sensations. 
In a former part of this work, we remarked that 
the term sensation has been used by the major part 
of authors on this subject, with a degree of vague- 
ness which cannot fail to cause obscurity in meta- 
physical discussions, if not avoided. Sometimes it 
has been employed as synonymous with perceptions, 
and, at other times, to designate feelings of various 
kinds, but especially those which are consequent 
on the perceptions through our bodily organs. It 
must be evident to all who reflect on the criteria 
which distinguish cognitive ideas from such as are 
sentient, that two kinds of mental phenomena en- 
tirely distinct and different are here confounded. 
And as the cognates of the term sensation, namely, 
sensitive, sensibility, &c, are universally employed 
in our language to express feelings and not cogni- 
tions, it will, we think, be best, in mental philoso- 
phy, to restrict this term also in a similar way. We 
therefore use the word sensations to express, not 
cognitions, but feelings of various kinds, and espe- 
cially those produced through our bodily organs. 
When discussing the process by which we obtain 
ideas through the bodily senses, we proved that each 



152 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of the five senses is a source of cognitions as well 
as of feelings. We easily perceive the difference 
between the idea obtained by beholding a beautiful 
landscape, and the feeling of pleasure which fol- 
lows it. The former is cognitive, the latter is sen- 
tient, is feeling. But is not the idea derived from 
tasting an apple or orange equally distinct from the 
pleasant feeling attending the same process ? And 
are not our ideas of the successive notes in a piece 
of music, different from the feelings, either pleasant 
or painful, cheerful or melancholy, which those 
notes also produce ? There is, therefore, a neces- 
sity for both of these terms, for perceptions and 
sensations, in reference to the operations of each of 
our bodily organs ; and if the one be used to express 
the cognitive result of their action, and the other 
more generally be confined to that which is sentient, 
much confusion will be avoided. 

All these sensations are obviously individual feel- 
ings, because they terminate in ourselves, in the 
sentient subject. 

II. Of Emotions. 

The term emotion also is employed in several 
different significations by respectable writers. By 
some the words sensations, emotions, and passions 
are used to designate different degrees of intensity 
in one and the same species of mental operations. 
But there is certainly a fixed difference between 
these terms in the usage of our language. Thus, 
no good writer would employ the term emotion to 
express a higher degree of the sensation produced 



INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS. 153 

by the organ of touch, any more than he would use 
the term passion to designate a still higher degree 
of it. Some authors by emotion designate a state 
of feeling intermediate between sensations and de- 
sires. 

Others define emotions to be those feelings which 
are consequent upon other mental operations than 
perceptions by the organs of sense. Yet this use 
of it is also not entirely correct ; because we speak 
of the emotions of the sublime or beautiful, and 
yet these emotions are immediately consequent on 
our perceptions, through the senses, of those objects 
which we regard as beautiful or sublime. And 
other writers employ the term emotion with almost 
as much latitude as feeling itself. A more correct 
description of emotions and appropriate use of the 
term, we think, would be the following. Emotions 
are those transient excitements of feeling which 
are consequent on mental operations direct or re- 
flective, other than perceptions through the organs 
of taste, smell, or touch. The very term emotion, 
in its primitive import, signifies a moving, a motion, 
an impulse ; thus indicating its transient nature. 
Nothing more is necessary to the intelligent inqui- 
rer than to reflect on the testimony of his own con- 
sciousness, to enable him to perceive that those 
feelings of the mind which he denominates emo- 
tions are of brief continuance, that they come and 
pass away again in a short time, and are then known 
to us only by memory. 

That they are different from cognitions and active 
operations, and that they are essentially sentient, 



154 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

are a species of feelings, is also a matter which can- 
not be rendered intelligible by words, but must be 
referred to the consciousness of each individual. 
When I behold a messenger, whom I had despatch- 
ed on a journey of a hundred miles, in four or five 
hours again entering my room, I am filled with sur- 
prise at his unexpected return ; and certainly I find 
no difficulty in distinguishing my perception of his 
personal appearance, and my knowledge of the un- 
expected circumstances under which he appears, 
from the feeling or emotion which attends it. 

Emotions always succeed some cognition, or some 
active operation of the mind. Before I can expe- 
rience the emotion of the beautiful or sublime, I 
must have had a perception of the object by which 
the emotion is caused ; and if I feel emotions of 
regret or sorrow at my failure in any active process 
in which I was engaged, say in an attempt to finish 
a sermon or other piece of composition within a 
given time, the failure and the consciousness of it 
must certainly have preceded the emotion, the tem- 
porary regret. Emotions are sometimes motives to 
action, and then, of course, they precede the desires 
or volitions resulting from them. We do not recol- 
lect, however, that the word emotion is applied to 
the feelings, of any degree, which are consequent 
on our perceptions through the organs of taste, 
smell, and touch. 

Emotions may be divided into intellectual and 
moral. Intellectual emotions are those which ex- 
press and imply no reference to moral character or 
conduct. They are such as the emotions of sub- 



INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS. 155 

lirnity, beauty, the ludicrous, emotions of surprise, 
wonder, astonishment, amazement, &c. The most 
important of these we will endeavour to explain in 
few words. It should, however, be distinctly re- 
membered that, in popular language, the terms em- 
ployed to designate these emotions, generally stand 
for a complex idea or state of mind, including a 
cognitive as well as a sentient element. Thus, when 
we speak of admiring the sublimity of a particular 
scene, we have reference as much, if not more, to 
our perceptions of its character and features, than 
to the emotions excited by it. And if we attempt 
to describe the ingredients of its sublimity, we de- 
scribe our perceptions as well as our consequent 
feelings. The terms beauty, sublimity, &c, are 
used both objectively and subjectively, and in men- 
tal philosophy we must discriminate between these 
different significations. Objective beauty inheres 
in the object itself which is styled beautiful. Sub- 
jective beauty is the effect produced on the mind 
by the contemplation of a beautiful object. This 
effect is complex, and includes both our perceptions 
of the object and the feelings accompanying them. 

Sublimity. 

The emotion of sublimity is that delightful, sol- 
emn, and expansive individual feeling of the mind, 
which, to use the language of a distinguished writer 
of our country,* is excited by the " contemplation of 
whatever is vast in nature, splendid in intellect, or 
lofty in morals." Or, in the language of Dr. Brown, 

* Dr. Wayland, in his Moral Dignity of the Missionary Enterprise. 



156 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

" Whatever is vast in the material world — whatever 
is supremely comprehensive in intellect — whatever 
in morals implies virtuous affections, or passions, far 
removed beyond the ordinary level of humanity, or 
even guilt itself, that is ennobled, in some measure, 
by the fearlessness of its darings, or the magnitude 
of the ends to which it has the boldness to aspire — 
these and various other objects, in matter and mind, 
produce the vivid feelings of sublimity." It has 
sometimes been disputed whether there is such a 
thing as objective sublimity ; whether there is, in the 
objects which are regarded as sublime, any particu- 
lar property calculated to excite the emotions in 
question ; or whether they are not wholly the result 
of association of ideas. That is, when we hear the 
thunder rolling over our heads, and perceive the 
earth trembling under our feet, and the lightning 
flashing in the sky, is it these several appearances 
which call forth the emotions of sublimity that we 
feel, or is it solely the conception of resistless power 
associated with them ? Mr. Payne, erroneously, we 
think, affirms the latter. That our reflections asso- 
ciated with the perception of these phenomena are 
also concerned in the production of these emotions 
seems evident ; yet they are certainly not the sole 
cause of them. If the property of these phenomena, 
by which they cause the emotion of sublimity, be 
nothing more than their tendency to impress the 
mind with the conception of vast, resistless, and ter- 
rific power, still this would be a peculiar property 
of these objects, because others of a different kind 
do not possess it. Nor does the fact, that the rum- 



INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS. 157 

bling of a cart may be mistaken for distant thunder, 
and excite emotions of sublimity, appear to disprove 
our position. It only shows, that the recollection 
of a scene of real sublimity may again excite emo- 
tions of the sublime ; and that any one feature of 
such a scene, or even anything nearly resembling 
it, may recall the essential circumstances of such 
scenes formerly witnessed by us. Thus the rum- 
bling of the cart recalls our former impressions of 
thunder, and with it, all those circumstances which 
are calculated to excite ideas of vast and resistless 
power, and thus it excites the emotions of sublimity. 
If thunder had no property peculiarly calculated to 
excite those ideas which produce emotions of sub- 
limity, then as the cart by association elicited our 
recollection of those same ideas, and thus produced 
these emotions, it would itself be regarded by us 
as a sublime object, even after it is known to be the 
cause of the sound. The sight of a fellow-mortal 
lying emaciated on a bed of sickness, scarce able to 
lift his hand, may, by the association of contrast, re- 
call to our minds the resistless power of Jehovah, 
and thus the emotion of sublimity be excited. But 
does any man transfer this emotion from God to the 
feeble mortal ? Certainly not. Therefore, what- 
ever is the process by which certain objects or ac- 
tions produce the emotion of sublimity, whether the 
effect be mediate or immediate, it is evident that 
entities or objects of this class do possess a peculiar 
tendency to produce these emotions, which objects 
of a different kind have not. If, then, it be inquired, 
is there any sublimity in external objects or actions 

O 



158 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

themselves, we reply, there is that in them which 
calls forth emotions of the sublime ; and as univer- 
sal usage designates this something sublimity, we 
see no objection to the term. And this same train 
of remarks is equally applicable to objects exciting 
emotions of beauty. 

The ordinary ingredients of sublimity in objects, 
or those attributes of them which are found by ex- 
perience to excite in us the emotions of sublimity, 
are vastness in dimension, such as a boundless 
plain or the vast ocean ; but especially height and 
depth, as a high mountain, a deep precipice, or the 
expanse of heaven, which is both high and bound- 
less ; resistless force, as the rushing of mighty wa- 
ters, the devastating tornado, prostrating trees and 
houses in its course ; extremes of colour, as the 
dazzling brightness of the sun, or the contrary ex- 
treme, in the dark and lowering clouds of a gath- 
ering storm ; vast sounds, as the roaring of thun- 
der, the sound of many waters ; as well as vastness 
of power, physical, intellectual, and moral. 

Beauty. 

The emotion of beauty cannot be logically defi- 
ned, but is known by consciousness to every individ- 
ual. It may be described as that pleasant individ- 
ual feeling of the mind which is excited by the per- 
ception of certain objects, termed beautiful, in the 
physical, intellectual, and moral world. The term 
beauty, like sublimity, is used both objectively and 
subjectively ; to express a certain property in out- 
ward entities, and also to designate the perceptions 



INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS. 159 

and feelings caused by them. In reference to this 
emotion, also, the very existence of objective beau- 
ty has been denied, and the entire effect of ob- 
jects of particular kinds in causing this emotion 
has been attributed to association. It is need- 
less to say, that these emotions do not resemble 
the properties in the object which produces them, 
as no mental operation, either cognitive, sentient, 
or active, does or can in any one particular resem- 
ble any material object. But that there are certain 
characteristics, belonging to those numberless ob- 
jects termed beautiful, which mediately or immedi- 
ately cause our emotions of beauty, and lead us to 
regard those objects as beautiful, is as evident in 
the case of beauty as of sublimity ; and the same 
arguments employed to prove it in that case are 
equally applicable to this. The emotions of beauty 
are augmented and multiplied by the influence of as- 
sociation ; but, certainly, there must be some ori- 
ginal basis for association to build upon, and even 
these associations must contain nothing inconsistent 
with the nature of beauty, or they impair instead of 
increasing the strength of the emotion. The influ- 
ence of association is exhibited in the figurative 
language often employed to express these feelings, 
or, rather, the objects exciting them. We charac- 
terize landscapes as cheerful or gloomy ; sounds as 
animated or mournful ; forms as delicate or modest ; 
colours as gay or grave, &c. 

It is difficult to describe the precise characteristics 
of beauty ; yet each individual possesses a natural 
susceptibility for objects of this kind, and can judge 



160 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

for himself. The influence of association and edu- 
cation causes the diversity of taste observable among 
different persons on these subjects ; but there are 
some objects and characteristics pretty generally 
agreed on. Such are delicate rather than glaring 
colours, and also a particular variety of such colours. 
Some kinds of motion are beautiful, such as the gen- 
tle gliding of a bird through the air, the undulating 
motion of the surface of a lake when moved by a 
gentle breeze, or the waving of a field of wheat 
when a gentle current of air is passing over it. 
Some figures or forms are beautiful, either on ac- 
count of their regularity, as in the case of a circle, 
a triangle, or a square ; or on account of their 
graceful variety, as in plants, leaves, or trees. The 
waving line is termed the line of beauty, and the 
same character belongs to twisted pillars, or the 
vine or ivy gracefully entwined around the oak. 
Certain sounds are also found to excite the emotion 
of beauty, as well simply as in their combinations. 
All men who have a taste for music, characterize 
certain airs as beautiful. Some works of art also 
are beautiful, when they combine the natural ele- 
ments of beauty in their form or colour. The cre- 
ations of imagination, as seen in poems or other 
works of fiction, are beautiful when the writer has 
faithfully copied nature, that is, has employed the 
natural sources of beauty, and conformed to their 
principles. The human countenance is often among 
the most beautiful objects, not only on account of 
the beauties of form and colour, but also the ex- 
pression of amiable, and cheerful, and benevolent 
feelings in its lineaments. This is, in part, a spe- 



INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS, 161 

cies of social, if not moral beauty. Intellectual 
and moral excellence is often exhibited in ways and 
under circumstances such as are felt to be beau- 
tiful by the corresponding emotions they excite. 
In some cases many of these sources of beauty are 
combined, and the general effect thus enhanced. 
" Perhaps," says Dr. Blair, " the most complete 
assemblage of beautiful objects that can anywhere 
be found, is presented by a rich, natural landscape, 
where there is a sufficient variety of objects : fields 
in verdure, scattered trees and flowers, running 
water, and animals grazing. If to these be joined 
some of the productions of art. which suit with such 
a scene, as a bridge with arches over a river, smoke 
rising from cottages in the midst of trees, and the 
distant view of a fine building seen by the rising- 
sun ; we then enjoy in the highest perfection that 
gay, cheerful, and placid sensation which charac- 
terizes beauty." Some operations purely intellect- 
ual possess a high degree of beauty, and excite 
corresponding pleasing emotions ; yet in some ca- 
ses, especially when they border on the sublime, 
they derive most of their influence from association. 
Thus, while there is manifest beauty in many of 
the demonstrations of geometry, we doubt not that 
the ecstatic emotion felt by the great mathematician 
Bernoulli, as he followed Sir Isaac Newton in some 
of his great steps — a feeling which he, on his death- 
bed, informed Professor Robinson, of Edinburgh, 
gave him the liveliest conception he had ever en- 
joyed of the happiness of heaven — arose, not sim- 
ply from the intellectual process of reasoning, but 
chiefly from the enlarged views thus obtained of the 
02 



162 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

grandeur and overwhelming extent of the universe 
itself. But even with this allowance, it is to be 
feared his idea of heaven was essentially defective, 
as it appears not to have embraced that " holiness'' 
of thought, feeling, and action which characterizes 
the inhabitants and occupations of heaven, and 
" without which no man can see God." 

The Ludicrous. 
The emotion of the ludicrous is that transient, 
pleasing individual feeling, excited in the mind by 
those entities or objects, physical or intellectual, 
which are calculated to cause laughter. The ob- 
jective ludicrous, or that property in entities which 
is directly or indirectly the cause of the emotion, 
has been variously defined. Mr. Payne and others 
regard it as a strange mixture of congruity and in- 
congruity, the unexpected perception of which oc- 
casions the mental emotion. This admixture of the 
congruous and incongruous is sometimes found in 
the language rather than the thing. Such is the 
case, for example, in puns and riddles ; as when a 
barrister, on hearing it remarked what a large quan- 
tity of ham he had eaten, replied that he had only 
been taking extracts from Bacon's Abridgment* 
But in the couplet of Hudibras, 

" For rhyme the rudder is of verses, 
s With which, like ships, they steer their courses," 

the incongruity is observed between the things com- 
pared, verses and a ship. 

To the class of ludicrous emotions belong those 
feelings excited by what is termed Wit. Wit seems 
to be the sudden and unexpected association of ideas, 



INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS. 163 

natural, but novel, and often conveying an important 
fact or argument in few words, or by an allusion, 
the consequence of which flashes on the hearer's 
mind ; or by an accommodation or play on some 
word or thing said before. Thus, Plutarch informs 
us, when Metellus Nepos told Cicero that he had 
ruined more persons as a witness than he had saved 
as an advocate, Cicero replied, " I grant it, for I have 
more truth than eloquence." And when a young 
man, who lay under the charge of having given his 
father a poisoned cake, was talking in an insolent 
manner, and threatening that Cicero should feel the 
weight of his reproaches, Cicero replied, " I would 
much rather have them than your cake." 

Burlesque is a species of wit employed in ren- 
dering ludicrous that which is naturally grave or dig- 
nified, or which assumes to be so, by comparing it to 
things really mean and contemptible. Thus, Hudi- 
bras burlesques the adventures of his reputed hero : 

" Ah me ! what perils do environ 
The man that meddles with cold iron ; 
What plaguy mischiefs and mishaps 
Do dog him still with after-claps ! 
For though dame Fortune seem to smile, 
And leer upon him for a while, 
She'll after show him, in the nick 
Of all his glories, a dog-trick." 

The mock-heroic is another species of wit, which 
consists in making low or trifling persons or things 
appear ridiculous by speaking of them in lofty and 
grandiloquent language, or by representing them as 
speaking in such style. Thus, in the same poem, 
Ralpho is made to address the beaten and prostrate 
knight : 



164 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

" You are, great sir, 
A self-denying conqueror, 
As high, victorious, and great, 
As ever fought for the churches yet, 
If you will give yourself but leave 
To make out what y'already have ; 
That's victory. The foe, for dread 
Of your nine-worthiness, is fled ; 
All save Crowdero, for whose sake 
You did the espous'd cause undertake ; 
And he lies pris'ner at your feet, 
To be disposed as you think meet ; 
Either for life, or death, or sale, 
The gallows, or perpetual jail ; 
For one wink of your powerful eye 
Must sentence him to live or die." 

Surprise, Wonder, Astonishment, Amazement. 

These are all different modifications of the same 
individual feeling, under different circumstances 
and degrees. Surprise is that feeling excited by 
the perception of something novel and unexpected 
This feeling is termed wonder, if the novel and un 
expected object is also strange or unaccountable 
Astonishment designates a higher degree of wonder 
And Amazement implies something intricate or in 
explicable in the object which caused, the feeling. 

These emotions may with propriety be termed 
monitory emotions, for they arrest for a season the 
action of the mind ; and, as Dr. Brown justly re- 
marks, " It is in new circumstances that it is most 
necessary for us to be upon our guard, because, 
from their novelty, we cannot be aware of the effects 
that attend them, and require, therefore, more than 
usual caution where foresight is impossible. But 
if new circumstances had not produced feelings pe- 
culiarly vivid, little regard might have been paid to 






INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS. 165 

them, and the evil, therefore, might have been suf- 
fered before the alarm was felt. Against this dan- 
ger nature has most providentially guarded us. We 
cannot feel surprise without a more than ordinary- 
interest in the objects which may have excited this 
emotion, and a consequent tendency to pause till 
their properties have become in some degree known 
to us. Our astonishment may, therefore, be con- 
sidered as a voice from that Almighty goodness 
which constantly protects us, that, in circumstances 
in which inattention might be perilous, whispers, or 
almost cries to us, Beware." 

The Moral Emotions. 

Moral emotions may be described as those indi- 
vidual feelings of the mind which are consequent 
on our cognition of moral truth, as well as moral 
character or conduct. The contemplation of the 
beauty of holiness in the Divine law itself, causes a 
delightful emotion in the Christian. The morality 
or immorality of an action, properly consists in its 
agreement or disagreement with the law of God. 
And our ideas of its morality will depend on our idea 
of that law, be it more or less accurate or defective. 
This relation of agreement or disagreement with 
our views of the law of God is, therefore, the entity 
which causes the peculiar feelings of pleasure or 
pain in view of moral actions, either our own or 
those of others. The terms moral approbation or 
disapprobation seem to include both the cognitive 
and sentient element, both our judgment that the 
act is right or wrong, as well as the concomitant 



166 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

feeling. Sense of moral obligation, more properly 
designates the impulsive part of conscience, and per- 
haps more or less feeling accompanying it. The 
operations of conscience, fully considered, consist of 
three ingredients, the judicial, the sentient, and the 
impulsive. The judicial ingredient is that judgment 
which we form of our actions, as being conformed 
or contrary to the law of God, and has found its 
place in the discussion of our cognitive ideas in the 
section on Relative Knowledge. The impulsive 
feature is active in its nature, and is discussed in 
the third division of our subject, when we treat of 
the first constitutional inclination. Our concern at 
present is wholly with the sentient part of these com- 
plex operations. 

The moral emotions, like all other feelings, are 
original feelings of the mind, which imply a suscep- 
tibility in the mind for such feelings, and thus at 
once decide the point, that conscience, or our moral 
faculty, is an original part of the constitution of the 
soul. But it does not hence follow that its opera- 
tions are not complex, embracing elements of differ- 
ent kinds. As they are original feelings, they must 
be learned from consciousness, and cannot be logi- 
cally defined. 

These feelings are neither numerous nor diversi- 
fied. They are either pleasant or painful, the for- 
mer consequent on a judgment of approval of a 
given action, and the latter resulting from a judg- 
ment of disapproval. From their intimate connex- 
ion with these judgments, some writers have con- 
founded the two, and even designated the pleasant 
feeling a feeling of approbation, and the unpleasant 



INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS. 167 

one a feeling of disapproval, forgetful of the judg- 
ment included in the term. In popular language 
this may be allowed, but in philosophical discus- 
sions we should always distinguish the feeling ac- 
companying the approval from the approval itself, 
which is always a judgment of the mind, that the 
act is right, is conformed to the will of God. Keep- 
ing in view this distinction, it may not be improper 
to retain the popular designation, and speak of 
judgments of approval or disapproval, and also feel- 
ings of approbation and disapprobation, meaning 
by the latter the emotions, either pleasant or pain- 
ful, consequent on those judgments. Those feel- 
ings are also sometimes termed feelings of inno- 
cence or guilt, of self-approbation, or self-condem- 
nation, or remorse. 

As our moral emotions are consequent on the 
judgments of approval or disapproval to which they 
succeed, it follows, that if those judgments change, 
the feelings will 'change also. Thus, so long as 
Paul was conscious that his judgment approved of 
the persecution of Christians, he contemplated the 
act with pleasing emotions, and felt an inward im- 
pulse urging him to do it. But when his views on 
the subject of Jesus of Nazareth changed, and his 
judgment disapproved the act, he regarded with 
emotions of pain and regret the very conduct in 
which he had formerly delighted. Nor does this 
liability to change in our emotions imply that they 
are not to be depended on, any more than change 
of opinion in reference to any subject proves that 
our intellectual or cognitive powers cannot be re- 
lied on. It only proves that our moral nature, in 



168 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

I 

ts cognitive, sentient, and active departments, is ' 
capable of improvement, and is a suitable subject of I 
education. 

The terms moral emotions may also be applied 
to transient impulses of some of our relative feelings, 
such as love and hatred, sympathy, &c, in as far 
as these feelings are matter of duty, and we have 
indirect control over them. 

III. The Affections. 

By the term affections we would designate those 
habits, or habitual states of feeling, which are more 
durable than sensations or emotions. Some of the 
affections refer only to ourselves, and some termi- 
nate on other objects. It is the former alone which 
belong to the individual feelings, now under dis- 
cussion. They may be divided into pleasant and 
unpleasant. 

The pleasant affections are such as joy, cheer- 
fulness, contentment, humility, patience. Joy is a 
highly pleasurable affection, excited in the mind by 
the contemplation of something past, present, or 
prospective, which we regard as highly favourabir 
to us or others. Cheerfulness is an habitual, moder- 
ate, pleasant affection of the mind, resulting from the 
view of our condition as on the whole favourable. 
It results from the habit of viewing the bright side of 
human affairs, and is of great importance in life, to 
ourselves and those around us. It often arises from 
constitutional temperament, but its purest source is 
true piety, which teaches us to dwell much on the 
numberless mercies surrounding us, and to believe 
that even the ills of life are designed for greater 



INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS. 169 

good. Contentment is a moderate, tranquil, pleasant 
affection, resulting from the conviction, that the cir- 
cumstances of our situation are, on the whole, such 
as not to give us just cause of dissatisfaction. Hu- 
mility is a moderate, pleasing affection, arising from 
a view of our un worthiness. Patience is a moderate, 
pleasing affection, resulting from our determination 
to endure the ills of life without murmuring. 

The painful affections are by some writers termed 
passions, but this term is often applied to some rel- 
ative affections both pleasant and unpleasant, to 
designate their existence in a high degree. Thus 
we speak of the passion of love and of anger. The 
painful individual affections are such as penitence, 
discontent, sadness, grief, despair, pride, vanity, 
fretfulness, &c. Penitence is that painful guilty 
feeling of self-condemnation, resulting from a viola- 
tion of known duty. Discontent is a painful feeling 
arising from the conviction, that we have reason to 
complain of our condition or treatment. Sadness 
is a moderate, painful feeling of dejection, resulting 
from some loss or difficulty to ourselves or those we 
love. Grief is a more intense, painful affection than 
sadness, resulting from a higher degree of the same 
causes. Despair is an intense and settled painful 
affection, resulting from the belief that our condition 
is hopeless, or the object of our desire unattainable. 
Pride is that feeling of self-complacency which arises 
from an over-estimate of our own merits. Vanity is 
that affection of the mind which results from an 
over-estimate of our own merits, and a desire that 
they may be admired by others. Fretfulness is a 

P 



170 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

painful feeling, resulting from losses or difficulties 
of minor importance. 

IV. The feelings connected with our Bodily Appe- 
tites. 

These appetites are such as hunger and thirst ; 
the operations of which are connected with feel- 
ings, pleasant or unpleasant, of the individual class, 
the nature of which will be more fully discussed in 
a subsequent section. 

We come now to the second general class of 
feelings. 

CLASS II. RELATIVE FEELINGS, 

OR THOSE WHICH TERMINATE ON SOME OTHER OBJECTS THAN OURSELVES. 

These we divide into benevolent, malevolent, sym- 
pathetic, and antipathetic. 

I. Benevolent Feelings or Affections. 

These are relative feelings, which are favourable 
to the being or thing, on which they terminate. 
These feelings constitute one of the noblest por- 
tions of our nature. When sanctified by Divine 
grace, they enter largely into the elements of true 
piety, and even in the natural man constitute one 
of the purest and principal sources of the happiness 
which he enjoys. The term affections is applied 
to this kind of feelings more generally than to any 
others, and in more specific accordance with the 
primitive import of the term. 

Benevolence, or Love, is a relative affection of a 
very broad character, and embraces various modi- 
fications, according to the different circumstances 
under which it is exercised. In its widest accepta- 



RELATIVE FEELINGS. 171 

tion, benevolence is a pleasing feeling of good- will 
and desire for the happiness of all sentient beings, ir- 
respective of their character or conduct. With this 
affection a good man loves the whole human fami- 
ly, as well as irrational animals. This feeling ap- 
pears to be much weaker in depraved human na- 
ture than the other modifications of love, and a ca- 
reer of sin very soon habitually overpowers it. 

Love, in its other modifications, embraces in it a 
perception of something agreeable, praiseworthy, 
or desirable in the appearance, character, or con- 
duct of the object beloved. It also implies delight 
in this object, a desire for its possession or enjoy- 
ment, and a disposition to promote its happiness. 
It is always^ in its intrinsic nature, a pleasing affec- 
tion. To a certain extent it is voluntary in well- 
balanced minds, and can be mediately controlled, 
by either shunning the presence and contemplation 
of the object which excites it, or by frequenting 
that presence and indulging in reflections on it 
when absent. All this, however, clearly proves that 
there is something in the beloved object itself which 
excites our affection, while, of course, it presuppo- 
ses in the mind a constitutional susceptibility to be 
thus affected. 

The principal modifications of this affection are 
the following : Paternal love, that affection which 
a father feels for his offspring, and which induces 
him contentedly to toil all day long for the support 
of his children, and to promote their welfare in ev- 
ery possible way. Maternal love is that affection 
felt by a mother for her children, which makes her 
watch especially over their defenceless years with 



172 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ceaseless care, and willingly endure the loss of rest 
and convenience in protecting and rearing them. 
Conjugal love is the affection of husband and wife 
towards each other, which induces them to study- 
to promote each other's happiness, to overlook each 
other's infirmities, and to lighten by mutual sympa- 
thy the ordinary troubles and afflictions of life. Fil- 
ial affection is that love which children bear to their 
parents. These several species of affection form 
alike the basis of the domestic or family institution, 
and the cement by which its members are held to- 
gether. A beautiful instance of conjugal affection 
is related by Xenophon in his semi-historical Cyro- 
psedia. Cyrus had taken captive Tigranes, the young 
Prince of Armenia, together with his wife, whom he 
had recently married, and of whom he was pas- 
sionately fond. When both were brought before 
Cyrus, he asked the prince what he would pay to 
receive back his wife again, to which question Ti- 
granes replied, " I will, if necessary, give my life 
to redeem her from servitude." Cyrus nobly gave 
liberty to all the prisoners, who, on departing, could 
not find words to express their admiration of their 
noble conqueror ; some applauding his wisdom, oth- 
ers his bravery, others his clemency, and some his 
beauty and tallness. At length Tigranes thus ad- 
dressed his wife : " And do you, Armenia, tell me, 
did Cyrus appear to you to be handsome ?" " In- 
deed," said she, " I did not look at him." " At 
whom, then, were you looking ?" said Tigranes. 
" At him, truly, who said that he was willing to lay 
down his life to purchase my freedom." Of mater- 
nal affection the history of every age is replete with 



RELATIVE FEELINGS. 173 

examples. An interesting case is quoted from an 
anonymous writer by Professor Upham. " When 
the Ajax, man-of-war, took fire in the straits of 
the Bosphorus, in 1807, an awful scene of distrac- 
tion ensued. The ship was of great size, full of 
people, and under the attack of an enemy at the 
time ; the mouths of destruction seemed to wage 
contention for their prey. Many of those on board 
could entertain no hopes of deliverance ; striving 
to shun one devouring element, they were the vic- 
tims of another. While the conflagration was ra- 
ging furiously, and shrieks of terror rent the air, an 
unfortunate mother, regardless of herself, seemed 
solicitous only for the safety of her infant child. 
She never attempted to escape ; but she committed 
it to the charge of an officer, who, at her earnest 
request, endeavoured to secure it in his coat ; and 
following the tender deposite with her eyes as he 
retired, she calmly awaited that catastrophe in 
which the rest were about to be involved. Amid 
the exertions of the officer in such an emergency, 
the infant dropped into the sea, which was no soon- 
er discovered by the unhappy parent, than, frantic, 
she plunged from the vessel's side as if to preserve 
it ; she sunk, and was seen no more." 

Gratitude, friendship, respect, confidence, patri- 
otism, and hope express pleasing relative feelings, 
the nature of which is so well understood as not to 
need farther elucidation. 

Love to God is that pleasant relative feeling 
which the good man cherishes towards God as a 
being of infinite perfections, and as deserving of 
P2 



174 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

his supreme affection. This feeling, the Scriptures 
teach us, is supreme in the heart of the true Chris- 
tian ; and, as conversion does but restore the char- 
acter of fallen man in some degree to its primitive 
condition, it seems reasonable to believe that it was 
the supreme affection of the soul in the state of 
primitive innocence. Adoration includes, besides 
its cognitive and active elements, a kindred feeling 
of more solemn kind, which accompanies our acts 
of worship, that is, our repetition of the truths of 
Scripture concerning the glorious character and re- 
lations of God, in an oral or mental address to him. 

II. Malevolent, Repulsive, or Defensive Feelings. 

Malevolent, or defensive affections, are those 
painful relative feelings which involve hostility, and 
a disposition to injure the beings on which they ter- 
minate. The malevolent affections appear to be 
a perversion of an original susceptibility, which is 
per se good, and purely defensive in its nature. 
Even in our fallen state the command of God to us 
is, in certain circumstances, " Be ye angry and sin 
not ;" and, prior to the fall, the exercises of this 
power were all of that sinless kind. These feel- 
ings are consequent on the perception or contem- 
plation of any person or object, which we deem 
hostile to ourselves, or to those with whom we sym- 
pathize, or to that which is right. In our unfallen 
state, our interests and feelings were in invariable 
harmony with the will of God : consequently, no- 
thing could call forth these feelings but what was 
opposed to the will of God, or, in other words, was 
sin. Originally, therefore, our repulsive feelings 



RELATIVE FEELINGS. 175 

were purely feelings of abhorrence or repugnance 
at sin. But, in the present state of man, it is un- 
deniable that the love of self preponderates over 
the love of God, and we often cherish interests and 
desires opposed to his will. Hence, when our re- 
pugnant feelings are excited against others for op- 
posing us, or our interests or desires, we are often 
wrong, and our opponents right, and these feelings 
are thus enlisted in opposition to right, in hostility 
to the will of God. Yet, in proportion as the im- 
age of God is restored in man, in proportion as he 
loves holiness and hates sin, his repugnant affec- 
tions will always be opposed only to sinners and to 
sin ; he will hate and feel anger only at that which 
God hates ; and thus, in exemplification of the 
Scripture precept, he " will be angry and not sin." 
The feelings belonging to this class are^such as 
the following : anger, hatred, resentment, revenge, 
malignity, cruelty, and malice. 

III. Sympathetic Feelings. 

Sympathetic feelings are relative affections of the 
mind, which imply similarity or congeniality to the 
feelings of the being on which they terminate. 

Sympathetic feelings do not differ in their gener- 
al nature from the other phenomena of our sentient 
nature. They are all feelings excited in the mind 
by the contemplation of certain entities. They are 
both pleasant and unpleasant, according as they are 
excited by the happiness or misery of our fellow- 
creatures. It is alike accordant with the principles 
of our nature, that we should rejoice with them that 
rejoice, and weep with those who weep. Yet ex- 



176 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

perience proves that we sympathize most acutely 
with those whose feelings are similar to the pre- 
vailing state of our own minds at the time. We 
do not, indeed, even in this case, literally partici- 
pate in the feelings of others, because every man's 
feelings, like his other mental phenomena, are in- 
alienable and untransferable. But in the similar 
state of our own minds, our susceptibility for feel- 
ings of that kind is peculiarly acute, and, therefore, 
deeper and stronger feelings are excited by the con- 
templation of the same entities than would at other 
times be the case. The impulses of sympathy are 
often sudden and unpremeditated, and lead to in- 
stantaneous action for the relief of those in danger 
or in pain, as when we rush to the relief of an in- 
dividual who is sinking beneath the strokes of some 
ruffian. „These sympathetic feelings have a most 
happy influence in harmonizing the differences 
which often exist among associates and in families, 
and thus making happy the intercourse of those 
who would otherwise be ever at variance. 

Besides the general term sympathy, which is alike 
applicable to a fellow-feeling of a pleasing or pain- 
ful nature, the terms compassion, pity, commisera- 
tion, are often used as synonymous terms, and at 
other times to express some shades of diversity in 
these feelings. Condolence signifies a fellow-feel- 
ing with others in suffering. 

IV. Antipathetic Feelings. 

To this class we refer all those relative feelings 
which, though they have reference to some other 
being, imply only opposition of feeling, but not in- 



RELATIVE FEELINGS. 177 

tention of action. They are such as envy, jealousy, 
disgust, grudging, fear, dread, horror, and indigna- 
tion. 

Envy is that painful relative feeling which is exci- 
ted in the selfish mind by the contemplation of some 
desirable property or possession of another. This 
feeling is excited more readily in some minds than 
in others, and the different susceptibility for it is 
proportioned to the relative preponderance of the 
second constitutional inclination over the first, that 
is, in proportion as the individual is in the habit of 
being influenced more by selfishness, the love of 
well-being, rather than by the moral fitness of 
things, his duty. It is the design and tendency of 
true religion to suppress and eradicate these feelings, 
and the truly pious man is rarely guilty of them. 

Jealousy, in its primary application, has reference 
to amatory affection, and signifies that painful feel- 
ing of temporary or qualified displeasure against an 
individual whom we love or have loved, because 
we suppose some other person to be preferred to 
ourselves. The term jealousy is, however, more 
generally applied to that painful feeling which is 
excited by apprehension that some other person 
has or will obtain some object which we had hoped 
to acquire ourselves. It is in this sense of it that 
we speak of professional jealousy, and jealousy be- 
tween competitors for any supposed good. This 
feeling has a particular tendency to warp the judg- 
ment, to make us place the most unfavourable con- 
struction on the actions of its object, and to magni- 
fy molehills into mountains ; so that it may with 
truth be said, 



178 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

" Trifles, light as air, 
Are to the jealous confirmation strong 
As proofs of Holy Writ." 

Disgust is an unpleasant feeling of aversion to an 
individual on account of something low, mean, ob- 
scene, vulgar, or base in his person or conduct. 
Indignation is the same feeling, mingled with con- 
tempt and scorn for its object. 

Fear is a painful feeling, resulting from the con- 
viction of some impending or probable evil. Dread 
is a higher and more permanent degree of the same 
feeling. Horror is a still higher degree of fear, 
excited by the sudden and unexpected view of 
something very evil or dangerous in our condition 
or conduct. 



CHAPTER II. 

OF ENTITIES AS EXCITANTS OF FEELING. 
SECTION I. 

All feeling, like knowledge, may be traced me- 
diately or immediately to entities without the mind. 
The eye could never afford us feeling if the rays of 
light were not reflected from external entities to it, 
or did not reach it from the surrounding atmosphere. 
The pleasing or painful feelings, excited by entities 
through the eye, are produced immediately by the 
rays of light which reach the eyes, and ultimately, 
in a certain sense, by the particular object from 



EXTERNAL ENTITIES EXCITANTS OF FEELING. 179 

which the rays pass, and which give them their pe- 
culiar texture or combination of colours. 

The ear could never be the medium through 
which either knowledge or feeling is excited, if the 
vibrations of the atmosphere were not permitted to 
reach the tympanum. The vibrating atmosphere is 
therefore the entity which immediately excites the 
feelings connected with sound, and the sounding 
body is the ultimate entity which gives the air its 
vibratory motion. 

The nose could never be the vehicle of knowl- 
edge or feeling to the mind, if the effluvia emana- 
ting from surrounding odorous bodies were not per- 
mitted to touch the olfactory nerves. 

Nor does religious feeling seem to be different in 
its nature. Thus, the Christian meditates on the 
glorious character of God, and the feelings of his 
heart are excited to the highest pitch. But what is 
this meditation else than an inspection of the entity 
God, and his relations to us ? By these it is that 
our feelings are excited. The case is similar, when 
our feelings are occasioned by reading the Divine 
word ; for the signs or letters read remind us of 
the sounds for which the letters stand, and the rec- 
ollection of these recalls the ideas of real, objective 
entities. The daily habit of meditating on heaven- 
ly or Divine things, by the same law of mind, keeps 
alive our interest, or, rather, our feelings, on this 
subject, and increases the frequency of our rein- 
spection of them ; thus, a kind of rapport is form- 
ed between the soul of the Christian and that heav- 
en which is his home, and that God who is his ev- 
erlasting friend. 



180 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

SECTION II. 

Entities of every class possess some tendency, 
though very different in degree, to excite feeling in 
the mind. Our remark is not that this tendency is 
perceptible in every entity belonging to each class, 
but that it is perceptible in some of every class. 
With regard to solids and liquids, the truth of this 
remark is evident. It is self-evident, that all arti- 
cles of food or drink possess it in some degree. 
Other objects of these classes, which at first view 
might seem incapable of exciting feeling, change 
their aspect when more closely examined. Thus, 
who would attribute to the earth and minerals the 
power of exciting feeling in the mind ; and yet 
what else is the pleasure found by men in the pur- 
suit of Geology and Mineralogy, than the result of 
this very feeling excited by a contemplation of the 
laws and principles of these sciences, as delineated 
in nature ? The pleasures experienced in the study 
of optics, exemplify the feelings excited by the en- 
tity light, its laws, properties, and relations. Space 
and number, which would seem, from their nature, 
least capable of exciting feeling in the mind, are, 
in fact, found more operative than some others, 
and afford all the pleasures of geometrical and 
mathematical study. 

Our retrospective and prospective knowledge of en- 
tities also produces feelings similar in kind, though 
generally inferior in degree, to the objective entity 
itself, when it is the subject of present attention ; 
yet our retrospective ideas are also entities without 



DIFFERENT DEGREES OF THIS POWER IN ENTITIES. 181 

the mind. I can reflect on a former interview with 
a long-absent and beloved friend, and derive the 
purest pleasure from the recollection. The va- 
rious relations of entities often exert this influence. 
Thus, the pleasure experienced by the mind when 
contemplating the beauty of holiness, is excited by 
the composite entity, a perfect law, and the con- 
duct of a moral agent ; and the relation which ex- 
cites this feeling, is that of agreement between 
them. 

SECTION III. 

The degrees in ivhich different entities possess this 
exciting power are very different, and can be ac- 
curately learned only from experience. Nor can any 
organ originally afford us this information, except 
the one through which the feeling is produced. We 
should be unable, from the mere appearance of an 
orange or a peach, to know, a priori, that their red- 
ness or yellowness is indicative of superior aptitude 
to gratify the palate. Yet after we have by expe- 
rience learned the fact of this tendency, and learned 
that the degrees of it are usually attended by these 
external appearances, they serve as indexes to the 
mind. But not only is the feeling, produced by en- 
tities of different classes, different in degree ; the 
same diversity belongs to one and the same entity, 
when acting in different ways, and under different 
circumstances. So far as this arises from a differ- 
ent susceptibility in different minds, or in the same 
mind at different times, its discussion falls under a 
subsequent division of our subject ; other circum- 
stances only claim our present attention. 

Q 



182 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The influence of different entities in exciting our 
feelings. 

(a.) Their strongest influence entities certainly 
exert when brought into contact with the particular 
organs of our body, through which, according to 
the divine constitution, they act upon the mind. 
Thus, a peach affords most pleasure, when brought 
into contact with the palate ; a beautiful landscape, 
when actually viewed by the eye ; an escape from 
the hands of a murderer, when really experienced 
by us ; and the pains of disease, hunger, disappoint- 
ed hope or ambition, when we are actually the sub- 
jects of them. 

(b.) When we have a prospective knowledge, 
that we shall, at some future time, probably be the 
subjects of their influence, they exert their next 
greatest power ; that is, when they are the sub- 
jects of hope or fear. 

In many instances our prospective view is ac- 
companied by stronger feeling than when we are the 
direct subjects of the influence of the entity. But 
this arises from erroneous ideas of the pleasures or 
pains which will be occasioned by actual experience. 
The law of nature seems to be that present feeling 
is stronger than retrospective or prospective. 

(c.) When these entities excite retrospective feel- 
ing, they are again productive of a different degree 
of pleasure or pain. 

[d.) Sympathetic feeling is, as a general rule, 
weaker than its corresponding direct class of feel- 
ings. 

(e.) The least degree of feeling is excited by en- 



EXTERNAL ENTITIES AS EXCITANTS OF FEELING. 183 

tities, when we view only their abstract tendency 
to produce pleasure or pain, without supposing 
ourselves or others to be actually the subjects of 
them. This might be termed their original degree 
of influence, and is, perhaps, the exact degree of 
strength which the Author of our being designed 
they should exert upon us as motives. It might 
also be termed their simple influence, because in 
all other cases additional principles, such as self- 
love, &c, are called into action. 

SECTION IV. 

Entities of the classes of solids and liquids excite 
more feeling, and exert more motive power, when 
near us than when far off. This circumstance 
may be demonstrated by a variety of cases, al- 
though it is not so easy to assign the philosophical 
reason of the fact. This appears to be the case 
particularly with those solids and liquids, which 
gratify our periodical susceptibilities of feeling, 
such as hunger and thirst. 

SECTION V. 

The manner in which entities act in exciting' feeling, 
seems to be very similar to that observed in the pro- 
duction of knowledge. Each adjective or composite 
entity can originally excite feeling in the mind, 
only through that organ by which it becomes the 
subject of our knowledge. The flavour of fruit can 
excite pleasure in us originally only through the 
palate. Again ; each individual property or rela- 
tion of an entity acts independently and individual- 



184 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ly, in exciting feeling ; so that the same substantive 
entity may produce different feelings in us, when 
we inspect different properties or relations of it. 
Hence, if I now love him whom I once hated, it is 
because I now contemplate different properties, or 
relations to me, or to others, from those which were 
formerly prominent in the same individual. This 
principle is extremely important to enable us to un- 
derstand how it is, that the penitent and converted 
sinner finds very different feelings excited by the 
contemplation of the Divine Being, from those 
which he formerly experienced. 

SECTION VI. 

In feeling, as in knowledge, two things are neces- 
sary ; first, the action of the entity on its appropriate 
organ ; and, secondly, the attention of the mind to 
that entity. Thus, if a peach or pear be placed be- 
fore my face, and my attention is firmly fixed on 
some other object of thought, the rays of light are 
indeed reflected from the peach to the retina of my 
eye, but the soul derives neither knowledge nor 
feeling from the peach, because my attention is oth- 
erwise directed. Hence attention, and the power 
of directing the mind to one or other object, are 
highly important active powers of the soul. 



LAWS OF FEELING. 185 



CHAPTER III. 

THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF THE MIND FOR FEELING, AND 
LAWS OF FEELING. 

Having discussed the nature and classification 
of feelings themselves, and also the cause from 
which they spring, that is, entities as excitants of 
feeling, we now proceed to examine the suscepti- 
bilities of the mind for feeling, and the laws by 
which they seem to be regulated. 

First law. Sensation, no less than cognition, is an 
attribute of the mind, and not of the body. That 
is, all sensation is in the mind. As sensations are 
obviously ideas, it must be admitted by all except 
materialists, that they are phenomena appertaining 
to the entity to which ideas belong, that is, to 
mind. As to the materialist, since he supposes 
cognitions also to be attributes of matter, or the re- 
sult of bodily organization, he can without great- 
er absurdity extend the same supposition to sensa- 
tions. But, so long as all the known properties of 
matter are totally different from all the known 
properties of mind, we may well leave the absurd 
supposition of their being the same substance, to 
those who delight in philosophical nonsense and par- 
adoxes. The popular impression, that sensations 
have some kind of local habitation in the organs, 
through the instrumentality of which they are pro- 
duced, results from a confusion of the organ through 
Q2 



186 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

which we perceive, and the thinking being itself. 
But obviously, there is little more propriety in re- 
garding the eye as the being that sees, than the tel- 
escope through which we see ; nor ear as the being 
that hears, than the acoustic tube by which the 
hearing of the partially deaf is improved. In like 
manner, the feeling produced by touch is wholly in 
the mind ; although the antecedent perception, which 
is different for some different parts of the body, en- 
ables us, by practice, generally to tell what part of 
the body has experienced the contact. 

Second law. The original susceptibility of different 
minds for feeling is evidently very different in degree. 
In this there is a striking similarity between the 
susceptibility for knowledge and feeling. Whether 
the ground of this diversity is seated partly in the 
mind itself, or wholly in the different texture or per- 
fection of the bodily organs by which the operations 
of the soul are limited, it is difficult to decide. 
That there is a striking diversity in the texture or 
organization of different individuals, cannot admit 
of a moment's doubt ; it is a subject of ocular and 
anatomical demonstration. The fact, moreover, is 
one of universal ocular observation, and its ex- 
pression provided for in popular language. What 
else is meant by the phrases, a person of ardent 
feelings, and, a cold-hearted man, than persons char- 
acterized by a diversity in the degree of their ha- 
bitual feelings ; i. e., by a natural diversity in their 
original susceptibility for feeling. The diversity in 
the texture of the organs themselves is designated 
by the term temperament. It is a point doubted 



LAWS OP FEELING. 187 

by no man of observation, that mankind are distin- 
guished by those diversities, and that they may be 
reduced to several classes, such as the phlegmatic, 
sanguine, choleric, &c. The various commixtures 
of these temperaments are almost infinite ; nor is 
the difference in the texture of the body which is 
designated by the word temperament, confined to 
any particular organ of sense; the characteristic 
pervades the whole organization of the body, the 
skin, the lymphatics, flesh, blood, bones, nerves, &c. 
Nothing, however, is more certain, than that the 
temperaments of men are hereditarily transmitted 
according to certain laws, which are fixed by the 
Author of our nature ; but which are not, and prob- 
ably never will be, fully understood by us. 

Third law. Excepting this diversity, which results 
from the different temperaments, the relative degrees 
of susceptibility for the influence of different entities 
is, in all minds, naturally the same. Although A 
is twice as sensitive as B, yet, the difference of tem- 
perament excepted, an entity which produces twice 
as much feeling in A as another given entity would, 
also naturally produces in B twice as much as the 
other would. A will be operated upon twice as 
forcibly as B by all motives to good, and it might 
be supposed that he was favoured by Providence 
more highly than B, whose natural susceptibility is 
only half as strong. But it must be remembered that 
A is also operated upon twice as forcibly as B by 
all motives to evil, and therefore the relative degree 
of his susceptibility for feeling is, in effect, equal to 
that of B. The relative equality of the influence 



188 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of different entities has an important bearing on 
the subject of the moral government of God; be- 
cause feelings are motives to action, and, other 
things being equal, they naturally exert a power 
proportionate to this degree. That the above pe- 
culiarity of the natural susceptibility for feeling also 
occurs in feelings of a religious character, seems to 
be certain. This fact must be taken into consider- 
ation by every pastor, who wishes to form a correct 
view of the religious progress of his spiritual chil- 
dren, and also by every individual, who would 
judge with accuracy of the religious state of his 
own soul. 

Fourth law. Feeling is, in a great measure, invol- 
untary at the time. We cannot, when acted upon 
by an entity, and when our attention is directed to 
it, determine whether feeling shall or shall not, in 
the first instance, be excited in us. 

Fifth law. We can, however, at the time, add to 
the intensity and duration of the feeling, or subtract 
from both, by either confining our attention to the 
exciting entity, or directing it to another object. 
Thus, the more wholly we fix our attention upon a 
piece of music performed within our hearing, the 
greater will be the feeling excited in us ; and the 
more wholly and intensely we direct our attention 
to the truths pronounced from the sacred desk, the 
more fully will they exert their proper influence of 
feeling and motive power upon us. 

Sixth law. When any particular feeling, or pas- 
sion, or purpose becomes dominant in the soul, and 
absorbs in a great measure its other energies, all 






LAWS OF FEELING. 189 

feelings at variance with this are impaired. Thus 
the sensualist, the miser, and the votary of ambi- 
tion, are in most cases found comparatively insen- 
sible to objects unconnected with their favourite 
pursuits. In like manner, when men find it neces- 
sary to success in any of their habitual pursuits, to 
suppress those feelings which would endanger that 
success, they can, by a settled purpose and contin- 
ued effort, succeed in steeling their hearts against 
those feelings, and can acquire an insensibility, 
which at first is artificial, but if persevered in, be- 
comes habitual and natural. It is on this principle 
that the most benevolent physician from the best 
of motives, the desire of benefiting his patient, stud- 
ies to acquire that control over his feelings amid 
scenes of the most distressing character, which is 
requisite to enable him to judge wisely of his pa- 
tient's condition, and to select the most appropriate 
remedies for his case. And it is upon the same 
principle, though from far less honourable motives, 
that military chieftains and professional soldiers ac- 
quire the unenviable ability to wade in the blood 
of their nominal foes, and even to climb unmoved 
over the mangled bodies of their slaughtered com- 
rades. 

Seventh law. The tendency of entities to excite 
pleasant or unpleasant feelings when they are the 
subjects of prospective or retrospective knowledge, 
depends, in a great measure, on their accordance, or 
discordance, with what will hereafter be described as 
the constitutional inclinations of the soid, espe- 
cially the love of well-being or happiness. 



190 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Eighth law. The influence of an entity, in exci- 
ting' feeling, is, to a mind of given susceptibility, 
stronger when it for the first time acts upon us, on 
account of its novelty. We may here refer to an 
analogous ease in medical science. A medicine, 
administered for the first time, produces a greater 
effect than the same dose does after having been re- 
peatedly taken. How far this analogy is occasioned 
by similarity of cause, would be an interesting sub- 
ject of inquiry, in which, however, we have not 
time to engage. This principle accounts for the 
fact, that the feelings of the newly-converted are 
so peculiarly vivid when the entities exciting them, 
that is, their new relations to God and his law, and 
to the Saviour, are first presented to their minds. 
Yet, as continued attention increases the constitu- 
tional susceptibility of feeling, the same mind may, 
by such attention, subsequently have feelings as 
vivid as those first experienced. 

Ninth law. Feelings produced by the same sub- 
stantive entity, in the same person, at different times, 
are in some cases different. This fact is explained 
by the principle adverted to on a former occasion, 
that every property or relation of an entity acts 
separately in the production of feeling. Every 
property, indeed, and every relation of an entity, 
produces a feeling peculiar to itself, and produces 
this feeling invariably ; but, as entities have various 
properties and relations, the different properties and 
relations of the same entity, in many cases, produce 
contrary feelings. Hence it will always be found, 
that when an entity produces feelings diverse from 



LAWS OF FEELING. 191 

those which it formerly excited, the reason is, either 
that the entity has changed its properties or rela- 
tions, or that a different property or relation is now 
the subject of our attention, and the excitant of our 
feeling. At one time we habitually dwell on one 
property or relation of an entity, and our feelings 
are correspondent ; but when our feelings change, 
it is because we dwell upon another relation of the 
same entity. Thus, reflecting on the death of my 
friend, viewing its relation to me as a social loss, I 
am grieved, that is, this relation produces painful 
feeling ; but when I reflect on it as a means of his 
translation from a bed of long-protracted, painful, 
and hopeless sickness to a world of bliss, I rejoice ; 
this relation of the same event excites pleasant feel- 
ings. When our feelings change towards any of 
our fellow-men, it is always because either their 
character has changed, or we have acquired addi- 
tional knowledge concerning it, or, from a change 
m our own character, we now dwell on different 
relations of it. The character of men being so very 
mutable, changes in the relative feelings existing 
among them, are constantly occurring. 

Tenth law. The susceptibility of the mind for 
feelings of every kind is increased by attentive 
practice. Here the question arises, whether the 
cause of increased susceptibility from practice is oc- 
casioned by an improvement in the bodily organs 
or in the mental power. Probably it may be found 
jointly in both. This principle is exemplified in 
the pleasures of the glutton, the drunkard, the mu- 
sician. In other words, the feelings of men are 



192 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

augmented by habit, just as all their cognitive and 
active operations are. The law of habit pervades 
the entire man physical and intellectual, and adds 
facility and strength to all his operations. Feelings 
of benevolence or of malevolence may be and are 
confirmed and increased by repetition ; and it is 
owing to this principle that we are enabled, as moral 
agents, by repeated voluntary exercise of our affec- 
tions on proper objects, to cherish and cultivate 
those habits of feeling and traits of character which 
we know to be good. 

Eleventh law. Intense and long- continued feel- 
ing produces a temporary exhaustion, and fatigues 
the system in a manner similar to intense cognitive 
mental action. Yet it is difficult, as knowledge and 
feeling always go together, to distinguish what por- 
tion of the fatigue is to be attributed to each. The 
question might arise whether the sleepiness of the 
glutton after dinner be owing to the debility occa- 
sioned by this feeling during eating, or by the fact 
that nature has been compelled to concentrate her 
energies upon the stomach to digest the newly-re- 
ceived load. 

Twelfth law. The susceptibility for feeling nat- 
urally declines with age and with the decline of the 
constitution, even if that be premature. 

Thirteenth law. A negligent review of entities 
diminishes their tendency to produce feeling. Upon 
this principle it is that religious formality tends to 
produce insensibility of mind. 

Fourteenth law. Time wears off retrospective 
feeling. There are cases of exception to this law, 



LAWS OF FEELING. 193 

such as in those persons who have become melan- 
choly in consequence of severe afflictions, and of 
always pondering over their loss. But here there 
is a morbid state of the mind, which, therefore, 
does not disprove the general law. The ordinary 
fact is, that the retrospect of our sufferings is at- 
tended by feelings less acute than our original suf- 
ferings, and that each successive retrospect by the 
same individual is productive of emotions of di- 
minished acuteness. This law must be regarded 
as a most benevolent arrangement of Providence. 
Life is a scene of not unfrequent trials and afflic- 
tions. Some of these, at the time of their occur- 
rence, fill us with grief almost as great as we can 
bear. Now, if the suffering caused by these suc- 
cessive calamities were all accumulated, with undi- 
minished vigour, as we advance in our earthly pil- 
grimage, life itself would in most cases become an 
intolerable burden, and man be disqualified for its 
ordinary duties. On the other hand, the death of 
friends or relatives could not affect us less at the 
time, without such a change in our mental struc- 
ture as would make us place a far lower estimate 
on their value, and thus greatly diminish our social 
enjoyments. The result of such a change would 
necessarily be to weaken the strongest and most 
endearing ties by which society is held together. 
We are, therefore, wisely and benevolently so con- 
structed that our suffering at the loss of friends and 
relatives is poignant, in order that we may take the 
better care of them when living ; and time diminish- 

R 



194 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

es the eight of these sorrows, so that their accu- 
mulated pressure might not disqualify us for the du- 
ties of life. 

Fifteenth law. Feeling is, in general, not instant- 
ly excited, as is knowledge, when an entity becomes 
the subject of our attention. Oftentimes feeling is 
elicited by continued application of the mind. 

Sixteenth law. The feelings connected with the 
gratification of our periodical appetites, such as hun- 
ger and thirst, have the following peculiarities. 
(1.) They are stronger in proportion to the length 
of previous abstinence, unless that has been ex- 
treme, and has impaired the organs. (2.) They 
are increased by the frequent attention of the soul 
to the. entities capable of gratifying these appetites. 
(3.) This feeling is diminished and eventually sus- 
pended by gratification. (4.) It is interrupted by 
the debility and increased by the vigour of the 
body. 

From the preceding laws and considerations it 
is evident that the state of our feelings is, to a cer- 
tain extent, under our own control. It is indeed 
true, that no man can instantly change his feel- 
ings by a mere volition to do so. But the end can 
be accomplished eventually, by his habitually di- 
recting his attention to those entities and truths 
calculated to produce the desired feelings. We 
are, therefore, justly held responsible by our moral 
Governor for the character of our feelings, so far 
as they are under our control. Nor is the case 
different with what is often termed the habitual 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 195 

stale of our feeliyigs or affections. As every feel- 
ing is individual and transient, as it continues only 
so long as our minds dwell on the entity or idea 
which excited it, and as it must, in every instance, 
be excited anew by the appropriate entity, or our 
knowledge of it, it follows that by the state of our 
feelings or affections must be meant our suscepti- 
bility for feelings from any particular entities. This 
susceptibility is permanent, being a part of our ori- 
ginal mental constitution, and is either increased or 
diminished according as it is more or less frequent- 
ly and designedly exercised towards any given ob- 
ject. 

To this increased susceptibility must be added, 
the increased tendency to the spontaneous recur- 
rence of the ideas of the objects, on which our sus- 
ceptibility is most frequently employed. These 
two things, the increased spontaneous recurrence of 
the ideas of the entities which excite feelings of any 
given character, and the increased susceptibility of 
the mind to their influence when presented, consti- 
tute those different habitual states of feeling, or of 
the affections, by which different persons are char- 
acterized. In this, so far as known to us, consists 
the difference between the virtuous and the vicious, 
the pure and the impure, in regard to the state of 
their affections. The licentious, for example, by 
continued voluntary indulgence of criminal thoughts, 
if not actions, have formed the habit of frequent 
spontaneous recurrence of licentious thoughts. By 
the same course they have increased the suscepti- 
bility of their minds to be excited by thoughts of 



196 SUSCEPTIBILITY FOR FEELINGS. 

that kind ; and thus they have corrupted the state 
of their affections, and made them far worse than 
they naturally were. For this corrupted state of 
their affections, they will justly be held liable by 
the Judge of all the earth. 

Thus a person of malevolent disposition, is one 
who has formed the habit of indulging in such 
views of human character as are calculated to ex- 
cite the malevolent feelings, and who has thus aug- 
mented the susceptibility of his mind for feelings of 
that description. 

Persons of a benevolent disposition are those of 
a directly contrary habit. As our feelings are al- 
ways preceded by a cognitive idea of the entity by 
which they are produced, we cannot determine 
whether there is any immediate connexion, any 
nexus rerum, between the several feelings them- 
selves, by which their tendency to recurrence is in- 
creased, or whether that tendency is based only on 
the association between the cognitive ideas, while 
the recurrence of these superinduces the repetition 
of the feelings. If, however, the individual feel- 
ings themselves have this tendency, it is exerted 
only through the medium of our cognitive ideas. 

The feelings connected with what are termed our 
periodical appetites, such as hunger and thiust, 
might at first view seem to form an exception to 
the remark, that all our feelings are transient and 
individual, and must be excited anew in every in- 
stance by their appropriate entity, or the recurrence 
of our idea of it; because they seem often to be 
permanent, at least for a season, and to continue 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 



197 



even without the presence of the external entity or 
the thought of it, by which they are gratified. But, 
upon closer examination it will be evident, that du- 
ring the whole time of their continuance, there is 
an objective entity acting on the organ and exci- 
ting the feeling. Thus, for example, in hunger, the 
exciting entity has been supposed to be the gastric 
fluid irritating the coats of the stomach, which in 
this case are the organ of sensation. This irrita- 
tion is continued so long as there is not a sufficiency 
of food thrown into the stomach to absorb or occu- 
py the gastric fluid, and divert it from the coats of 
the stomach. And just so long, and no longer, do 
we experience the feeling we term hunger, and the 
desire of food resulting from it, without its being 
excited by any external article of food or the 
thought of any. Still, even while this desire and 
feeling are excited by continued action of the gas- 
tric fluid within us, the idea of food of some kind 
or other is almost constantly present to the mind, 
and adds its excitement to the feeling and desire 
excited from within. The feeling of hunger thus 
seems simply to be that pain produced by the gas- 
tric fluid. The desire connected with it is the re- 
sult of the motive influence of some article of food, 
or the idea of it, acting on the mind, and tending to 
a volition to procure it. The feeling- of hunger can 
exist independently of any idea of food ; the desire 
of any kind of food whatever cannot exist without 
either its presence, or the thought of it. 
R2 



198 ACTIVE OPERATIONS OF THE SOUL. 



PART III. 



ACTIVE OPERATIONS OF THE SOUL. 

Having taken a brief survey of the various classes 
of entities around us, and having discussed the two 
kinds of mental representatives, which are obtained 
by the soul, when these entities are the subjects of 
our attention, viz., the cognitive and sentient, that 
is, those ideas which constitute our knowledge and 
feeling, we must next advance to the examination 
of those active operations of which the soul is ca- 
pable, and which certainly constitute the most im- 
portant feature of our character, as beings respon- 
sible to God. Our knowledge and feeling may be 
regarded mainly as our acquaintance with the uni- 
verse which God created. They are what our 
Creator has made them, and, with the exceptions 
detailed in former portions of this work, we have 
in general little or no influence over them, so far 
as their mere original nature is concerned ; but 
these entities, simple and composite, are the mate- 
rials with which, and the motives in view of which, 
all the active operations of the soul are performed. 

As these active operations are either directly or 
indirectly, mediately or immediately, under our in- 
dividual control ; as it is by these actions that we 
exert our influence on the other rational and senti- 
ent beings associated with us in this probationary 
world, an influence always operating for evil or for 



ACTIVE OPERATIONS OF THE SOUL. 199 

good ; and as it is only through these active opera- 
tions that the character of our cognitive and senti- 
ent states of mind, be they good or evil, can make 
their influence felt on others, it must be evident 
that these active operations constitute the principal 
and most important part of our mental phenomena, 
that part more immediately contemplated in the 
precepts and sanctions of the moral government of 
Jehovah. A man may harbour sentiments of the 
rankest infidelity, and so long as he keeps them se- 
cret, so long as he does not perform the active op- 
eration of communicating them to others, either 
orally or in writing, they will exert no direct ten- 
dency to contaminate those around him. Perhaps, 
if he could prevent his sentiments from influencing 
his own conduct in the neglect of duty and in giv- 
ing direction to his agency through life, his opin- 
ions and feelings would injure no one but himself. 
But so soon as they are manifest in his active oper- 
ations, which in most instances is very soon the 
case, their baneful tendency is seen and felt by his 
associates, and by all within the circle of his influ- 
ence, either personal or literary. In accordance 
with this is the common sentiment of mankind, that 
propriety of conduct is more important than the ex- 
tent of our knowledge or the acuteness of our sen- 
sibility ; that to do right is more valuable and meri- 
torious than to know accurately or to reason clearly. 
Before we proceed in the attempt to enumerate 
the several species of active operations, we shall 
first call your attention to the criteria hy which men- 
tal operations of the third class are distinguished. 
The more we compare the active, operations of the 



200 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

soul with its knowledge and feeling, the more dis- 
tinctly do we perceive that they are radically dif- 
ferent in their nature. 

The marks of distinction are such as the follow- 
ing : 

(1.) One grand feature of this diversity is, that, 
while knowledge and feeling are effects, ultimately 
produced upon the mind by external entities, our 
active operations are mainly causes originating in 
the mind, or rather they are the mind itself, exert- 
ing its influence on the entities which are the sub- 
jects of its action. Knowledge and feeling are in- 
ward effects produced from without ; the active op- 
erations are outward effects caused from within. 
In short, in the two former mental operations we 
are, to a certain extent, passive recipients of exter- 
nal influence ; but in the third we are the active 
agents, ourselves originating the action. 

(2.) The entities by which our cognitive and sen- 
tient ideas are excited, must have an existence be- 
fore we can have either knowledge or feeling by 
them ; but the action, which is the subject of our 
volition, is yet future, and cannot have an existence 
at the time when we resolve to perform it. I can 
have no knowledge of an orange or a peach which 
has no existence, nor can either affect my palate 
by feeling unless it exist ; but when I will or re- 
solve to perform any action, the act which I deter- 
mine to perform has no existence at the time when 
I resolve upon doing it. 

(3.) Our feeling is, in some measure, and our 
knowledge still more, dependant for its character 



MATERIALS FOR HUMAN ACTION. 201 

on the entities which produce it. But when we re- 
solve to perform an action, that action does not ne- 
cessarily depend for its character on anything with- 
out us ; it is what, within the limits of the laws 
of nature, we determine that it shall be. 

Of Entities as the Materials on which our Active 
Operations are performed. 

As the soul, in both cognitive and sentient oper- 
ations, is the subject of the influence of entities 
without us ; so the active operations of the soul 
have also their subjects on which the exerted ac- 
tion is performed. This subject is, in every in- 
stance, entities without the mind, which is the case 
even when some operation is performed upon ideas. 
Entities of every class and of every species are 
the materials which, in a greater or less degree, are 
within the range of our active influence ; and on 
these all our active operations are performed. The 
soul, like a mechanist, goes to work on these ma- 
terials, and is capable of producing various combi- 
nations, modifications, and alterations in them, lim- 
ited indeed by the laws of its own nature, and the na- 
ture of these materials ; but nevertheless important 
in themselves, and sufficient to enable us to accom- 
plish the customary purposes of daily life, and the 
grand ultimate end of our existence upon earth. 

In order that you may be prepared for under- 
standing the active operations of the soul, it will be 
advantageous to fix in your minds a specific view 
of the various materials for human action. These 
are the following : 



202 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

(a.) The external objective entities of the differ- 
ent classes. 

{b.) Past mental operations of any class ; that is, 
mental representatives of entities, and sentient 
ideas, and active operations either of our own or 
other minds. 

(c.) The natural signs by which these represent- 
atives or ideas are expressed ; such as, (1.) The 
sounds which constitute oral language, and (2.) The 
signs employed ; such as the expression of the coun- 
tenance, gesture, and pantomime in general. The 
artificial marks or letters by which these sounds are 
designated in written or printed language, might 
at first view appear to be an additional class of ma- 
terials, but they are merely the results of physical 
action on paper or other materials, which are em- 
braced in the class of external entities already des- 
ignated. 



CHAPTER I. 

DIVISION AND DISCUSSION OF THE ACTIVE OPERATIONS 
OF THE SOUL. 

All the active processes of the soul are essen- 
tially alike, so far as mere activity is concerned ; 
but they differ in the end contemplated by each, in 
the operation performed, in the different results of 
the action, and in the different objects on which 
they terminate. The first place among these ac- 



INSPECTION. 203 

tive processes seems, for various reasons, to be due 
to what may be termed the process of inspection, 
by which we mean the survey or investigation of 
entities. 

SECTION I. 
Of Inspection. 
By Inspection we would designate that active 
operation in which the attention of the soul is direct- 
ed to some entity, simple or composite; prospective, 
present, or retrospective ; with a view to acquire 
some knowledge concerning it. Or, in other w r ords, 
inspection is that active process of the mind by 
which w r e contemplate, either some external entity 
through the bodily organs, or some idea or operation 
of the mind, without employing the bodily organs, at 
least at the time. Some of the ideas thus inspected, 
are often ideas originally obtained through the bod- 
ily organs ; although this is not always the case. 
Thus, we inspect the objects in nature around us, 
and the result of this act of inspection is a knowl- 
edge of the properties perceptible to us. Thus, 
also, we inspect a train of argument, which we late- 
ly heard, on the importance of phrenology ; and 
the result is the belief, or knowledge, that the mer- 
its of that science are much overrated, and that it 
affords few instructions that can safely be relied on, 
beyond those general indications w T hich have long 
since been established as a branch of physiognomy. 
Or, I inspect the abstract proposition, " That things 
equal to the same thing are equal to one another," 
and perceive, acquire a knowledge of its truth ; or 



204 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the metaphysical proposition, " It is impossible for 
the same thing to be and not to be at the same 
time," and I judge, perceive, know its truth. The 
sphere in which this operation is conducted, embra- 
ces all the entities within our knowledge, including 
our own mind and its operations, as well as our 
ideas concerning all these entities. If the entities 
inspected were always present, external entities, 
and never retrospective or prospective, the defini- 
tion might be altered thus : Inspection is that active 
operation in which, by a voluntary effort, the atten- 
tion of the soul is directed to some one or more of 
the bodily organs, and that organ directed to a par- 
ticular entity. Thus, when a man wiio is partially 
deaf, and does not hear the carriage that is rush- 
ing on at some little distance behind him, is called 
to by a person standing near him to look at the car- 
riage approaching, the information conveyed to him 
through the ear induces him to look at, that is, in- 
spect the entity by which his safety is endangered. 
By what action is this accomplished ? First, by 
volition or resolution to inspect ; secondly, by a di- 
rection of the bodily organ towards the entity to 
be inspected ; and, thirdly, by directing the atten- 
tion of the soul to the organ, or, rather, to the rays 
of light reflected from the carriage to the retina of 
the eye. But when we contemplate the mind it- 
self or its operations, or when we take a retrospect 
of an external entity, that is, inspect our knowledge 
of a past entity, or when we view an entity, either 
past, present, or prospective, in its relation to some 
abstract truth, or proposition, or law, the bodily or- 



FIRST ACTIVE OPERATION, INSPECTION. 205 

gan is not used at all ; and to embrace such cases, 
the definition must be more general. 

The specific objects of the soul in this inspection 
may be various. In present entities its object may 
be, and its results are, the following : 

(1.) To obtain more correct mental representa- 
tives of the properties of entities. For instance, 
suppose the Capitol of the United States were the 
subject of our inspection. We direct our attention 
to it, and, in so doing, also our eyes, and the first 
glance gives us an idea of its general structure. 
"We, however, wish to acquire a more minute ac- 
quaintance with its structure, and for this specific 
purpose continue to direct our eyes and our atten- 
tion successively to every part of it. We may ex- 
amine it with a specific design of ascertaining its 
general plan, or the execution of any particular part 
of the work, such as that performed by the mason, 
or the plasterer, or the carpenter ; and thus, by re- 
peated and continued inspection, we acquire more 
correct and minute mental representatives of the 
external entity. 

(2.) The second object in inspecting present en- 
tities may be to give more vividness to our mental 
representatives of them. This vividness may per- 
haps consist in the additional feeling, excited by a 
reiterated and attentive inspection. After having 
examined all the features of a painting, we have a 
correct mental representative of it ; but we may 
resolve to fix our attention successively on its dif- 
ferent features, and exert the intensity of that atten- 
tion on them ; and thus, perhaps, it is in part, that 
S 



206 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

our ideas of it become more vivid, because our feel- 
ings are more interested. 

(3.) We may inspect entities with the express 
view of ascertaining their relations. Thus, we in- 
spect different entities for the purpose of ascertain- 
ing their relation of sameness, or diversity, or con- 
tiguity, or causation. In all these examinations, the 
accuracy of our results will greatly depend on the 
deliberateness and degree of attention with which 
the process is conducted. Particular caution is re- 
quisite, when the design of our inspection is to as- 
certain the relation of causation between entities, 
or to decide, whether the relation be one of mere an- 
tecedence and sequence. 

In inspecting the moral character of any action, 
that is, its relation of congruity or incongruity with 
some law of God, inferred by reason from the works 
of nature, or learned from Revelation, the relation 
may be so obvious as to be instantaneously per- 
ceived, and thus our judgment is intuitive. In 
otner cases, the moral character of the action may 
not be so clear, and then continued attention and 
investigation are requisite, either to ascertain, by an 
induction of facts, the real tendency of the actions 
in question, or by continued exegetical investiga- 
tions, conducted according to the laws of impartial 
hermeneutics, to ascertain the true sense of Scrips 
ture, to determine whether the disputed action is 
or is not interdicted in the Sacred Volume. 

For the same general purposes, namely, to ascer- 
tain the relations of entities, the mechanist exam- 
ines, inspects the materials which he designs to em- 



FIRST ACTIVE OPERATION, INSPECTION. 207 

ploy. Thus the carpenter inspects a piece of wood 
in order to discover its relation of fitness or unfit- 
ness for the specific purpose for which he intends 
it, or with a view to perform some voluntary action 
on it, such as sawing, planing, or cutting it. 

In the case of retrospective entities, simple or 
composite. (1.) These we inspect, or rather our 
mental representatives of them, in order to revive 
those representatives, that is, as it is popularly ex- 
pressed, to refresh our memory. Experience proves, 
that both knowledge and feeling have a tendency 
to vanish from the mind. Both become weakened 
by time, and, unless revived by retrospection, will 
be lost to us, at least in the present world. When 
we reflect on the instances of extraordinary memory 
on record, and combine with them the fact, that 
some persons of very ordinary powers of retention 
have, under the influence of disease, recollected 
facts which they had long forgotten, and rehearsed 
extended passages of authors in a language un- 
known to them, which they had heard repeated 
many years before, but which in health they were 
utterly unable to repeat, we may well be inclined 
to regard thought as indestructible, and think it 
probable that all the mental operations of our whole 
life will be recollected by us in eternity, and per- 
haps these reminiscences will be one of the princi- 
pal bases of our future happiness or misery. But 
in the present life, there is a constant tendency in 
the mind to forget what is long past, if it be not re- 
vived by reinspection. 

^2.) The second object of inspecting retrospect- 



208 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ive entities is to view their relations to each other ; 
that is, to compare them with each other, or a present 
entity with a prospective one. Thus, we may in- 
spect the relation of causation between the British 
Stamp Act and our Revolutionary War, both being 
retrospective entities ; or we may examine the re- 
lation of causation between our Revolutionary War 
and our present enjoyment of free institutions; in 
which case we compare a retrospective and a pres- 
ent entity or idea. Finally, we may consider the 
relation of probable causation between our Revolu- 
tionary War and a future regeneration and remodel- 
ling of all the governments in Europe ; here we 
compare a past with a future entity. In this last 
example we have an instance of the inspection of 
the prospective knowledge of entities. All the 
subjects of our prospective knowledge may be sub- 
jects of inspection. Indeed, this department of our 
knowledge, more than any other, seems to be the 
fruit of voluntary inspection. Every hypothetical 
case that can be imagined is, at least in part, an in- 
spection of prospective entities. 

The process of inspection embraces all the vol- 
untary operations which, in former systems, have 
been attributed to the faculties of perception, con- 
sciousness, conception, judgment in moral as well 
as intellectual and physical cases, voluntary recol- 
lection, analytic reasoning, and conscience. That 
the operations of the mind termed perceptions, when 
voluntary, are embraced in the process of inspec- 
tion, is evident from what was said on the subject 
of the inspection of present entities. That the op- 



FIRST ACTIVE OPERATION, INSPECTION. 209 

erations usually ascribed to conception are nothing 
else than inspection, is evident from the remarks 
made on the inquiry, how many of our supposed 
faculties furnish us with knowledge, or how many 
of the operations of the supposed faculties are cog- 
nitive in their character. The only cases which, 
might seem to militate against the classification of 
the operations of conception under the process of 
inspection are abstract ideas, such as virtue, vice, 
&c. But we have already exhibited to you the 
proof, that these terms designate our ideas of cer- 
tain relations of real entities which are observed by 
inspection. The conception of the meaning of a 
proposition, is nothing more than the inspection of 
retrospective knowledge, aided by the signs called 
words, either written or oral. 

In the inspection of present entities, the entity 
itself is the subject of inspection. In the inspection 
of retrospective entities, however, it is not the entity 
itself, but onr knowledge of it, which is the subject 
of our inspection. This seems evident from the 
fact, lhat, if our original knowledge of an entity was 
incorrect, a review of it, however frequent, will not 
rectify it ; unless we compare our knowledge with 
the original entity itself, or with a description of it 
by another, whose knowledge was more accurate, 
and in whose testimony we confide ; whereas, 
every attentive review of a present entity tends to 
correct any error in our first idea of it. These facts 
also prove the fallacy of Dr. Brown's opinion, that 
all mental operations are merely the mind itself in 
certain states. When we review our knowledge, 
S2 



210 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

are not the passive, inert items of this knowledge 
manifestly different from the active being, or mind, 
which is at work on them ? As well might we say- 
that the wood, out of which the cabinet-maker is 
framing a desk or table, is nothing else than the 
workman himself, in a certain state. 

The act of memorizing is an active operation em- 
braced under the process of inspection. It may- 
be defined thus : The act of memorizing is a vol- 
untary, repeated, attentive review of some entities, 
or of our ideas of them, or of some signs of such 
ideas, in order that we may have a retrospective 
knowledge of either the ideas of the entities, or the 
ideas of the associated signs. Thus, if we commit 
to memory a piece of composition with a view to 
speak it verbatim, we make the recollection of our 
ideas of the sounds, which are associated with the 
ideas of the entities, the subjects of our chief at- 
tention. But if we wish to recollect only the ideas 
of the entities themselves, we pay little attention to 
the ideas of the sounds, and leave them to be re- 
called at the time of delivery by the ideas of the 
entities. Thus, it is evident, we are able to make 
different things the subjects of our aim in the act 
of committing to memory, and different persons 
have different habits on this subject. The man 
who, as it is usually expressed, recollects only 
ideas, is one who by habit, or possibly by a con- 
stitutional predisposition, recollects principally the 
ideas of the entities themselves about which he is 
speaking, and trusts to the association formed in 
his mind between the ideas of the entities and those 



SECOND ACTIVE OPERATION, ARRANGEMENT. 211 

of the sounds designating them, for the suggestion 
of words at the time of speaking. The man dis- 
tinguished for verbal memory, on the contrary, is 
one who is in the habit of inspecting the ideas of 
the sounds as well as of the entities signified by 
them ; and to his mind, in the moment of delivery, 
the very words recur in which he had committed 
the speech. Perhaps, in the one case, the train of 
the ideas of the signs is the leading train, on which 
the retrospective energy of his mind is expended ; 
and this train of the ideas of sounds does, in the 
moment of delivery, recall the parallel train of the 
ideas of entities. In the other case, the train of 
the ideas of entities is the prominent one which re- 
curs, and, by association, brings with it the train of 
the ideas of the connected sounds. Yet, as there 
is no relation at all between the ideas of sounds 
except that of contiguity, whereas the ideas of the 
entities are related by the additional connexion sub- 
sisting between them in a well-digested composi- 
tion, it is not improbable that the ideas of the en- 
tities discussed are in most cases the prominent 
train in the recollection ; and the different degrees 
in which sounds are recollected form the difference 
between ideal and verbal memories. 

That analytic reasoning is also chiefly a process of 
inspection, is evident from its nature, as it consists of 
the successive investigation of a series of particulars, 
from which eventually a general conclusion is inferred 
to be applicable to all other particulars of the same 
kind. Thus we learn from observation (inspection), 
that a number of material objects, such as trees, 
stones, portions of lead, water, earth, &c, gravitate 



212 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

towards the centre of the earth. Hence, as we find 
this property to belong to all material objects, with- 
out excepiton, which we have examined, we infer, 
with the greatest probability, that it belongs also to 
all other material substances. Our syllogism will 
then stand thus : 

Trees, stones, lead, water, earth, &c, gravitate 
towards the centre of the earth : 

Trees, stones, lead, water, earth, &c, are all the 
material bodies which are within the reach of our 
examination : 

Therefore all the material bodies which are with- 
in the reach of our observation, gravitate towards 
the centre of the earth. 

Should we invert this reasoning, and form our 
syllogism in the synthetic mode, it would run thus: 

All material bodies, within the reach of our ob- 
servation, gravitate towards the centre of the earth : 

Stone is a material body within the reach of our 
observation : 

Therefore stone gravitates towards the centre of 
the earth. 

The analytic method is best adapted to the in- 
vestigation of subjects, and the synthetic to the 
communication of knowledge already attained. 

In all its reasonings, however, the mind is gov- 
erned by certain principles of its own structure, or 
haws of Belief) the most important of which it may 
not be unimportant to enumerate. These truths 
are, however, not abstract or general in their intrin- 
sic nature or form, in which they operate on. the 
mind. They are, indeed, often formed into general 
truths, and by some writers these general truths 



LAWS OF HUMAN BELIEF. 213 

were supposed to possess greater strength of evi- 
dence than the individual cases from which they 
are derived. But this is incorrect. The general 
truth is merely an abstract statement, derived from 
the individual cases, and embracing them all, and, 
consequently, cannot possibly possess stronger pro- 
bative influence than the individuals of which it is 
composed. With this explanation, we proceed to 
state the 

Fundamental Laws of Human Belief. 

All men make the following constitutional judg- 
ments, in each individual case as it occurs : 

1. That the testimony of their senses, when clear- 
ly ascertained, is true. This truth has never been 
sincerely doubted by any man in his senses, not 
even by those skeptics who, in theory, professed 
to do so. 

2. That the testimony of consciousness is entitled 
to our confidence in every case. This is, indeed, 
the fundamental source of our knowledge of all our 
mental operations, of our cognitions, of our feelings, 
and of our active processes of mind. If this chan- 
nel, so to speak, through which all our knowledge 
passes, were unworthy of confidence, of course no 
other item of our knowledge, of any kind whatever, 
could claim a higher degree of certainty. 

3. That the testimony of memory, when distinct, 
and so far as distinct, may be relied on as true. I 
am just as certain that I lately re-examined the 
prophecies of Daniel, and the Revelation of St. 
John, on the second coming of our Saviour, a sub- 
ject now arresting so much attention in some parts 



214 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of our country, as that I see the pen with which I 
am now writing. Our confidence in our reminis- 
cences is strong in proportion to the degree of dis- 
tinctness which they appear to us to possess. Yet 
our recollection of a general fact may often be 
perfectly distinct, while we recollect but imperfect- 
ly some of its attendant circumstances. In this 
case our confidence in the former is unwavering, 
and our belief in the latter doubtful. I remember 
with great certainty my having read Dr. Channing's 
sermon at the ordination of Mr. Sparks upward of 
twenty years ago, and also Professor Stuart's letters 
in reply to it ; yet of some of the arguments and 
explanations contained in these works, my recollec- 
tion is indistinct. But I can, on this account, no 
more doubt that I perused these productions, than 
if it had occurred yesterday. 

4. That all the other operations of our mind, such 
as reasonings and judgment, may be relied on with 
a degree of certainty proportioned to their nature, 
and to the circumstances under which they are per- 
formed. 

5. That all men naturally speak the truth, when 
they have no motive to practise deception. 

6. That every act of consciousness presupposes or 
implies a conscious being, the soul. On occasion of 
every such act we constitutionally judge the exist- 
ence of a conscious subject, to whom these acts be- 
long. The only case we have met with of an in- 
dividual who disbelieved the existence of his soul, 
is that of Rev. Simon Browne, of England, a dis- 
senting minister, of excellent character, who died 
about 1732. " He imagined, that in consequence 



LAWS OF HUMAN BELIEF. 215 

of an extraordinary interposition of Divine power, 
his rational soul was gradually annihilated, and that 
nothing was now left of him but a principle of ani- 
mal life, which he held in common with the brutes." 
But no man can be at a loss for the proper solution 
of this melancholy phenomenon. All will just as 
readily regard it as the result of mental derange- 
ment, as if he had denied the axioms of mathemat- 
ics, or disbelieved the existence of his body. The 
circumstance which so preyed upon his mind as to 
deprive him of reason, was the death of his wife 
and only son, in 1723.* 

7. That every act of memory, or succession of 
acts of consciousness, implies our personal identity, 
and is the occasion which elicits the constitutional 
judgment of such identity. Nor is this judgment 
of our identity destroyed, even if consciousness and 
memory, yea, all conscious mental action, is for a 
season interrupted. A very singular case, illustra- 
tive of this fact, was reported to the Royal Acade- 
my of Sciences in France. " A nobleman of Lau- 
sanne, as he was giving orders to a servant, sudden- 
ly lost his speech and all his senses. Different rem- 
edies were tried without effect for six months, du- 
ring all which time he appeared to be in a deep 
sleep, or deliquium, with various symptoms at differ- 
ent periods. At last, after some chirurgical opera- 
tions, at the end of six months his speech and senses 
were suddenly restored. When he recovered, the 
servant to whom he had been giving orders when 
he was first seized with the distemper, happening to 

* See the Narrative of his case in the Adventurer, No. 88. 



216 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

be in the room, he asked whether he had executed 
his commission : not being sensible, it seems, that 
any interval of time, except, perhaps, a very short 
one, had elapsed during his illness. He lived ten 
years after, and died of another disease."* Dr. 
Beattie also cites his own experience in support of 
the same view. " That consciousness may be in- 
terrupted by a total deliquium, without any change 
in our notions of our own identity, I know by my 
own experience. I am, therefore, fully persuaded 
that the identity of this substance, which I call my 
soul, may continue even when I am unconscious of 
it ; and if for a shorter space, why not for a longer ?"f 

8. In addition to the above constitutional truths, 
there are some other judgments, not intuitive, indeed, 
but early acquired and universally entertained, which 
also lie at the basis of much of our reasoning. Thus 
all men judge that the laws of nature and the known 
properties of all entities or objects in the ivorld will, 
ivith almost entire certainty, continue, because they 
have found them to continue with absolute invaria- 
bleness during the whole time of their observation 
and recollection. 

9. Different kinds of truth are found to be pos- 
sessed of different kinds and degrees of evidence. 
And we have reason to believe that the Author of ■ 
our nature has invested every truth, which he has 
placed within our sphere of observation, with a de- 
gree of evidence sufficient, when fully and impar- 
tially weighed, to produce just as strong a convic- 
tion as he designs us to feel. 

* Dr. Beattie, on Truth, p. 36. t Essay on Truth, p. 36. 



REASONING. 217 

These principles are presupposed in all kinds of 
reasoning. The different species of reasoning are 
influenced by the nature of the subject or entity 
under investigation. Analytic reasoning may relate 
to physical, intellectual, or moral subjects or entities. 

In the investigation of physical objects, the ma- 
terials for reasoning must be acquired through our 
bodily senses, on the testimony of which we confi- 
dently rely. 

In the investigation of intellectual objects, the 
phenomena of mind are the materials for reasoning, 
and these we acquire by the testimony of conscious- 
ness, which we judge to be true. 

In the investigation of moral truth, in its most 
limited sense, the moral relations of rational beings 
to each other and to God, as well as the relation of 
their actions to the Divine law, are the materials for 
reasoning ; and in the acquisition of our knowledge 
of these, we rely on the accuracy of consciousness 
and other powers of the soul, as well as on the tes- 
timony of our senses when the actions of men are 
concerned. But, as it is not our design to embrace 
Logic in this treatise, Ave shall not enter into the 
discussion of these different processes of ratiocina- 
tion. 

SECTION II. 
Of Arrangement. 

Arrangement is hat active operation of the soul 
by ivhich we select sl me from among the mass, either 
of external entities themselves, or of our mental rep- 
resentatives of them, and place them, as wholes or 

T 



218 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

units, in a particular order, with a view to a specific 
purpose. In present entities, the entities themselves 
are the subjects of the arrangement. Thus, having 
a number of ivory balls of different colours before 
us, after having inspected them, the result of this 
inspection is a knowledge of their shape, colour, 
&c, and nothing more than knowledge. But when 
we select those of the same colour from the mass 
and place them together, we perform an additional 
and distinct operation, viz., that of arrangement. 
In addition to the present entities themselves, this 
operation is also performed on our mental repre- 
sentatives of retrospective and prospective entities. 
"When, e. g., we resolve to arrange into classes all 
the various animals which we have ever seen, and 
of which we have a recollection, we can accom- 
plish the work, though not one of those animals be 
present. But then it is not the animals themselves 
(present entities) which we arrange into different 
classes of quadrupeds, bipeds, carnivorous, grami- 
nivorous, oviparous, viviparous, &c, but only our 
mental representatives or cognitive ideas of them. 
The purposes of this arrangement, and the princi- 
ples on which it is made, may be various. 

(1.) We may arrange them according to any 
one of the various relations of entities to each 
other ; such as sameness, diversity, contiguity, cau- 
sation, majority, minority, progression, proportion, 
&c. Thus the mental act of comparison in lan- 
guage is nothing else than the arrangement of two 
entities according to the relation of similarity, to- 
gether with an expression of their relation in words. 



SECOND ACTIVE OPERATION, ARRANGEMENT. 219 

E. g., " Virtue is the pillar of a republic." This 
sentence means, that virtue in a republic resembles 
the pillar of an edifice, which supports the fabric. 
Comparison may be performed on present entities, 
or on our ideas of them. 

The arithmetical processes of addition, subtrac- 
tion, division, multiplication, are so many species 
of this second active operation, arrangement, per- 
formed by man on different numbers. Addibility, 
subtractibility, &c, i. e., the capacity of being thus 
operated on, are properties of the absolute entity 
number ; but the operation of addition, &c, is an 
active process of the mind of man on these prop- 
erties. Addition is the arrangement of several 
numbers into one class or sum; division is the ar- 
rangement of a certain number into a given num- 
ber of parts ; subtraction is the arrangement of 
some of the integral parts of a given number into 
a separate class or number ; and multiplication is 
the addition of a sum a given number of times. 

(2.) The second principle according to which 
the process of arrangement may be conducted, is 
that of genus, species, class, &c. The difference 
between this and the first mode of arrangement is, 
that in the former only one classification is em- 
braced, whereas, in the latter, there are several 
grades of similarity. The arrangement of entities 
differs from the mere reinspection of them, in the 
fact, that the latter always embraces merely the view 
of entities, without including any change effected 
in their relations to other entities or ideas. In- 
spection can only view the universe of entities as it 



220 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

exists at the time of inspection, but arrangement 
changes their order, or connexion, or relation, by 
bringing those into contiguity which were separate 
before, and by separating such as were before con- 
tiguous. By this process, we form all the varieties 
of mental associations which are based on any nat- 
ural principle or affinity ; while unnatural and ar- 
bitrary associations are the product of what we term 
the third active process, modification. 

The musician, who composes a piece of music, 
performs this process of arrangement. He takes 
the several individual notes or sounds, and places 
them into such relation as, by the constitutional in- 
fluence which they exert on our minds, will produce 
the effects at which he aims. The act of recording 
such composition by writing is a process of physi- 
cal agency. 

(3.) This arrangement may be made according 
to the probative relation of entities to a given prop- 
osition or to the human mind. The order in which i 
evidence, that is, related entities are arranged, gives | 
them more or less force or influence upon the mind. | 
This is well understood by the advocate, the logi- } 
cian, and the intelligent and faithful preacher. The | 
successful arrangement of our knowledge or argu- j 
ments according to their probative relations to the i 
human mind, constitutes the all-important operation 
of synthetic reasoning, so far as its object is to pro- 
duce in others, conviction of truths already known | 
to the speaker or writer. The capacity of reason- ! 
ing clearly, in a public speaker or writer, is nothing 
else than the ability to arrange his ideas or. argu- ; 



SECOND ACTIVE OPERATION, ARRANGEMENT. 221 

ments in their best probative order, and in that 
order in which they produce their greatest convin- 
cing effect, to enunciate them in words, or record 
them in written signs, which will recall those words 
to all who read (i. e., inspect) them. Thus we see 
that analytic reasoning, or, more properly, investi- 
gation, is an operation of inspection, while synthetic 
reasoning, that is, the logical arrangement of the 
result and evidences of our investigation, is chiefly 
an instance of the second active operation, viz., 
Arrangement. The formation of generic proposi- 
tions, in which the results of our investigations are 
synthetically proposed, is a process of abstraction 
or generalization, and thus belongs to the active 
process, modification. The presentation of the 
whole to others in oral or written language belongs 
to the last active operation, namely, the communi- 
cation of our ideas to others, or intellectual inter- 
course with other minds. 

Evidence, objectively considered, is the tendency 
or fitness of any one entity in the physical, intel- 
lectual, or moral universe, or of its relations, to 
make the reality of another supposed entity credi- 
ble, that is, apparent to the mind. Evidence, sub- 
jectively considered, is the tendency of our knowl- 
edge of some entity, or its relations, to make our 
knowledge of other entities, or their relations, ap- 
pear true. Here is presented to our view one of 
the grandest features of intellectual science — truth 
based upon the rock of the universe, which God 
founded, while our knowledge is but the shadow 
or reflection of it, merely its mental representative. 
T 2 



222 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The probative order or relation of entities to a 
certain proposition, seems to consist in their being 
detached from all irrelevant appendages, and placed 
in such connexion of contiguity or succession, in 
relation to the proposition, as is best calculated for 
the inspection of the hearer, so as to present the 
greatest facility for the operation of inspection by 
the auditors or readers. The more completely ar- 
guments are separated from everything irrelevant, 
the more easily can they be inspected by the mind. 

Every species of syllogism is nothing- else than a 
particular arrangement of certain entities, or rather 
of propositions expressing our ideas of them, such 
as is best calculated to facilitate their inspection ; 
and the art of reasoning well is nothing else than 
the habit of arranging the related ideas in this way 
for easy inspection. Before we exemplify these 
observations by the examination of the process of 
reasoning itself, we would remind the student of 
the classification of composite entities, that is, of 
relations as the bases of verbs in human language : 
for, as all syllogisms embrace verbs, an accurate 
idea of the nature of verbs is essential to the com- 
prehension of the subject. We have, on a former 
occasion, remarked that the words in human lan- 
guage originally and most naturally expressing sub- 
stantive entities are in grammar substantives, and 
those standing for adjective entities are originally 
adjectives. But it is the verbs which alone most 
naturally express the relations subsisting between 
different entities. In pursuing our examination of 
syllogisms, we begin with the several parts, and 



SYLLOGISMS. 223 

first inquire, What are they ? They consist of hu- 
man language, of propositions. These describe 
some of our mental representatives or ideas ; and 
the question is, Of what entities are they represent- 
atives, of substantive, or adjective, or composite 
entities, or of all combined ? An example will best 
illustrate these observations in their application to 
the structure of the syllogism. 

Major proposition: If there is a God, he ought 
to be worshipped. 

Minor proposition : But there is a God. 

Conclusion : Therefore he ought to be worship- 
ped. 

Here the term God, or letters G, o, d, express 
the sound, which, in our language, is the sign of a 
certain idea, which idea is our mental representa- 
tive of a real entity, viz., the great Author of the 
universe. This is a substantive entity. The phrase 
" ought to be worshipped'' is a verb, and expresses 
our idea of a certain composite entity, viz., the rela- 
tion of moral fitness or obligation between the two 
parts of a composite entity, viz., God (a Being of a 
certain character), and his rational creatures wor- 
shipping him. The major proposition, therefore, 
expressed in the language of our system, would run 
thus: "If there be an entity corresponding to the 
idea designated by the sound which is spelled by 
the letters G-o-d, he ought to be worshipped ;" i. e., 
we see the relation of suitableness between him and 
those actions of his rational creatures called the 
worship of him. The major proposition, when 
closely examined, seems evidently to be nothing 



224 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

else than a sentence expressing in words our ideas 
of a composite entity, i. e., of the relation of two 
simple entities to each other. The simple entities 
are, (1.) A Being corresponding to the idea desig- 
nated by the sound and word God ; and, (2.) Those 
actions of his rational creatures, which they per- 
form with a view of worshipping him ; and the 
relation between them is that of suitableness. 
The process by which this relation is known is 
none other than that of inspection. The result of 
inspection is, in all cases, knowledge ; and in this 
case likewise we can trace no other operation than 
the act of inspecting the two parts of a composite 
entity, God and the worship of him by rational 
creatures, and the result of this inspection is, con- 
viction of the relation. This knowledge or convic- 
tion is not optional, but necessary. The minor 
proposition, philosophically stated, runs thus : " But 
there is an entity corresponding to the mental rep- 
resentative designated by the sound, which we de- 
scribe by the letters G-o-d ;" " hence he ought to 
be worshipped" is the conclusion or relation per- 
ceived by the mind. It is evident that the only 
point to be proved in this syllogism is the minor, 
viz., that there exists an entity which we designate 
by the term God, and this must be done, and can 
be done, only by the successive inspection of the 
entities which constitute the proof. 



MODIFICATION. 22o 

SECTION III. 

Of Modification. 
The third active operation or process is termed 
modification, and embraces a class of operations 
distinct in their nature from those which have pre- 
ceded. Modification is that active operation of the 
soul, by which we take some from among our mental 
representatives of real entities (rarely the objective 
entities themselves), and bring them into such forms 
or combinations as do not correspond to realities; 
that is, make arbitrary substantive and composite en- 
tities out of them. The materials on which these op- 
erations are performed are seldom objective enti- 
ties themselves, but generally^ are our mental rep- 
resentatives of them. This operation is distinguish- 
ed from the two preceding by the following dis- 
tinct peculiarities : (1.) The operations of inspec- 
tion and arrangement act as generally on objective 
entities themselves, as on our mental representa- 
tives of them ; whereas, that of modification is con- 
versant chiefly about our ideas. (2.) The former 
two operations take our mental representatives of 
substantive entities as wholes or units, and leave 
them such throughout all the process of their influ- 
ence ; take our ideas of the combination of prop- 
erties found coexisting, and leave these combina- 
tions unaltered ; but modification changes them 
from their natural state, and brings their constituent 
parts or elements into forms and combinations 
which do not exactly correspond to real entities. 
This operation embraces, among others, the follow- 
ing processes : 



226 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

1. The process of abstraction and generalization ; 
that is, the process of framing ideas and combina- 
tions of ideas, which do not fully represent any one 
entity, but are used to express a whole class of in- 
dividual entities which have, in common, the prop- 
erties expressed by the generic idea and term. 
Thus the idea quadruped is formed by the process 
of abstraction. We take the combinations of our 
mental representatives of the properties found co- 
existing in each of the several animals, horse, cow, 
sheep, dog, &c. We compare with each other our 
ideas of these several combinations of properties, 
each one of which combinations is found coexisting 
in one or other of these animals. Thus comparing 
these several combinations of ideas, we omit from 
each every individual idea which is peculiar to 
itself, until at last we have nothing remaining but 
the idea of four legs, as the property or peculiarity 
which they have in common, and by which they 
are distinguished from animals of a different class. 
In considering this process, let it be recollected that 
our mental representative of each one of the differ- 
ent coexisting objective properties is separate and 
independent. We can therefore, with the greatest 
ease, abstract from our ideas of the combination, 
any one or more of its elements at option, and use 
the residue as a substantive entity in our ratiocina- 
tions. It is in this way that all generic terms are 
formed. 

If we examine the ideas conveyed to the mind 
by the term quadruped and the phrase four legs, 
we instantly perceive a great distinction between 



PROCESS OF MODIFICATION. 227 

them : the latter designates our idea of a part of an 
animal, while the former signifies not only a whole 
animal, but a whole class of animals each of which 
has four legs. But it is evident that the idea ex- 
pressed by the term quadruped does not correspond 
with any individual entity intended by it, any far- 
ther than the circumstance of its having four legs. 
The term quadruped, therefore, expresses one of 
those general ideas which we refer to the process 
of abstraction. Thus also the idea expressed by 
the term all, when definitely used, does not corre- 
spond fully to any real entity, but is a generic idea 
embracing a great number of entities. 

Of the same character, generically, are negations, 
and the ideas expressed by particles of speech 
which have no objective entity in nature corre- 
sponding to them. They are, though of differ- 
ent kinds, the product of this power of modifica- 
tion. Thus the word " nothing" expresses a nega- 
tive generic idea, and is equivalent to not a solid, 
not a liquid, not a gas, not light, not caloric, &c, 
&c. The idea is acquired by the perception of the 
absence of one entity after another, and ultimately 
the supposed absence of all entities. Generally, 
however, when we use the term nothing, we em- 
ploy it in a qualified sense. About absolute no- 
thing we seldom speak, and can say but little in- 
telligently. 

Generic propositions are formed by striking out 
from a specific proposition, the name of the in- 
dividual objective entity of which the predicate 
of the proposition may be affirmed, and soibstitu- 



228 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ting in its stead some generic name, which com- 
prehends all the individual objective entities to 
which the predicate is believed to be applicable. 
One of the most important rules of correct reason- 
ing is, that the utmost caution be always observed 
not to introduce into our general proposition a term 
more generic than our actual examinations warrant, 
not so general as to include any entity, of which 
we are not certain that the predicate really belongs 
to it, or in regard to which our experience is not 
sufficiently extensive, and also uniform so far as it 
goes. This process of generalization or abstrac- 
tion is one of the most important among all our 
mental operations. 

Among its results are embraced, (1.) Geometrical 
axioms ; (2.) Metaphysical axioms ; (3.) Mathemat- 
ical truths ; (4.) Moral general truths or principles ; 
such as, virtue is productive of happiness and vice 
of misery. 

Hence the opinion of Kant and many other German 
philosophers, that knowledge of this kind is a priori, 
that is, inherent in the mind, is erroneous. There 
are, indeed, many truths which may be characterized 
as universal and unchangeable, which are the prop- 
erties assigned by him to the truths of pure reason 
(Reine Vernunft). And there can be no objection 
to calling them transcendental. But they do not 
differ in their nature from other ideas. Viewed 
subjectively, these general ideas are phenomena of 
our minds, are mental representatives of actual re- 
lations in nature, abstracted from the entities in 
which they are found. Viewed objectively, gen- 



kant's view of a priori knowledge. 229 

eral truths are relations actually existing in na- 
ture, not in an abstract, but in a concrete state, be- 
tween different individual entities. Thus the axiom, 
" Things which are equal to the same thing are 
equal to one another," is nothing else than a prop- 
osition expressing the relation of agreement be- 
tween different entities, and especially the truth 
taught by experience, that any two of them which 
are equal to a third, will also be found equal to 
each other. But if it be inquired whether these 
truths are a priori knowledge, we reply in the nega- 
tive. The individual relation of equality between 
the different objects existed before we perceived 
it ; but the general, abstract, subjective idea of this 
relation, having been formed from the ideas of the 
individual relations perceived, must necessarily be 
subsequent to our (empyric) perceptions of the in- 
dividual relations. The general truth has nothing 
in nature corresponding to it ; because all actual 
relations and entities are individual. It therefore 
exists only as an idea in the mind of man. There 
are, indeed, some laws of the mind itself, which reg- 
ulate and limit its operations, our knowledge of 
which is not derived from the observation of exter- 
nal nature. These laws, it is admitted, exist prior 
to our knowledge of them. But so do the laws of 
the material universe. And just as we derive our 
knowledge of the laws of the physical universe by 
observation of external nature, so we acquire our 
knowledge of the laws of mind by observing the 
phenomena of mind. Yet, there is as much differ- 
ence between the laws of mind and our knowledge 

U 



230 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of those laws, as there is between the laws of mat- 
ter and our knowledge of them. Nor can we per- 
ceive any reason why the one should be regarded 
as a priori knowledge, rather than the other ; for in 
reality neither possesses any claim to that character. 

2. Fictitious combinations of ideas : (a.) Fictitious 
simple entities, either substantive or adjective, i. e., 
fictitious persons, things, and properties, (b.) Fic- 
titious composite entities, or relations, or actions 
performed by one on the other, or existing between 
several. This process brings different entire sub- 
stantive entities into imaginary combinations, and 
attributes to them imaginary actions. To this spe- 
cies of modification belong all the operations of 
imagination and fancy, the active element of many 
specimens of wit and burlesque ; all specimens of 
painting, and all works of fiction, either in poetry 
or prose ; and also, what is of the same character, 
though of different design, every species of misrep- 
resentation, falsehood, or lying. 

The operations of what is termed imagination 
are clearly specimens of modification. The defini- 
tions of imagination, adopted by the best writers, 
sufficiently prove this. " It is the province of ima- 
gination," says Mr. Stewart, " to make a selection of 
qualities and of circumstances from a variety of dif- 
ferent objects, and by combining and disposing 
these, to form a new creation of its own." What 
is this else than modification, which, according to 
our definition, " is that active operation of the soul, 
by which we take some from among our mental 
representatives of real entities (rarely the objective 
entities themselves), and bring them into such forms 



RELATIONS OF ENTITIES. 231 

or combinations as do not correspond to realities." 
Still more accordant with our definition of modifi- 
cation is that given of imagination by Dr. Aber- 
crombie, who says, " In the process of imagination, 
we take the component elements of real scenes, 
events, or characters, and combine them anew by a 
process of the mind itself, so as to form compounds 
which have no existence in nature." But the pro- 
cess of abstraction, or generalization, also consists 
in an operation of the same general kind, but for 
different purposes. Some of the processes termed 
wit, burlesque, and the ludicrous, partake of the 
same nature. Hence, as these several processes 
differ only in minor circumstances, while they are 
generically the same, it is more philosophic not to 
regard them as entirely different operations, but to 
adopt one general process of modification, and re- 
gard these as its different species. Thus, when the 
painter designs to paint an imaginary landscape 
of perfect beauty, how does he proceed ? He re- 
calls to his reminiscences all the most beautiful 
scenes which he has witnessed in nature, and se- 
lecting from them his ideas of those traits which 
strike him as most beautiful, he forms these into 
one imaginary landscape in his own mind. After 
this, he tries successively to imitate these several 
features with his pencil, that is, he records this new 
creation of his imagination on the canvass. The 
poet passes through the same process, more or less 
formally, only he makes his record in words instead 
of colours, with the pen instead of the painter's pen- 
cil. " Milton," says Mr. Stuart, " has, in his gar- 
den of Eden, created a landscape more perfect, 



232 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

probably, in all its parts, than has ever been reali- 
zed in nature, and certainly very different from any- 
thing that this country (England) exhibited at the 
time when he wrote. It is a curious remark of 
Mr. Walpole, that Milton's Eden is free from the 
defects of the old English garden, and is imagined 
on the same principles, which it was reserved for 
the present age to carry into execution." But it 
was no peculiarity of Milton, that he depicted his 
garden as more beautiful than any which nature 
presents to us. This is characteristic of poets and 
novelists generally. They exhibit their heroes and 
heroines either as elevated above the bounds of hu- 
man perfection, or sunk below the dregs of our 
race. For this very reason, a fondness for works 
of this description is no promising trait of charac- 
ter, especially in the young ; and the habitual in- 
dulgence of it almost invariably disqualifies, in a 
greater or less degree, for the sober realities and 
the active scenes of real life. But another and 
still more serious objection to the great mass of 
popular novels, romances, tragedies, and comedies, 
is, that they familiarize the mind with scenes of pol- 
lution, and thus destroy the moral sensibilities of 
the soul ; and they often present vice arrayed in so 
many circumstances of interest, as to make the 
reader insensibly forget its deformity. Nor does 
the unfortunate end which is sometimes made to 
close the career of wickedness, and which is the 
reputed moral of the tale, at all compensate for the 
corrupting influence exerted on the reader's mind 
by long familiarity with scenes of impurity through- 
out the book. Even when scenes of affliction or 



CONNEXION BETWEEN MIND AND MATTER. 233 

misfortune are presented, and the sympathy of the 
reader becomes deeply interested, as the whole is 
confessedly fictitious, and no opportunity is afford- 
ed to him to exercise his sympathy in efforts to re- 
lieve the unfortunate, the practical benevolent ten- 
dencies of his nature are impaired, and even his 
sensibility to real misfortune blunted. 

The sudden and arbitrary combinations of thought, 
which constitute the intellectual part of wit and 
burlesque, are in many cases different species of 
the process of modification, while the sentient part 
of these complex efforts of mind constitute the feel- 
ing or emotion of the ludicrous. 

The architect and the sculptor, likewise, first 
make a creation of fancy, and then endeavour to 
realize it by erecting some splendid and tasteful ed- 
ifice, or an animated, almost living statue. 



SECTION IV. 

The fourth active process is that mental agency 
which immediately regards and regulates the action 
of our bodily organs. It may be termed the men- 
tal direction of our physical action. It embraces 
all voluntary control over the entire muscular sys- 
tem, by which alone motion is produced in any 
part of the body. The intrinsic connexion between 
mind and matter, and the manner in which the lat- 
ter is made to obey the former, is a mystery to us. 
The fact of the obedience of the body to the mind 
is of daily and hourly, yea, of incessant occurrence ; 
but is as incomprehensible to the greatest philoso- 
U2 



234 CONNEXION BETWEEN MIND AND MATTER. 

pher, as any other mystery in nature or religion. 
I will to hold the pen in my right hand, and so to 
move it as to form letters and words ; but why my 
right hand takes the pen rather than the left, why 
my fingers move the pen so as to form alphabetic 
letters rather than mathematical figures, I know 
not. I can assign no other reason than my antece- 
dent volition, that they should do so. And a man 
who has suffered a paralysis is surprised when, for 
the first time, he finds that the muscles of his arm 
or leg refuse to obey the volitions of his mind. 

This connexion between the mind and body, 
this obedience of the muscles to the will, in healthy 
persons, being assumed as one of the best- estab- 
lished facts in nature, our next inquiry is, how far 
is so-called physical action really physical, and 
how far is it mental ? It seems evident that every- 
thing about it, except the simple tension and relax- 
ation of the muscles, and consequent locomotion of 
the body, or some of its parts, is mental. Mechan- 
ical skill is an improvement of the mind in direct- 
ing bodily motion. Intelligence, memory, wisdom 
in the selection of appropriate materials, and ap- 
propriate bodily motions, to effect an end, are in- 
volved, as are also other mental processes. 

This agency might be divided into different kinds, 
according to the different organs to which it more 
immediately relates ; or it might be divided into 
the different processes effected by the hands, by 
the feet, the eyes, the whole body, &c. Under the 
operations effected by the hands would be em- 
braced, (1.) The different species of mechanical and 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 235 

agricultural labour ; (2.) The manipulations requi- 
site to performances on musical instruments, in 
which there is, combined with much physical ac- 
tivity, remarkable intellectual skill. Of the opera- 
tions of the feet, walking is the most remarkable. 
It properly results from the combined muscular ef- 
fort of the whole body, and consists in balancing 
the body by leaning forward so far that the centre 
of gravity is brought beyond the base, and sustain- 
ing the body from falling by the continued position 
of one foot after another in advance of the whole. 
In all cases of voluntary physical action, we can 
distinguish the following mental processes : (1.) Se- 
lection of the end to be accomplished ; (2.) Knowl- 
edge of the ways and means for its attainment ; 
(3.) The volition to exert the bodily organ ; (4.) The 
attention of the soul to the organ ; (5.) The inspec- 
tion of the material on which the agency is to be 
performed ; and, (6.) The active process of the mind 
conducting and regulating the physical action. 

SECTION V. 

The fifth process is that of holding intellectual 
intercourse with other minds ; or, as it is com- 
monly, though incorrectly termed, the process of 
communicating our ideas to others. 

Philosophically speaking, this process consists in 
exciting in others the ideas which they themselves 
have already obtained from those entities on which 
we wish them to think, and exciting them in such 
order, and in such combinations, and with such ad- 
jective properties annexed, as we wish them to en- 



236 INTELLECTUAL INTERCOURSE. 

tertain. When we utter articulate sounds, these 
sounds, by their exact similitude to those which the 
person whom we address has heard in connexion 
with certain ideas, first recall his idea of the simi- 
lar sound formerly heard by himself, and this re- 
calls the idea of an entity then connected in his 
mind with that idea of the sound. Thus, by speak- 
ing to others, that is, by successively pronouncing 
the sounds corresponding to the train of thought in 
our own minds, we not only excite in others the 
similar ideas which they have received from enti- 
ties, but we bring them into new connexions, and 
add epithets to suit our purpose. 

This process of intellectual intercourse is carried 
on in different ways : 

I. By speaking-, or expressing- our ideas by ar- 
ticulate sounds. We are born with organs of ar- 
ticulation, by the voluntary action of which we 
can so modify the expiring breath as to produce 
specific articulate sounds. The air on which the 
action of these organs is exerted is only the ex- 
piring breath, the breath as it is in the act of pass- 
ing out from the lungs. The constant inhalation 
and expiration of breath is, within certain limits, 
involuntary, and goes on during sleep ; but wheth- 
er we will or will not modify this breath by the or- 
gans of speech, and emit it with such force as to 
produce sound, is voluntary. The scope of vol- 
untary control which we have over respiration, 
seems to be just as much as is necessary for speak- 
ing, and yet not sufficient to destroy life by a total 
interruption of breathing. If it were possible to 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 237 

withhold respiration entirely, a man might at any 
moment easily put an end to his existence. If, on 
the other hand, we had no control over our respi- 
ration, but were compelled to inspire and expire 
at regular intervals, our sentences would all have 
to be of a certain length, or our enunciation could 
have no reference to their punctuation, and the op- 
eration of speaking would be subject to such monot- 
onous interruptions, as would be unpleasantly me- 
chanical. Hence, it is evident, this voluntary con- 
trol was given, and this voluntary respiration with- 
held, for these very purposes. 

Children find the same pleasure in exercising 
their organs of articulation on the expiring breath, 
that they do in using their arms and legs. God 
has so constituted animals, that the use of their or- 
gans is, in itself and for its own sake, pleasant. 
The fishes skipping about in their watery element, 
the birds in the atmosphere filling it with warbling 
notes, exhibit such signs of enjoyment as to leave 
no doubt, that if the vocabulary of their language 
were intelligible to man, the feelings would be joy- 
ous which they express. For the same reason, chil- 
dren, when they find themselves able to talk, are 
prone to talk incessantly. Even before they can 
articulate correctly, they find, by crying, that they 
can in some measure control their organs of speech, 
and thus they learn the rudiments of oral action. 
By continued practice they increase this ability, 
and in due time they learn to articulate, that is, to 
speak, with tolerable accuracy. 

The following appears to be the manner in which 



238 CONNEXION OF WORDS WITH THINGS. 

words become connected with things, or, rather, in 
which the ideas of oral words, that is, sounds, be 
come connected in our minds with the ideas of ex- 
ternal entities. Children see an entity, and hear a 
certain sound pronounced in connexion with it. 
The idea of an entity, for example, an apple, ob^ 
tained by sight, and the idea of the sound obtained 
by the ear, are received almost simultaneously, and 
thus, having the relation of contiguity of time, the 
one, by virtue of this relation, recalls the other. 
Thus a father approaches his child with an apple ; 
he stretches out the fruit that the child may take 
it, and, in so doing, pronounces the word apple. 
The child's mind thus receives, almost simultane- 
ously, two ideas, viz., that of the colour of the ap- 
ple, obtained by the eye, and that of the sound in- 
dicated by the written word apple, acquired by the 
ear. Originally the child perceives no connexion 
between these ideas, the one of sound and the other 
of colour ; but finding the two generally connected 
by other persons, that is, hearing the same sound 
pronounced by all who seem to be speaking of the 
same entity, the child soon learns that the one, viz., 
the sound apple, is used as a sign or name to des- 
ignate the other, the thing apple. Thus both these 
ideas, or items of knowledge, having been obtained 
together, have the relation of (temporal) contiguity, 
and become so closely related, that if the attention 
of the mind is by any means directed to the one, 
it spontaneously pursues this relation, and is con- 
ducted to the other. The idea of the colour of the 
apple may also at any time be recalled by the pres- 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 239 

ence of another apple, which will afford a similar 
idea, and thus, by the relation of similarity, recall 
the first. The visual idea may likewise be medi- 
ately recalled by seeing the letters which spell the 
sound which stands for that idea. 

These remarks show us that, parallel to our train 
of thoughts, the subjects of which are objective en- 
tities, runs another coequal train of thoughts, the 
subjects of which are sounds, viz., those sounds 
which, by experience, have become associated with 
those entities. But speaking is an active operation 
of the articulating organs consequent on a volition 
to communicate our wishes, commands, or other 
ideas, to those whom we address ; experience hav- 
ing taught us that others associate with certain 
sounds the same ideas that we do, and, therefore, 
that the utterance of sounds by us, similar to those 
which we have heard uttered by others, will excite 
in others the same ideas which we attach to these 
sounds. 

Properly speaking, however, we neither do nor 
can excite in others the same identical ideas which 
we connect with our words. The ideas which all 
men connect with words are the mental representa- 
tives of entities which they originally derive from 
entities themselves, and which they can derive from 
no other source. "When they hear others pronounce 
the same, or, rather, exactly similar sounds, they, 
by the relation of similarity, recall the recollection 
of the sounds which they formerly heard ; and the 
recollection of these former sounds recalls the ideas 
formerly associated with them. Thus, when a 



240 PARALLEL AND COEQUAL TRAINS OF THOUGHTS. 

speaker addresses an audience, there is a truly re- 
markable train of collateral and parallel operations 
running on with the train of the speaker's ideas. 
Every idea of the speaker is succeeded by the fol- 
lowing operations before it accomplishes its design. 

(1.) The idea of the speaker himself. (2.) The 
speaker's recollection of the idea of the sound for- 
merly associated with that idea by himself. (3.) 
His volition to articulate a similar sound. (4.) The 
articulating action of his organs on the expiring 
breath to produce a similar sound. (5.) The hear- 
er's idea of the sound produced by the speaker's 
voice. (6.) The hearer's recollection of the simi- 
lar sound which he himself had often made. (7.) 
The recurrence of the idea which he formerly con- 
nected with the similar sound made by himself. 
All these parallel trains of operations attend every 
thought conveyed by the speaker. The security 
that men by this process will substantially under- 
stand each other, rests on the fact, that all men de- 
rive from an inspection of the same entity substan- 
tially the same representative ; otherwise there 
could not be any common language or communica- 
tion of thought among men. 

Our ability to make just such sounds as corre- 
spond to our recollection of sounds made by oth- 
ers, results from our being able to make at option 
coarser or finer, dental or labial, lingual or guttural 
sounds, and from our ability to discern whether the 
sounds which we make, and of which we have an 
idea so soon as we hear them, exactly resemble 
those which we heard from others. 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 241 

The structure of the human articulating organs is 
such, that all men naturally make certain element- 
ary sounds. These sounds are expressed by the 
letters of the alphabet, and are substantially the 
same in all languages. Even the difference ob- 
served in the number of letters in different langua- 
ges is often the result of the imperfect state of the 
art of designating these elementary or alphabetic 
sounds, and two languages whose alphabets differ 
most, may, when spoken, bear much greater simi- 
larity to each other in their elementary sounds. 
So far then, at least, as the elementary sounds are 
concerned, we must answer the long-disputed ques- 
tion in the affirmative, and maintain that language 
is of Divine origin ; because the nature of these ele- 
mentary sounds results from the structure of the 
organs which God gave us. 

We learn, by early habit, to articulate nearly all 
the elementary sounds with great promptness and 
certainty ; and it is thus that we learn new langua- 
ges ; because we can form relations of contiguity 
between our ideas and the words of a new tongue. 
Nay, although it is a rare attainment, we may, by 
frequent repetition and long-continued habit, form 
so close a connexion between old ideas which we 
were wont to express in our vernacular tongue, and 
the words of a new language, that we spontaneous- 
ly think in it ; that is, as we reinspect the old ideas, 
the corresponding words of the newly-acquired lan- 
guage will spontaneously recur to our memory as 
we advance, instead of those of our vernacular 
tongue. In the exercise of articulation the breath 

X 



242 COMMUNICATION OF THOUGHTS BY WRITTEN SIG. 

is voluntarily modulated into those sounds : one 
lungs' full after another, leaving only short intervals 
for inspiration, just as long as we wish to convey 
our ideas to others ; and when this volition is ac- 
complished, the articulating organs become motion- 
less, and the breath is inhaled and exhaled without 
any sound, except what is termed audible breathing. 

II. The second means of communicating our 
ideas to others is by gestures and muscular action 
of the countenance correspondent to the thought. 
How far this kind of communication may be car- 
ried, is forcibly exhibited in pantomimic exhibitions, 
in which a regular succession of scenes is intelligi- 
bly represented by gestures and muscular expres- 
sion of the countenance, without the utterance of a 
single word. This process it is not necessary for 
our purpose to examine in greater detail. 

III. The third mode of communicating our 
thoughts is by written signs. These signs are of 
different kinds. (1.) The regular alphabetical let- 
ters. These designate the elementary sounds which 
belong to languages in general, and are virtually 
the same in them all. These signs, or letters, con- 
stitute the most perfect form of the alphabet, and 
in point of time were probably later than the hiero- 
glyphic and syllabic signs. In the Chinese lan- 
guage the written signs do not designate elementa- 
ry sounds ; but at least many of them stand for 
whole words, and designate those elementary ob- 
jects which men find it necessary to express in the 
infancy of knowledge ; additional words being form- 
ed by a combination of these. You will easily per- 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 243 

ceive, that the accumulation of signs in this lan- 
guage must be unusually great, and very inconve- 
nient. So much is this the case, that it is said very 
few of the most learned men in China itself are 
fully acquainted with all the marks of their own 
language, and the exact import of their numerous 
combinations. 

Of the syllabic alphabet, intermediate between 
the Chinese and European languages, we have a 
modern instance in the invention of See-qua-yah 
(George Guess), a North American Indian of the 
Cherokee tribe, which deserves notice. It consists 
of an alphabet of eighty-six letters, each of them 
designating neither an elementary sound, as in Eu- 
ropean languages, nor an entire word, as in the 
Chinese, but a syllable or part of a word. 

(2.) Arithmetical figures and signs, which stand 
for sounds designating our ideas of the entity num- 
ber. (3.) Musical notes, which designate our ideas 
of such sounds as are used in musical composition. 

IV. The fourth mode of expressing our thoughts 
is by singing. This is a voluntary effort to make 
certain sounds in accordance with different princi- 
ples, with a view to excite in ourselves or others 
certain feelings, and sometimes to give interest to 
certain truths. This mode might, indeed, be re- 
garded as a subdivision of the first or oral sounds. 



The exercise of Composition is a complex opera- 
tion, consisting of an act of voluntary inspection 
and arrangement of ideas of entities, simple or com- 



i 



244 THE EXERCISE OF COMPOSITION. 

posite, together with the act of expressing the ideas 
thus arranged, by signs on paper ; that is, writing 
the ideas as arranged by us. Thus, e. g., we re- 
solve to compose an essay on the evils of intemper- 
ance. We reflect on the entity a drunkard, or our 
idea of him, that is, inspect it in all its various mel- 
ancholy and disgusting relations, and arrange our 
ideas with reference to the object in view, and then 
write them as arranged. We do not write every 
idea which the mind lights on in its voluntary in- 
spection, but only those which are particularly suit- 
ed to our purpose. Here the question arises, What 
are the new ideas, not retrospective, which we nev- 
er had before, but which thus oftentimes occur to 
the mind ? Are they not merely cognitive repre- 
sentatives of relations ; of new combinations of sim- 
ple entities, which were known before, but never 
precisely thus combined by the mind ? Now from 
these new combinations result new relations, which, 
when viewed by the mind, are called original or 
new ideas. This feature of suggestion presented 
some difficulty to Dr. Brown ; but, according to this 
view of it, its nature would be sufficiently plain. It 
is incorrect to say that the new idea recurred to the 
mind. The true statement is this : the simple en- 
tities thus viewed together by the mind are inactive, 
as are also our ideas of them ; but the mind itself 
is the active agent, which, in voluntarily contempla- 
ting, that is, inspecting the entity and its relations, 
perceives this, to it, new relation, which, however, 
existed before it was viewed, and was perhaps per- 
ceived by many others before, and which would 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 245 

exist in nature if it had never been viewed by any- 
one. 

The preceding five operations, viz., Inspection, 
Arrangement, Modification, Physical action or agen- 
cy, and Intellectual intercourse with other minds, 
appear to constitute all the specific active opera- 
tions of the soul. To one or other of these every 
operation of the mind may be referred which is in 
its nature active, excepting only what remains to 
be discussed under the mode of their occurrence. 

SECTION VI. 

Of Attention. 

We shall first make a few remarks on the sub- 
ject of attention before we inquire whether it is 
entitled to the rank of a distinct active process. 
Whatever be the active operation in which we are 
engaged, the clearness, success, and mnemonic te- 
nacity attending it, will generally be in proportion 
to the degree of attention exerted in the operation. 
Every one must have observed, that an inattentive 
perusal of a book leaves an indistinct impression, 
figuratively speaking, of its contents on the mind ; 
while an attentive perusal produces a directly con- 
trary effect. In conducting an inquiry, if the pro- 
cess be negligently conducted, the result may be a 
total failure to obtain a clear conviction ; but an 
attentive review, that is, reinspection, of the very 
same evidence, will often produce clear conviction, 
and dispel every doubt. 

The influence of attention on the degree of feel- 
ing excited in the mind is equally striking. In- 
X2 



246 ATTENTION. 

deed, in most cases, there can be very little feeling, 
that is, little pleasure or pain, without attention. The t 
same remark is equally true of knowledge. Thus, 
the rays of light may be reflected from an object to 
the retina of the eye, and form the image there, but ! 
it will fail to convey knowledge to the mind, if the \ 
attention be not directed to it. So also the same | 
entity can produce no feeling unless the attention j 
be directed to it ; or, in other words, unless it be j 
observed. There are, indeed, cases of disease in 
which painful feeling is irresistibly produced, and ! 
we are not able entirely to divert our attention from 
it ; but in so far and so long as we can divert it, the 
pain is greatly diminished. 

Attention also greatly improves every active op- 
eration to which it is directed. The success and 
accuracy of inspection are obviously improved by it 
in the highest degree. Arrangement can also be 
performed with an accuracy and facility propor- 
tioned to the attention bestowed on the operation. 
The abstractions and generalizations of the active 
process of modification are in like manner greatly 
improved by attention. Who can doubt, that the 
excellence of mechanical operations, or of the exe- 
cution of instrumental music, requires the attention 
of the performer ? Or who would be guilty of the 
absurdity of denying, that the communication of 
thought on any subject, whether performed orally 
or in writing, can be executed with greater accu- 
racy, and system, and effect, when the energy, the 
attention of the soul, is expended on the effort ? 

In complex operations, also, the influence of con- 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 247 

tinued attention, that is, of attention combined with 
habit, is strongly displayed. Some talented indi- 
viduals have thus acquired the ability to conduct a 
simultaneous train of several operations, each of 
which ordinarily engrosses the attention of men 
separately. Thus, of Julius Caesar it is said, that 
he could at the same time dictate seven letters to 
as many secretaries, and that even when engaged 
in writing himself, he could dictate to four others. 

Attention, too intensely exerted, and too long 
continued upon any one subject, sometimes induces 
monomania. But it is a benevolent law of our na- 
ture, that the lassitude arising from continued atten- 
tion unlooses, as it were, the grasp of attention, and 
enables the mind to resume the natural and salutary 
self-control and equipoise of its powers. 

That attention, however, is not a distinct and 
separate operation, will appear evident from the fol- 
lowing facts : (1.) We cannot conceive of it as 
acting by itself, but only in connexion with some 
other operation of the mind. (2.) It does not give 
us any results of its action, distinct from those of 
the active operation with which it is combined. 
(3.) It is common to all the active operations. (4.) 
It seems only to be a property of the active opera- 
tions conducted at the time. We therefore define 
attention to be the energy of the soul exerted in some 
active operation. 

The causes which excite attention appear, in gen- 
eral, to be these. (1.) A volition to bestow atten- 
tion on the performance of some active operation. 
(2.) The present interest or pleasure felt in the op- 



248 MODE OF OCCURRENCE OF ACTIVE OPERATIONS. 

eration itself. Thus, we commence the perusal of 
a book incidentally met with, not knowing what its 
contents may be, but soon become so interested, 
that the most, intense attention is excited in our 
breast. (3.) Some impression from without made 
through" the bodily organs. Thus, we may be en- 
gaged listening to some interesting narrative ; but, 
a band of musicians passing by, their music makes 
an impression on the organs of hearing, and it at- 
tracts and diverts the attention. This we suppose 
to be a correct view of the character of attention, 
which we, therefore, cannot regard as a separate or 
distinct active operation. 



CHAPTER IT. 

THE MODE OF OCCURRENCE OF THE TIVE ACTIVE 
OPERATIONS. 

If it be asked, tohy does the soul engage in active 
operations at all rather than not, we reply, the rea- 
son is, because the nature of the soul is active. 
By this we mean, that the Divine Author of our 
nature has so constituted the mind of man, that, du- 
ring his waking hours, it is unavoidably and inces- 
santly engaged in some one of these five active 
processes. Of this we can be convinced by an ex- 
amination of our own mental operations. On such 
an investigation we find, that it is not optional with 
us whether our minds shall be engaged in thinking 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 249 

or not ; we are constitutionally thus engaged, and 
can at best, by the most determined voluntary ef- 
fort, interrupt the succession of thought for a few 
seconds only. 

As to the manner in which this continued action 
is mediately sustained, several theories might be 
suggested ; but the fact, which is beyond dispute, 
is all that is requisite to the accuracy of our sys- 
tem ; and as we have endeavoured to avoid mere 
theory heretofore, we shall not at present call your 
attention to either of these. 

If it be inquired, in the second place, why does 
the soul, at any given time, engage in one of these 
active operations rather than another, the experi- 
ence of every individual will unhesitatingly reply, 
that these operations are engaged in in one of two 
ways : either from deliberate choice or from habit. 
The testimony of every man's own consciousness, 
if Ave mistake not, is decided and conclusive on this 
subject, and teaches that in one of these two ways, 
and in no other, do active operations at any time 
take place. 

The mode of occurrence in the active operations 
of the mind is twofold : 

I. Voluntary. II. Spontaneous. 

SECTION I. 

Of the Voluntary Occurrence of the Active Opera- 
tions. 

The active processes of the soul are voluntary, 
when we engage in them in consequence of a voli- 
tion so to do, or, to express the same in popular 



250 VOLUNTARY OCCURRENCE OF ACTIVE OPERATION*. 

language, when they are undertaken from deliber- 
ate choice. That we do perform such acts of 
choice every hour of the day, must be evident to 
every impartial inquirer, from the testimony of his 
own consciousness. 

(1.) The certainty of our performing such acts 
of uncontrolled choice is just as evident and indu- 
bitable to every individual, as is the certainty of 
his performing any other mental act. All men 
agree as to the existence of our other mental oper- 
ations, such as knowledge and feeling ; nor do any 
doubt in practice the existence of our acts of choice, 
because it rests on the same basis. 

(2.) As to the nature of this act of choice, our 
ideas must be derived from the same source by 
which we become acquainted with the nature of 
knowledge and feeling. It is probable, too, that 
all men agree in fact and practice, though not in the- 
ory, in their views of these acts of choice, as much 
as in their ideas of knowledge and feeling. The 
differences of opinion which exist do not relate to 
the existence of the power of willing, nor to the 
idea which consciousness furnishes of our volitions 
as mental acts, but to the supposed relations be- 
tween volitions and precedent operations, and to 
other powers and principles of the mind, (a.) All 
men agree that these acts of choice differ from acts 
of necessity, and are in their nature opposite to them. 
When the fiendlike assassin has deliberately sent 
the fatal ball through the heart of his victim, we do 
not censure the bullet that penetrated his heart, 
nor the rifle which contained the powder, nor the 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 251 

spark which ignited it, nor the cock which elicited 
the spark, nor the trigger which moved the cock, 
nor even the finger which moved the trigger : but 
instantly perceiving that all these are not voluntary- 
agents, we attribute the blame to the malicious 
mind, which originated the whole train of second 
causes. Nor does the common sense of mankind 
discriminate merely between the voluntary actions 
of man and the actions of mechanical and irration- 
al agents ; the distinction between the voluntary and 
involuntary actions of man himself is equally clear, 
and universally acknowledged. What different 
feelings from those produced by the voluntary act 
of the cold-blooded assassin, are excited in every 
bosom when, as two intimate companions are run- 
ning through a thicket in pursuit of game, their 
guns cocked and hands applied to the trigger, the 
foot of the hindermost is caught in a brush ; he 
stumbles, and in his effort to regain himself presses 
unconsciously the fatal trigger, and prostrates his 
friend, a corpse, before him. (b.) It is only for 
such actions as are voluntary that we accuse or 
excuse ourselves, and for these alone can we feel 
true penitence, if they are contrary to known duty. 
When we have yielded to the force of temptation, 
we are conscious of our guilt, because we know 
that the force of these temptations was not irresisti- 
ble ; we know that we could and ought to have re- 
sisted it. (c.) All men agree, that for their own 
acts of choice alone, and the consequences of them, 
can they really and justly be held responsible either 
by God or man. (d.) Every reflecting man who 



252 CONSTITUTIONAL INCLINATIONS OF THE SOUL. 

has attained mature development of mind, is con- 
scious of the fact that he can and ought to regulate 
the voluntary actions of his life according to certain 
fixed rules and principles. 

The question now arises, Is the soul, in choosing 
and refusing from among the acts possible to it, en- 
tirely free from any and every bias, and left to make 
its choice uninfluenced by anything whatever, or do 
we perceive in the voluntary actions of the soul any 
evidence to the contrary ? If we find, that the great 
majority of the acts of deliberate choice in all men 
of every character, under all circumstances, and of 
every age, are of a particular kind, are calculated 
to promote a particular general end, and made with 
a view to accomplish the same general purpose, we 
are irresistibly led to the belief, that there is in the 
soul itself a constitutional impulse, or bias, or in- 
clination to that end. This inclination must be prior 
to the actions themselves, and is among the causes 
which produce them. It must belong to the struc- 
ture of the soul itself, and may therefore with pro- 
priety be termed a constitutional inclination. If we 
are not grossly mistaken, the conduct of all men 
does present evidence of such inclinations in every 
situation of life, from the cradle to the tomb. 
Though these inclinations at first view appear 
numerous and complicated, on closer examination 
they resolve themselves into the following two con- 
stitutional inclinations : 

I. The inclination to action in accordance with 
the fitness of things, moral, intellectual, andphysU 
cal. 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 253 

II. The inclination to well-being, or the en- 
joyment of pleasure, present and ultimate ; and the 
avoiding of pain. 

These inclinations are not faculties, because they 
are not sources of distinct species of mental opera- 
tions. Nor are they themselves mental operations, 
in the ordinary sense of the term, because they ex- 
ist constantly, and prior to action. Nor are they 
habits of the soul, for habits are merely a facility 
for the performance of actions of particular kinds, 
and a tendency to their spontaneous performance, 
which facility is acquired by practice, and may be 
changed; while the constitutional inclinations are 
permanent and immutable. They are therefore 
natural characteristics of the soul, and belong to its 
constitutional structure. This bias seems to have 
been impressed upon our minds by the great Crea- 
tor, to determine, in some degree, the general ten- 
our of our voluntary actions ; and experience teach- 
es us that the great mass of all human actions is in 
accordance with one or the other, or both of these 
inclinations. 

I. The first constitutional inclination, viz., the in- 
clination to action in accordance with the physical, 
intellectual, and moral fitness of things, is an attri- 
bute of the soul, the existence of which is clearly 
established by a multitude of facts. All mankind 
do habitually evince the existence of this disposi- 
tion, in a greater or less degree, in their unpremed- 
itated actions. It is this inclination which leads 
all men, even from their earliest years, naturally to 
speak the truth rather than falsehood, unless they 
Y 



254 FIRST INCLINATION OF THE SOUL. 

have acquired the habit of misrepresentation from 
deliberate and self-interested calculations. The 
truth of this fact is not only admitted by men on 
ordinary occasions, but is incorporated into their 
criminal codes and judicial proceedings. It is an 
admitted rule of testimony in all our courts. Ac- 
cordingly, if the testimony of a stranger be offered 
in a trial, we inquire whether he has any interest in 
the issue, which his testimony may tend to produce. 
And if it be fully ascertained that no interest of 
his, even of the most remote kind, can possibly be 
affected by the decision, we naturally expect, in the 
absence of contrary evidence, that he will not de- 
signedly swerve from the truth. 

All mankind have a constitutional sense of obli- 
gation, a constitutional inclination to obey the moral 
fitness of things. Whatever men naturally judge 
to be right, they also feel some impulse to do. This 
impulse is, alas ! too often, and in many persons 
habitually resisted ; yet its existence is clearly 
taught in the occasional unpremeditated actions, 
and in the deathbed confessions of the most aban- 
doned. And all who pay the least attention to the 
moral dictates of their nature, will not only freely 
admit its existence, but also acknowledge that its 
empire is justly unlimited ; that wherever, through- 
out the whole range of creation, they perceive a 
trace of moral fitness, there they also find this im- 
pulse accompanying it, and feel a constitutional 
monition to obey its dictates. This obligation, too, 
though so often resisted, is seen by all men to be 
paramount in importance, and in the strength of its 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 255 

claims, to everything else. It is this inclination 
which leads men, when travelling in a strange land, 
to keep the road rather than pass through an ad- 
joining grain-field, where they would destroy the 
provision which God has made for his creatures. 
This inclination also urges us to obey the intellec- 
tual fitness of things in general ; such as, to yield 
submission to those who have a right to direct, and 
to receive instruction from those who are older and 
wiser than Ave ; to arise in the morning when we 
awake ; to take care of things belonging to un- 
known persons, rather than to destroy them. In 
short, when we examine the whole sphere of human 
agency, we find that the crimes of men alone are 
exceptions to the observance of this constitutional 
inclination, while the precepts of the law on all 
subjects exhibit its appropriate dictates. The ten- 
dency to observe the physical fitness of things is 
witnessed throughout the whole sphere of physical 
action, in every department of life. Thus, apart 
from every self-interested motive, who can doubt 
that there is a natural disposition in persons enga- 
ged in mechanical or commercial pursuits, to make 
things right rather than wrong ? to make them ac- 
cording to the principles of physical fitness rather 
than the reverse ? 

From the above considerations, it is evident that 
the first constitutional inclination is one of the most 
important features of our moral nature, and em- 
braces all that is monitory or impulsive, in what is 
termed the moral sense, in the widest import of the 
term, and also in conscience, in its stricter accepta- 



256 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

tion. As the operations of conscience are complex 
in their nature, their several constituent parts belong 
to different branches of our subject. There is in 
conscience something that is judicial, something that 
is sentient, and something that is impulsive. The 
first was discussed in the observations made on rel- 
ative knowledge ; the second, when treating of 
moral emotions ; and the third, or impulsive part, 
belongs to this place. 

The monitions or impulses of conscience are 
original and constitutional. If we attend to the 
testimony of our own consciousness on this subject, 
we think all will admit that these impulses arise 
spontaneously in the soul, whenever we contemplate 
our relations to the beings around us in the universe, 
in their bearings on our own conduct. Whatever 
we thus perceive to be dictated by these relations, 
to be our duty, to be right, to be conformed to the 
moral fitness of things, we also feel an imperative 
monition to perform. It follows, therefore, that 
conscience, in its principal, its impulsive feature, is 
an original faculty or power of the soul, although 
the operations generally designated by the term are 
complex, and several of their elements referable to 
cognition (judgment) and sensibility. The very 
structure of all different languages, proves alike 
the existence and the universality of this principle. 
Whenever we use the term " ought," or any others 
equivalent to it, we express an impulse of this con- 
stitutional inclination of conscience ; and where is 
the language on earth that is destitute of terms 
equivalent to these ; or where is the individual, in 



CONSTITUTIONAL INCLINATIONS. 257 

any nation under the sun, which never employs 
them ? 

All men also judge the impulses of this monitor, 
■whom God has implanted into our breasts, to be su- 
preme in the authority of its dictates. If at any time 
we yield to the solicitations of passion, and violate 
the prescriptions of conscience, we feel guilty and 
degraded ; we feel that we have done that which 
is unworthy of our nature, and have violated the 
relations we sustain to the great Author of our 
being. 

This principle of our nature is one of the funda- 
mental bases of our moral responsibility. Without 
it, man could not be a moral agent ; for, however 
lucid might be his views of the relations of the dif- 
ferent beings in the universe to God and to each 
other, and of the influence of his conduct on their 
happiness or misery, he certainly could not be re- 
sponsible for the conduct he pursued, if he felt no 
sense of obligation, no impulse to select the one and 
shun the other. 

The impulses of this principle of our moral nature, 
though strong enough in all to make us justly re- 
sponsible for our conduct, are not, in any case, irre- 
sistible. They never destroy our liberty, although 
they are strong enough to justify conscience in " ex- 
cusing, or else accusing, us" for our conduct. 

Like every other power of the soul, the consti- 
tutional inclination can be strengthened by faithful 
exercise, and it may be weakened by the neglect 
or violation of its dictates. The first entrance into 
the paths of known sin is generally made with a 

Y2 



258 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

tremulous step. The first oath, or the first act of 
theft or violence, is perpetrated with uncomfortable 
feelings, and followed with a sense of guilt and self- 
condemnation. Happy would it be, if erring, guilty- 
man would then listen to this kind, monitory voice, 
and return to virtue's paths, for they are paths of 
pleasantness and peace ! But the repetition of 
crime soon impairs the strength of these monitory 
impulses, and every subsequent transgression makes 
farther violations easier. On the other hand, sincere 
and faithful obedience to the dictates of conscience, 
both in ascertaining what our duty is, and in labour- 
ing to perform it, will increase the strength of its 
impulses, and make subsequent obedience the more 
easy. 

II. The second constitutional inclination, viz., the 
love of well-being-, acquires different names in pop- 
ular language, according as it is habitually indulged 
in reference to any particular class of entities. This 
inclination embraces the following, among other 
modifications : (1.) Love of life. This is one of the 
fundamental principles of the soul, and is implied 
in all the subsequent modifications of this constitu- 
tional inclination. Independently of its superad- 
ded pleasures, life itself is regarded by man as a 
great good. " Skin for skin, and all that a man 
hath, will he give for his life," is a sentiment which, 
notwithstanding the source whence it proceeded, is 
undeniably true. The afflictions of life have some- 
times made men willing to leave this world ; but it 
was always in the expectation, true or false, that a 
hereafter would restore them to life and pleasure. 



CONSTITUTIONAL INCLINATIONS. 259 

So much is man attached to his existence, and so 
deeply ingrafted on our nature is the love of life, 
that we can scarcely find, even among the most 
miserable of the sons and daughters of affliction, 
one who would be willing to purchase release from 
his sufferings at the expense of his being, one who 
would be willing to be blotted out from existence. 
In the beautiful language of Grey, we may confi- 
dently inquire, 

" For who, to dumb forgetfulness a prey, 
This pleasing, anxious being e'er resigned ; 
Left the warm precincts of the cheerful day, 
Nor cast one longing, ling'ring look behind]" 

This love of life leads us to a proper care of our 
health, and to all necessary acts of self-defence in 
time of danger. As this principle is an inherent part 
of our mental nature, it seems to be right that man, 
when assailed by violence, should defend himself 
to the utmost extremity, unless by the laws of God 
he has forfeited his right to live. And if in this 
defence his own life cannot be preserved except at 
the risk of that of his assailant, this constitutional 
principle seems to dictate a preference of his own 
existence to that of others. The propriety of this 
position is not doubted if the assailant be a serpent 
or some ravenous beast, nor can we perceive why 
it should not be equally proper in reference to rob- 
bers and murderers. We have no right to submit to 
be murdered, and by doing so Ave would often cause 
two deaths instead of one, as the murderer will gen- 
erally also, and justly, be executed. But " if he has 
done anything worthy of death," then, like Paul, 



260 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

he ought '"not to refuse to die." (2.) Love of es- 
teem or power , which is the inclination to gratify 
our love of well-being by the pursuit of such enti- 
ties and the performance of such active operations 
as acquire for us the applause and admiration of 
men. A desire for the approbation and esteem of 
others is in itself, when regulated by a proper regard 
to the first constitutional inclination, an important 
and useful principle of our nature. It tends to 
make us observe the decencies of life, and to pur- 
sue such a course of conduct as will commend us 
to others. It is only when it becomes inordinate, 
and is indulged in violation of the fitness of things, 
that it becomes sinful and pernicious in its conse- 
quences. 

So, also, the desire of possessing influence or pow- 
er is in itself commendable, if that influence be desi- 
red not to promote any selfish ends, but chiefly as 
a means to advance the welfare of the community 
and the glory of God. When this principle be- 
comes inordinate, it is termed ambition, in the un- 
favourable sense of that term. (3.) Love of prop- 
erty or possession, which is the inclination to gratify 
our love of well-being in the pursuit and posses- 
sion of wealth. So long as the love of property is 
controlled by the first constitutional inclination, the 
fitness of things ; so long as it is not pursued con- 
trary to right, contrary to the relations we sustain 
to others, it is a useful principle, and leads men to 
industry and exertion to provide comfortably for 
themselves, and those of their own household ; but 
when it degenerates into avarice, it becomes not 



CONSTITUTIONAL INCLINATIONS. 261 

only morally wrong, but also detrimental to the in- 
terests of society. (4.) Love of novelty, or curios- 
ity, which is the inclination to gratify our love of 
well-being by the pursuit of frequent change in the 
objects of our attention, having learned from our 
experience that any entity excites the greater feel- 
ing for being novel to the mind. (5.) Sensuality, 
which is the inclination to gratify the second consti- 
tutional inclination by the pursuit of objects adapt- 
ed to the indulgence of the sensual propensities. 
(6.) Love of science, which is the inclination to 
gratify our second constitutional inclination by the 
pursuit of the different objects of human knowl- 
edge. (7.) Social inclination, which is the inclina- 
tion to gratify our love of well-being by seeking the 
society of others. These, and various other modi- 
fications of the second constitutional inclination, are 
exhibited in the actions of mankind generally. 

This second constitutional inclination, the love of 
self, or of well-being, was, in its original condition, 
morally good, and of salutary tendency. The Scrip- 
tures often address our love of happiness, and the 
Saviour expressly commends it : " Thou shalt love 
thy neighbour as thyself." 

These two constitutional inclinations of the soul 
exert more or less influence on the character of our 
acts of choice, but never destroy the ability to 
choose ; that is, they never act irresistibly. When 
an individual act of choice is in harmony with both 
these inclinations of the soul, both as to motive and 
outward form, it is right in the sight of God. But 
it is evident that the great mass of human actions 



262 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

is an indulgence of the second inclination at the 
expense of the first, that is, consists in actions which 
are an indulgence of our love of pleasure or well- 
being in violation of the dictates of the physical, in- 
tellectual, or moral fitness of things. All such ac- 
tions are sinful. Among this class must be reckon- 
ed, also, some actions which, in themselves consid- 
ered, that is, so far as the outward acts are con- 
cerned, are right, but which originate from a mo- 
tive of pure selfishness. Thus, that modification 
of the second constitutional inclination termed am- 
bition, induces many men of the world to observe 
outward morality of deportment, and even to per- 
form acts of beneficence, and to support the institu- 
tions of religion, in order that they may secure the 
public approbation, and be successful in their aspi- 
rations after fame or power. Such morality is, in- 
deed, less unfavourable in its influence on the com- 
munity at large than open vice ; yea, it may even 
tend to support the order and promote the well-be- 
ing of society ; but it evidently cannot secure the 
Divine approbation, because a regard to the moral 
fitness of things, a regard to what is morally right, 
and duty, did not enter into the motive with which 
it was performed. 

It is greatly to be feared that a large portion of 
the morality of the world is of this kind, is the re- 
sult of selfishness in some one or other of its modi- 
fications. This may even be the case without the 
person himself being fully aware of it, because he 
has not carefully and faithfully examined his heart, 



CONSTITUTIONAL INCLINATIONS. 263 

and tested the motives of his conduct by the light 
of truth, either natural or revealed. Thus multi- 
tudes deceive themselves as to their real charac- 
ter. The first constitutional inclination is mani- 
festly the more noble ; but it is evident to all im- 
partial observers, that in the natural state of man 
the second greatly preponderates : and in this, so 
far as the mind is concerned, may at least in part 
consist the natural or constitutional depravity or 
disorder of man. Self preponderates over God, 
pleasure over what is right. This constitutional 
bias of the soul itself, let. it be remembered, deter- 
mines only the general end ; but not the specific 
means by which, in any case, we accomplish that 
end. Thus, the second constitutional inclination, 
in the form of self-interest, inclines our fellow-citi- 
zens to seek the melioration of their temporal con- 
dition by the construction of internal improve- 
ments ; but it does not decide whether they shall 
do it by making railroads or canals. This latter 
point the soul itself decides, after an inspection of 
the relative properties and advantages of both these 
means of gratifying our constitutional inclination. 
The several volitions of the mind, resulting from 
these different sources, are different in regard to 
comprehensiveness. Some of them are of the most 
generic kind, as they relate indefinitely to the gen- 
eral end ; others, which contemplate some particu- 
lar method of accomplishing the generic one, are 
specific in their character. Resolutions in regard 
to our general conduct are generic volitions, and 
exert an important influence on the specific voli- 



264 MOTIVE POWER OF EXTERNAL ENTITIES. 

tions, and other operations of the mind, concerned 
in executing therm 

Besides these constitutional inclinations within 
the soul itself, by which the Author of our nature has 
given a general direction to the agency of man, 
there is also in entities themselves without the mind, 
a certain degree of motive influence, that is, a cer- 
tain degree of adaptation to influence the mind to 
action, in view of which the soul exercises its pow- 
ers of choice. 

All entities without the mind may be divided, in 
reference to this subject, into two classes: 

1. Our own bodies. 

2. All other entities in the universe. 

In our own bodies we find certain phenomena, 
termed bodily appetites, which possess a strong motive 
power. By bodily appetites we here strictly mean 
the corporeal part, the material part of those appe- 
tites. Thus by the bodily appetite, hunger, we mean 
the periodical action of the gastric fluid on the coats 
of the stomach (or, as this theory has of late been 
impugned, whatever other physical change that may 
be the true cause of the feeling), which results from 
the structure of our bodily organisms, and was de- 
signed by the Creator as a periodical motive to urge 
us to take the necessary food. The same remarks 
are applicable to thirst, which is nothing else than 
that peculiar condition of the throat and fauces, oc- 
casioned by the want of a liquid, and causing a de- 
sire to obtain it, or some other substance, in order 
to relieve the pain felt ; and also sometimes in or- 
der to enjoy the pleasure occasioned by the reception 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 265 

of the liquid. The fluid thus taken into the stom- 
ach is consumed by the progress of the bodily func- 
tions, and its want occasions a painful feeling term- 
ed thirst. Both these appetites are the work of 
God. They are the necessary results of the bodily 
organization of man, and may justly be considered 
by him as clear indications of the Divine will, that 
they should lead to the course of action by which 
they are relieved, though under the limitations of 
reason. 

The second general class of motives embraces all 
other entities except the above. The pleasure we 
expect to derive from eating any fruit, or from pe- 
rusing the work of a well-known author, acts as a 
motive to procure the object of our desire. Enti- 
ties of every class seem to possess some motive in- 
fluence on the will, e. g., all kinds of food, a land- 
scape, a beautiful passage in any author, literary or 
scientific. To the mathematician, the pleasures 
found in the discussion of the relations of space 
and number are a strong inducement to the repeti- 
tion of the exercise. 

The question here arises, Have these entities any 
certain motive power which they exert on all minds, 
and how is their relative strength determined ? It 
is certain that every entity does possess a definite, 
invariable, intrinsic desirableness, or the contrary ; 
and one entity is more or less desirable than anoth- 
er. Again, when we view these relatively, they all 
have certain fixed relations to each other, and to 
human actions and interests, as means to an end. 
After having weighed the merits of a case or a plan, 

Z 



266 MOTIVE POWER OF ENTITIES. 

we can practically decide which is most suitable, 
and which presents the strongest inducements to its 
adoption ; and we are seldom in doubt as to what 
we ought to do, that is, on which side the strongest 
inducements lie. 

But these inducements or entities do certainly 
not act with irresistible force or mechanical power 
on the will ; otherwise men would always act in 
obedience to the strongest consideration, that is, to 
truth, and thus they would act virtuously. It is ev- 
idently the duty of all men thus to do ; God has 
made the inducements to virtue stronger than those 
to vice, the evidences of truth stronger than those 
of falsehood ; hence it is the duty of all men volun- 
tarily to obey the truth by pursuing virtue. But 
have they no power to act otherwise ? The fact 
that they do, must forever set this point at rest. 
And it is certain even with regard to our bodily ap- 
petites, that we can resist their cravings. A sensi- 
ble man can refuse to satisfy the most ravenous ap- 
petite, when he knows that abstinence is necessary 
to the recovery of health. In this case, regarding 
health as a greater motive than present gratification, 
he wills to obey the stronger motive, and declines 
eating ; while another, under the same circumstan- 
ces, wills to prefer present gratification to ultimate 
health. 

It seems evident, therefore, that, though men gen- 
erally do, in matters relating to temporal interests, 
will in accordance with the strongest motive, yet 
they certainly can will contrary to conviction and to 
a sense of duty. Hence it is evident that, though 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 267 

the determinations of the will are made in view of 
motives, that is, of a knowledge of entities, they are 
nevertheless made freely. 

The spontaneous recurrence of retrospective 
knowledge of certain entities exerts an important 
motive influence upon the soul. When this recur- 
rence is habitual, it will constitute a particular trait 
in the character of its subject. A certain sphere of 
this knowledge and feeling, retrospective, present, 
and prospective, is constantly at our command, and 
some item or other of it is constantly recurring to 
us spontaneously, when the attention of the mind is 
not occupied in some active, voluntary operation. 
When we are not engaged in any voluntary active 
process, the tenour of this spontaneous recurrence 
is regulated by the impressions made on the organs 
of sense, or by other principles to be enumerated in 
the discussion of spontaneous inspection. Some 
such impression is made almost every moment, and 
each object, seen, or heard, or felt, educes a train 
of related spontaneous knowledge. Thus each item 
of present knowledge or feeling gives rise to a train 
of related ideas, which runs on according to certain 
laws, until interrupted by some other impression on 
the organs of sense, or by some process of voluntary 
action. Peculiar pursuits in life, also, form habits 
of peculiarly frequent spontaneous recurrence of our 
knowledge of the particular entities connected with 
them, which also exert an important influence on 
the will, by bringing the entities referred to more 
frequently to bear on it by their retrospective influ- 
ence. Hence the incalculable advantage of a good, 



268 INFLUENCE OF DESIRE. 

a religious education. And as knowledge can in- 
fluence our active operations only so long as it is 
recollected, the advantage of early good instruction 
is manifest ; because what is learned in early life 
is longest recollected. And, finally, as a daily, or, 
at least, frequent attentive review of such truths, 
tends to rivet them on the mind, and make them the 
subjects of frequent spontaneous retrospection, we 
cannot fail to perceive the salutary tendency of the 
habit of daily perusing a portion of the Sacred Vol- 
ume, or reading it in our family circle. 

Desire is that state of the soul in which an entity, 
that is the subject of inspection, is exerting its mo- 
tive power, but the will has not yet made a decis- 
ion. Hence desire may be regarded as incipient, 
but suspended volition. Nor is the decision of the 
will always, or at any time necessarily, in accord- 
ance with the desire. Oftentimes we decide against 
the solicitations of the present desire, in consequence 
of our recollection of other and more influential 
considerations to the contrary. And if we direct 
our attention to these preponderant considerations 
or objects, and dwell upon them, they will gradually 
excite desire in us. Desire is therefore a state of 
soul, tending to a volition to choose the object by 
which it is excited, but not necessarily producing it. 
Various objects possess different degrees of desira- 
bleness in our view ; and each one, when it is made 
the subject of our deliberate attention, will excite 
its appropriate degree of desire in us. 

Desires differ from feelings in this particular, by 
which they may easily be distinguished. The im~ 
mediate object of desire is always some action ; 



DESIRES. 269 

while the immediate object of relative feelings, with 
which alone it may be confounded, is always some 
person or thing. If I desire, I always desire to do, 
to be, or to possess some person or thing ; but if I 
have love, it is towards some person or thing ; and 
if I hate, I hate something or some person. Or, in 
the language of our system, relative feeling imme- 
diately contemplates substantive or adjective enti- 
ties, while the immediate object of desire is a com- 
posite entity. 

The strength of our desires for particular objects 
is not the same in all men, nor in the same person 
at all times of life. It is very much influenced by 
the preponderance of the one or the other constitu- 
tional inclination in reference to the objects in 
question, and the strength of the constitutional in- 
clination is influenced by the habitual voluntary 
conduct. To the miser a purse of gold will appear 
more desirable than to another man; because the 
second constitutional inclination has become strong- 
er in consequence of his long-continued voluntary 
pursuit of money, and seeking his enjoyment in its 
possession. 

Desires always presuppose a cognition of the 
object desired, and generally, also, a pleasant emo- 
tion or feeling in reference to it. Yet this pleasant 
feeling does not appear to be always present ; for 
we may desire a dose of medicine that is nauseous 
to us and makes us shudder ; but here the end which 
we hope to accomplish by it appears desirable to us. 

Desire is a state of mind, which is sometimes of 
long continuance. 

Z2 



270 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 



With regard to our power of choice, usually term- 
ed power of volition, we may yet remark, that it is 
confined, in the intended objects on which it deter- 
mines to act, to some future time. However vari- 
ous the actions which we resolve to do or not to do, 
they must be done or avoided hereafter. Yet this 
future time admits of various modifications in rela- 
tion to the will ; we can resolve to do an act imme- 
diately, or at some future time more or less distant ; 
we can resolve absolutely or conditionally. The 
object of every act of volition or choice is the per- 
formance or non-performance of some one or more 
of the five active operations ; and one trait of dif- 
ference between them is, that, while some one or 
other of the five active operations is always going 
forward in the mind, the act of choice occurs more 
rarely and at intervals, either to give a new direc- 
tion or continued energy to the current active pro- 
cess. 



Our entire view of the will therefore resolves 
itself into the following features. 

I. The soul of man does possess the power of 
free, uncontrolled choice. 

II. In the exercise of this power, the soul is in- 
fluenced (but not certainly or irresistibly deter- 
mined) by the following things : 

1. By its two constitutional inclinations, which 
relate only to the general end to be aimed at. 

2. By the motive power of entities without the 
mind. These relate to the specific means for the 



THE SOUL'S CHOICE, BY WHAT INFLUENCED. 271 

attainment of the ends pointed out by our constitu- 
tional inclinations. These entities are the follow- 
ing : (a.) Our bodily appetites, (b.) All other ex- 
ternal entities. 

3. By our knowledge of these entities, either ret- 
rospective or prospective. This knowledge em- 
braces truth of every kind, which, by generating 
conviction and exciting feeling, exerts a definite 
motive influence. 

4. By the habitual state of our feelings on similar 
or related subjects, or, to speak more accurately, by 
the state of our susceptibility of feeling from the ob- 
ject in question ; that is, from the degree in which 
our feelings are susceptible of being excited by said 
object. Every feeling is individual, and more or 
less transient in its nature. Every individual feeling 
must be excited anew in each individual case, either 
by its appropriate objective entity, or by our knowl- 
edge of it, retrospective or prospective. But our sus* 
ceptibility for feeling is permanent, and is increased 
or diminished, in each individual, by his mental hab- 
its. Thus the ambitious man habitually seeks the 
gratification of his second constitutional inclination, 
the love of well-being, by the pursuit of human ap- 
plause. By this habit, the susceptibility of his mind 
to pleasure from demonstrations of popular appro- 
bation, and pain from the reverse, is augmented. 

Thus also the sensualist habitually seeks the grat- 
ification of his second constitutional inclination, the 
love of well-being or pleasure, in the pursuit of ob- 
jects of licentious indulgence. 

His mental associations cluster around such 



272 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

scenes, and his spontaneous mental operations re- 
cur to them. By this habit the susceptibility of his 
mind to be influenced by such objects is greatly 
increased. Thus, every circumstance, however re- 
motely connected with such scenes, becomes a 
temptation to him, and every exposure to direct 
temptation acquires a double influence on his mind. 
And thus it is that his volitions, in view of such 
circumstances of temptation, will obviously be in- 
fluenced by the state of his susceptibility for feeling 
in reference to them. 

The native activity of the soul prompts us to ac- 
tion. 

The constitutional inclinations of the soul deter- 
mine the general character of the ends, or results, 
at which we aim. 

Our knowledge presents to us the various entities, 
with their difTerent and relative properties, by ac- 
tive operations upon which the proposed end may be 
attained in various ways and in different degrees. 

The different entities exert a motive power pro- 
portional to their relative adaptation to accomplish 
the end proposed, and influenced by the habitual 
state of our feelings on related subjects ; and, final- 
ly, in view of all these circumstances, the soul freely 
determines in its choice of the different possible 
means of attaining the desired end. We therefore 
define the will as follows : 

The will is that power of the soul by which it 
freely determines, in view of motives, either now or 
hereafter, absolutely or conditionally, to perform or 
not to perform some one or more of the five active 
operations. 



SPONTANEOUS OCCURRENCE OF ACTIVE OPERATIONS. 273 
SECTION II. 

Of the Spontaneous Occurrence of the Active Oper- 
ations. 

When the attention of the soul is withdrawn, the 
greater part, if not all the five active operations, are 
carried on spontaneously, viz., inspectiou, arrange- 
ment, modification, the intellectual agency concern- 
ed in physical action, and intellectual intercourse 
with other minds. 

The difference between the voluntary and spon- 
taneous active operations seems to consist chiefly in 
the following circumstances : 

1. The former are the results of volition in their 
commencement, that is, are always begun in conse- 
quence of volition ; while the latter are not com- 
menced in consequence of volition, but result from 
an inherent constitutional disposition of the mind to 
be always, during waking hours, engaged in some 
active operation. The reason why one active op- 
eration is spontaneously engaged in rather than an- 
other, or why one entity is the subject of its action 
rather than another, seems to be a previous habit 
formed by frequent or late voluntary action of the 
same kind, on the same entities, or on our mental 
representatives of them. Habit is an increased 
facility in the performance of any active operation, 
resulting from repeated acts of the same kind. 
Habit not only renders the performance of any op- 
eration more easy, but also enables us to perform 
it with greater perfection and success. It is truly 
surprising with what facility and perfection we are 



274 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

able to perform many active operations when long- 
continued practice has rendered them habitual ; 
which at first we could perform at all only with the 
greatest difficulty. After years of continued prac- 
tice, a student will commit to memory a given piece 
of composition, in one fifth of the time at first re- 
quisite for the task. An expert performer on the 
pianoforte will with ease execute some of the most 
intricate and difficult pieces of music, which he 
could not perform at all, in proper time, before long 
practice had established the habit from which his 
ability results. The same is true of all intellectual 
operations : habit makes them easy, and, in most 
cases, pleasant. This principle of habit seems to 
be nothing more than the progressive development 
of the powers of the soul by continued practice, 
and is applicable more or less to every part of our 
mental and bodily organism, not excepting even 
the constitutional inclinations of the soul. It is wit- 
nessed in the rapid reasonings, the almost intuitive 
conclusions of the experienced logician, in the dec- 
lamation of the orator, and in the skill and expert- 
ness of every species of mechanical operation. It 
must, however, not be supposed, that these pro- 
cesses, which have become habitual to us, and in 
which continued practice has enabled us to make 
great improvements, are always performed sponta- 
neously. The contrary is obviously the case. Even 
the celebrated Paganini, when performing a diffi- 
cult piece of music, which he has never before 
seen, must certainly exert a volition to strike every 
individual note ; although the execution may be 
so rapid that he will have no recollection in refer- 



SPONTANEOUS ACTION. 275 

ence to any single note, and will merely remember 
his generic volition to play the piece, that is, to fol- 
low the series of notes, as he sees them before him. 
The same is also the case when a familiar piece of 
music is designedly performed by the most skilful 
artist. He has, indeed, no recollection of a volition in 
reference to a score of things, a knowledge of which 
is implied by every note that he strikes, and each 
of which he had at first to perform by deliberate 
volition. But then he has learned to produce mu- 
sical sounds on an instrument with as much facility 
as he utters oral sounds when reading the printed 
page. And who, in reading, can recollect the sep- 
arate volitions to articulate each individual letter, 
and to combine these sounds into syllables, and 
these syllables into words, as he is rapidly reading? 
These operations are spontaneous only when atten- 
tion is withdrawn, and they are performed negli- 
gently, without deliberate purpose to do so. And 
even when thus negligently commenced, there is 
probably some effort of will occasionally exerted in 
the progress of such spontaneous exercises. 

The improveableness of the different bodily and 
mental powers by practice is a subject of great ex- 
tent and peculiar interest ; but we shall not pursue 
it farther in this place. 

The formation of these habits is voluntary, but 
their subsequent action is spontaneous. When we 
say, the formation of these habits is voluntary, Ave 
do not mean that there are not, in the constitutional 
structure of our minds and bodies, more opportuni- 
ties, yea, constant temptations, to the formation of 



276 SPONTANEOUS OPERATIONS OF THE MIND. 

some particular habits rather than others. The 
contrary is evidently the fact. There seems to be, 
even in the mind itself, a greater aptitude for the 
formation of sinful habits than of such as arc holy. 
Fewer voluntary acts will create or form a sinful 
habit, and the habit resulting from any given num- 
ber of voluntary sinful acts is stronger than would 
result from the same number of acts of a different 
character. The perverted state of our bodily pro- 
pensities, since the fall, also leads men into frequent 
temptations to sin. The bodily propensity is invol- 
untary, but the indulgence of the inspection of ob- 
jects to which it prompts is voluntary and sinful, 
and is one cause of the formation of sinful habits. 

2. Voluntary active operations are carried on with 
much more attention and energy than those which 
are spontaneous. 

The spontaneous operations of the mind in many 
persons constitute far the greater part of all their 
mental action ; and in all persons, even in those 
most constantly engaged in duties or labours, men- 
tal or bodily, they occupy much of their time. In- 
deed, it is the spontaneous action of an individual 
that exhibits his real character. Hence, as the 
spontaneous action results from that which is vol- 
untary, and is correspondent w T it.h it. either holy or 
unholy, it is evident that we are responsible to God, 
not only for our voluntary action, but also for that 
which is spontaneous, i. e., for the mental habits by 
which we are characterized. It might, at first 
glance, appear as if our view of the spontaneous op- 
erations tended to remove them from the sphere of 
responsibility ; but, on a more careful examination, 



SPONTANEOUS ACTION. 277 

we think this difficulty will vanish. The grounds of 
our responsibility for spontaneous action, and the rea- 
sons which will make it evident, are the following: 

{a.) The fact, that any particular active opera- 
tion is spontaneously engaged in rather than anoth- 
er, is owing to the circumstances of our having, by 
previous voluntary action, formed a habit, or facil- 
ity, and inclination for such action. As it is thus 
ultimately caused by our voluntary acts, responsi- 
bility justly attaches to it. 

(b.) We can, moreover, prevent much of our 
spontaneous mental action, by keeping the mind 
constantly employed in voluntary engagements. 

(c.) Although spontaneous operations are com- 
menced without deliberate volition to do so, there 
is often some slight degree of volition exercised in 
their progress. 

(d.) Spontaneous operations are at all times un- 
der the control of the will as to their continuance. 
We can at any moment put a stop to any sponta- 
neous operations of the mind, by a volition to do 
so, and to engage in some other mental process. 
Spontaneous operations are, therefore, continued 
by consent of the will. Since, therefore, the com- 
mencement, continuance, and termination of these 
processes are at all times under our voluntary con- 
trol, it seems evident that we are justly held re- 
sponsible for their character by our great moral 
Governor. 

Spontaneous action has for its materials, like our 
voluntary action, entities, simple or composite, past, 
present, or future. 

Aa 



278 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

An important fact of a physiological nature 
touching this subject is, that spontaneous active 
operations are much less debilitating to the mind 
than voluntary. The more entirely we can with- 
hold the mind from voluntary action, and even 
from intense attention to a process of spontaneous 
thought, the more complete is this state of rest. 
Hence, riding on horseback or walking in company 
with others, by presenting a series of changing ob- 
jects to the mind, and preventing us from entering 
on a very attentive inspection of any of them, is 
excellent relaxation. A solitary walk of a student, 
in which he becomes absorbed in the customary 
subjects of his pursuit, is but an ambulatory study, 
and affords very slight relaxation to the mind. On 
this principle, the different debilitating tendency of 
various species of mental exercise can be regularly 
graduated. Each mental process will debilitate in 
proportion to its difficulty to the student, and to the 
degree of attention requisite to its performance. 

When the mind is fatigued, or, for any reason 
whatever, does not engage by volition in any of the 
five active processes, some of them will invariably 
occur in a spontaneous, indifferent, and careless 
manner ; so that we have little, and sometimes no, 
recollection of the operation so long as it proceeds 
in this spontaneous way. The operations which oc- 
cur spontaneously with the greatest frequency belong 
chiefly to the process of inspection, and they are gen- 
erally such as are most frequently, or have been 
most recently, engaged in in a voluntary manner. 

I. Spontaneous Inspection. — In the spontaneous 



SPONTANEOUS INSPECTION. 279 

inspection of entities, or their mental representa- 
tives, the mind is found generally to proceed in 
several uniform ways, or laws of association. 

(1.) It seems to follow the relations of the enti- 
ties, which are the subjects of its inspection. The 
relations which are most frequently followed are 
sameness, contrariety, contiguity — temporal, local, 
or numerical — and causation. But all the other 
relations are also occasionally pursued in our spon- 
taneous inspections. Perhaps the relative frequen- 
cy with which each of the relations is pursued in 
spontaneous inspection, is not materially different 
from the order in which those relations have been 
enumerated. But the course of the mental train 
of action is often changed by one or more of the 
principles yet to be enumerated. 

(2.) There is a tendency in spontaneous inspec- 
tion to pursue, in preference, the train of those en- 
tities which have most frequently been the subjects 
of its voluntary attention. Thus, the mind of the 
mathematician pursues its spontaneous rambles in 
the regions of mathematical science ; the mind of 
the sensualist recurs to the objects of his sinful grat- 
ification ; and the mind of the faithful Christian de- 
lights to dwell upon the topics connected with his 
high and holy calling. And if several persons, of 
different pursuits, were requested to give us some 
account of their reminiscences of a recent tour which 
they had made, the memory of the farmer would 
spontaneously recur to the agricultural productions 
of the country through which he had passed ; the 
painter would think first of the landscapes, the 



280 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

statesman of some political intelligence which he 
had obtained, and the Christian, of an interesting 
conversation which he had heard on the subject of 
the Redeemer's kingdom. 

(3.) The mind more readily recurs to those ob- 
jects which have lately been the subjects of its at- 
tention. 

(4.) It pursues more frequently those entities 
which excite the most pleasant feelings and gratify 
the second constitutional inclination. This incli- 
nation, or love of well-being, is not, in itself, sin- 
ful ; on the contrary, the joys and pleasures of re- 
ligion itself are sought in accordance with its dic- 
tates. But it becomes sinful when it is so inordi- 
nate as to outweigh the sense of obligation to obey 
the fitness of things, to obey the strongest evidence, 
that is, to obey truth. This preponderating influ- 
ence is found in all unconverted persons by nature, 
and thus all by nature are sinners. 

(5.) The mind is diverted from the pursuit of the 
above-mentioned relations in its spontaneous op- 
erations, by the immediate action of some entities, 
at the time, through the bodily organs. 

(6.) It is interrupted by volition. While en- 
gaged in spontaneous action we may, for some rea- 
son or other, resolve to do something, i. e., to en- 
gage in some active process, and thus the sponta- 
neous character of our mental action is instantly 
interrupted and succeeded by a process of a volun- 
tary nature. 

These spontaneous retrospections have, by some 
recent metaphysicians, been termed suggestions. 



ARRANGEMENT SOMETIMES SPONTANEOUS. 281 

This word, though it conveys something of the char- 
acter of these operations, seems not to be well select- 
ed as their generic and characteristic appellation. 
It seems to represent one item in a train of consec- 
utive reminiscences or associations, as the agent 
that causes the occurrence of the other, while the 
mind is regarded rather as the passive recipient of 
these influences. In reality, however, the mind is 
the active subject ; its spontaneous rambles result 
from the constitutional activity of its nature, while 
in these rambles it, by a law of its nature, pursues 
in preference the channel of those natural relations 
between the different entities or objects which real- 
ly subsist between them, or those artificial rela- 
tions constituted in the course of events, or those 
habits of mind which proceed from individual vol- 
untary action. The principles regulating these as- 
sociations are therefore intelligible, and it is also 
evident that, to a certain extent, they are the re- 
sult of our most frequent voluntary actions. Their 
character is therefore, though not immediately, yet 
ultimately, in a great measure under our control. 
And just so far as this is the case, we are evidently 
responsible for the moral character of our sponta- 
neous reminiscences and other spontaneous mental 
operations. 

II. The operations of Arrangement are also some- 
times carried on spontaneously. If, in passing along 
the road, we see any animal, and especially one of 
rare occurrence, how often do we not spontaneously 
arrange it with the class of quadrupeds, or bipeds, 
&c, as the case may be ; how often do we not 
Aa2 



282 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

compare it to other similar animals, and thus spon- 
taneously arrange the two by the relation of same- 
ness. Every figure of comparison used by extem- 
poraneous speakers, consists of spontaneous arrange- 
ments according to the relation of similarity, ex- 
pressed in words. And when a person of well-dis- 
ciplined mind hears a fact which has an important 
probative bearing, he instantly and previous to voli- 
tion, even in the act of rapidly reading a book, ar- 
ranges it with other facts bearing on the same sub- 
ject. 

III. The process of modification very seldom oc- 
curs spontaneously, especially in persons of veracity 
and conscientious character ; yet, doubtless, the 
mind of the novelist, who has habituated himself by 
voluntary effort to the very frequent fabrication of 
fiction, will, when left unoccupied, sometimes form 
such combinations spontaneously. 

IV. The mental process regulating our physical 
action is very often exercised spontaneously. How 
many motions of the hands, or feet, or entire body 
do we not daily perform from mere habit, without 
volition. How often does the musician find him- 
self engaged in the spontaneous act of singing, and 
the ambitious orator, in practising emphatic and pe- 
culiar pronunciation. How often do some men 
spontaneously fumble their watch-key, or play with 
their penknife, without being aware of the fact. In 
short, all those actions of the body, which are said 
to be performed from mere habit, are spontaneous 
operations. Men sometimes, and with truth, as- 
sign it as an excuse for particular actions, that they 



SPONTANEOUS INTELLECTUAL INTERCOURSE. 283 

did them without thinking, did them unintentional- 
ly ; doubtless some of these acts are spontaneous. 
Sometimes, however, physical action is performed 
in a manner which does not properly fail within the 
division either of spontaneous or voluntary action, 
but is properly attributed to instinct. 

V. The process of intellectual intercourse is some- 
times carried on spontaneously, in a revery ; as is 
evident from our making articulate sounds in the 
same spontaneous manner to express our ideas. 
How often do those who are in the habit of talking 
much, such as children and some talkative superan- 
nuated persons, talk not only without a volition, but 
even contrary to a resolution not to do so. 



A PRAGMATIC VIEW 



OPERATIONS OF THE WAKING MINL 

FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXEMPLIFYING THE PRECEDING j 

PRINCIPLES. 



I. When a superabundance of animal and men- 
tal vigour has been accumulated during sleep, we 
make a transition from the sleeping to the active, 
conscious, waking state. This transition is, in gen- 
eral, independent of our wishes, and seems to be 
the result of the stimulating or exciting influence 
of the principle of animal vigour, accumulated du- 
ring sleep. In some cases the act of awaking is 
produced by the uneasiness resulting from the 
accumulation of some of the products of the ani- 
mal economy, such as a painful stricture on the 
bladder in persons advanced in years, and some 
other cases which might be cited ; but these we 
should regard as mere exceptions to the general 
rule. Persons labouring under such difficulties, 
awake before the time in which the system w^ould 
spontaneously return to the condition of cerebral 
preponderance or waking action. And if the ac- 
cumulated vigour is not yet sufficient to produce 
this effect by itself, the auxiliary stimulus of the 
light of returning day will aid in exciting us to a 



OPERATIONS OF THE WAKING MIND. 285 

waking state. This is demonstrated by the fact, 
that all persons can sleep longer and more soundly 
in a dark, than in a light room. Thus the adorable 
Author of our being admonishes us, that night is 
the proper time for sleep, and that the artificial 
perversions of day and night, which are met with 
in some of the more fashionable ranks of society, 
are not only contrary to the constitution of our na- 
ture, but also detrimental to our health. 

II. The moment we make the transition from the 
sleeping to the waking state, the mind begins to 
act, and the body, particularly the muscles and or- 
gans of sense, become subservient to the mind. 
The first action of the waking mind seems gener- 
ally to be spontaneous ; in most cases it consists in 
the spontaneous inspection of the objects surround- 
ing our bed. Sometimes this spontaneous inspec- 
tion gives rise to voluntary action, such as the re- 
flection, i. e., the voluntary retrospection, of some 
entities related to those spontaneously seen by us 
and recalled by them. Thus, from the light per- 
ceived in the room, the mind of pious habits will 
revert to the great Father of lights from whom it 
comes, and to the value of that spiritual light, which 
constitutes the Christian's greatest and most con- 
stant source of happiness on earth and expected 
bliss in heaven. The worldly-minded, from the 
inspection of the same light, will be led to reflect 
on some profitable business or pursuit which this 
light enables them to prosecute. In this manner 
more or less time is spent until the next prominent 
active operation is engaged in, viz., 



286 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 



III. The voluntary actions of physical agency^ 
such as rising, dressing, washing, &c. If we in- 
quire in what manner these voluntary actions take 
place, we trace them to the constitutional inclina- 
tion to obey the fitness of things actively prompt- 
ing us to perform what is right, fit, suitable, profit- 
able, or agreeable to the Divine will. We have a 
knowledge that it is right or fit to rise in the morn- 
ing, and, invited by the joint influence of these 
several considerations, we voluntarily determine to 
perform the active operation. Here, then, we dis- 
tinguish the following several things : 

1. Our constitutional vigour compels us to act 
either spontaneously or voluntarily, i. e., it keeps 
the mind always engaged in some active process 
during waking hours. 

2. The constitutional inclinations of the soul in- 
cline us to the end, viz., obedience to the fitness, 
or propriety, or constitution of things, or pursuit of 
pleasure. 

3. Our knowledge of the manner in which that 
end will be accomplished, determines the means or 
individual acts to be performed. Inasmuch as duty, 
fitness, profit, love of pleasure, often all dictate the 
performance of the same action, persons of differ- 
ent character will frequently do the same act from 
different motives. This is a very important fact, 
and shows that the moral worth of actions must be 
judged by the view or motive from which they 
were performed. Those who are in the habit of 
being influenced by the love of gain, i. e., of self, 
and personal advantage, will rise early, because 



OPERATIONS OF THE WAKING MIND. 287 

they know early rising to be a means of enabling 
them to transact more business, and accumulate 
wealth. 

4. The same view seems to be exemplified in the 
daily duties of men. The Christian is prompted, 
by an habitual regard to the first constitutional incli- 
nation, to obey the moral fitness or obligation, i. e., 
to obey the Divine will. He knows that the act 
of offering up his morning and evening sacrifice to 
the Author and Preserver of his life, is a means or 
instance of obedience to his will, and thus performs 
it with benefit and delight. With the same motive 
he pursues his daily business, because he regards it 
as a means of supporting his family and of glorify- 
ing his God. The man of the world engages in 
the same various occupations of the day from dif- 
ferent motives, some more and others less honour- 
able in their nature. 

Thus, throughout the day, various active opera- 
tions are voluntarily engaged in and pursued. The 
intervals between these voluntary operations are 
filled up with spontaneous active processes, the na- 
ture of which, as has been already explained, will 
be influenced by the prevailing habits of voluntary 
engagement of each individual. Thus, between 
the voluntary and spontaneous processes, between 
labours and intermissions of labour, the day is pass- 
ed. To the several customary meals the individual 
is invited, partly by the recurrence of stated times, 
partly by the solicitations of his periodical appetites, 
and partly by other circumstances. 

The close of the engagements of the day and 



288 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

evening, ordinarily finds every individual somewhat 
languid, and finally a feeling of exhaustion or drow- 
siness ensues, and sooner or later the cerebral gives 
way to the preponderance of the ganglionic action, 
and he relapses into the state of sleep in which the 
vigour of his system, if he be in health, is again re- 
cruited, and he prepared to pass through the same 
routine of another day. 



OF DREAMS. 



Before closing the discussions of this volume, it 
may not be improper to add a few words on the 
subject of another species of spontaneous mental 
operations, which, though properly belonging to the 
diseased action of the soul, is of such frequent oc- 
currence, and oftentimes attended by so slight a 
derangement of the bodily functions, that it is pop- 
ularly, though erroneously, regarded as a healthy 
state of mental action. 

The existence of mankind in this life, is divided 
by a clear and definite line into two very different 
states ; that of dormancy, and the waking state. 
Between these two conditions, the life of man and 
of every other animate being is spent. It is our 
waking action that properly belongs to us as moral 
beings, and constitutes the appropriate agency of 
man in life. Indeed, it seems to be the design of 
the Author of our nature, that sleep should be, as 
in healthy subjects it actually is, an entire cessation 
from all conscious mental action. Habitual, deep 
sleep is a characteristic of sound general health ; 
and those who enjoy the highest degree of it are 
not conscious of dreaming at all. It, however, not 
unfrequently happens, that disease affects our bodily 
functions, and disturbs the exact relation which or- 
dinarily subsists between them and the soul, thus 
Bb 



290 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

rendering less distinct the line of separation be- 
tween our sleeping and our waking hours. 

Sleep being properly a physical phenomenon, 
belonging in common to man, to irrational animals, 
and, in a subordinate sense also, to the vegetable 
kingdom, its particular discussion does not fall with- 
in the design of our work. In animals it is a most 
important and salutary restorative process of nature. 
It is a fact of daily observation, that the perform- 
ance of the various mental and bodily operations, 
during our waking hours, exhausts the animal vig- 
our of the system, and that this exhaustion in a 
healthy subject naturally predisposes to sleep, and 
results in it. Equally well established is the posi- 
tion, that the healthy subject awakes with the re- 
turning light of the morning, refreshed by sleep, 
and conscious of the feelings of renovated life and 
vigour, but without any recollection of having been 
disturbed by dreams. Yet it may, perhaps, be pos- 
sible to excite dreams in a healthy subject, by de- 
signedly acting on his bodily senses during his sleep, 
and the same effect may with equal probability be 
produced, when such impression is made accident- 
ally. But we suppose that no healthy person will 
have any recollection of dreams, unless thus acted 
on from without. 

As we recollect some dreams ourselves, and as 
others have discovered from our talking, and walk- 
ing, and other actions in sleep, that we did dream 
when we had no recollection of it ourselves, the 
probability is, that the soul is essentially active, that 
active operations are always going on spontaneous- 



NATURE OF DREAMS. 291 

]y when we are asleep. This is rendered the more 
probable, because many of the dreams recollected 
by us, occurred, while others who observed us saw 
that our bodies were perfectly motionless, and sup- 
posed us to be enveloped in profound sleep. The 
most perfect repose of the body, therefore, affords 
no argument against the supposition of constant, 
spontaneous, mental processes. 

Dreams may be regarded as those spontaneous 
trains of mental operation, which occur, when sleep 
has, in a great measure, suspended that self-control, 
through reason and volition, which we possess, and 
ordinarily exercise when awake. The term dream 
has often been confined to those trains of thought, 
of which we retain some recollection in our waking 
state. But it is also applied to the cases observed 
by others, though not recollected by ourselves, and 
is in its nature equally applicable to all other in- 
stances of mental action in sleep. 

The correctness of this view of dreams is strong- 
ly corroborated by the fact, that we often have no 
recollection of them until some time after, when they 
are recalled to our memory by some related thought 
or occurrence, which would, on the principles of 
association, have recalled the same train, if it had 
first occurred when we were awake. 

In dreams the exercise of reason and volition is 
not entirely suspended ; although it is probably 
more in a defect of the exercise of these powers 
than in anything else, that dreams differ from our 
waking reveries or unrestricted spontaneous mental 
trains. We can and do sustain conversations ei- 



292 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ther mentally or orally ; we enact scenes, and per- 
form various achievements ; in short, all the differ- 
ent powers of the mind appear sometimes to be 
exerted in dreams, though with various degrees of 
imperfection. The farmer has sometimes engaged 
in threshing his grain, the lawyer has prepared his 
argument, and the preacher has imagined himself 
in the great assembly, and proclaimed to listless 
walls the truths of his holy religion. Such cases 
of somniloquism and somnambulism are within the 
knowledge of all. Other instances of still more 
singular and extraordinary morbid action of the 
mind are on record ; but, as they do not properly 
fall within the limits of our science, we pass them 
in silence. From the map of the mind in its healthy 
state, which we have endeavoured to present, we 
perceive evidence enough that we are " wonder- 
fully and fearfully," and, at the same time, benev- 
olently " made ;" and that we " should praise the 
Lord for his goodness and his wonderful works to 
the children of men." 

It is an interesting peculiarity of dreams, that 
they often disregard the exact relations of time and 
space. Though the scenes are passed through with 
the utmost rapidity of waking thought, we some- 
times suppose them all to have been real, and ima- 
gine that months, and sometimes years, have trans- 
pired in their occurrence. This singular circum- 
stance may be owing, among other things, to two 
causes ; to the fact, that in sleep we hold no com- 
munion with the visible world through the senses, 
by which, especially through the succession of night 



CONNEXION OF DREAMS WITH WAKING THOUGHTS. 293 

and day, and the aid of memory, we have learned 
to measure time, even in its minor fractions, and 
also the fact, that the exercise of judgment is chiefly 
suspended, by which, in our waking state, we can 
distinguish between fact and fiction. 

From this view of the nature of dreams, it fol- 
lows, that however fantastic and unnatural they 
may sometimes be, yet there will, on the whole, be 
some analogy between the dreams of any individ- 
ual, and the habitual traits and peculiarities of his 
mind when awake. The poet, the mathematician^ 
the lawyer, the politician, the agriculturist, the me- 
chanic, and the minister of religion, will all find in 
their habitual dreams some special relation to their 
waking pursuits. Even the peculiarities of genius 
may often be traced in dreams. The moral char- 
acter, which is frequently concealed during waking 
hours, will sometimes be betrayed in dreams ; and 
the Rev. Mr. Young, in his " Record of Provi- 
dence," relates an instance of a murderer in Eng- 
land, whose dreams led to his arrest and convic- 
tion, seven years after he had committed the crime, 
for which he was eventually executed. 

It is also evident from the nature of dreams, that 
there can be nothing ominous or prophetic in them. 
We do not affirm that no dream was ever of this 
character. The Almighty doubtless can, and, as 
the Volume of Inspiration teaches, has communi- 
cated his will to some individuals in the form of 
dreams. But this was as certainly miraculous, as 
if the same communication had been made in open 
day by a voice from Heaven. What we maintain 
Bb2 



294 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

is, that dreams have nothing ominous or prophetic 
in their own nature. As they are spontaneous pro- 
cesses of the mind, they depend for their character, 
in some measure, on the voluntary waking habits, 
from which they result. As the peculiarities of 
these spontaneous processes arise from the suspen- 
sion of the exercise of judgment and reason in 
sleep, they must evidently be entitled to less confi- 
dence than our waking thoughts. And the adven- 
titious influences on the senses, which tend still far- 
ther to modify them, cannot fail to divest them of 
all claim to confidence. Such are our natural 
dreams. The fact, that one dream in a million has 
some resemblance to an event that succeeds, only 
proves that in these cases men may form somewhat 
correct anticipations of coming events when awake, 
and that the same conjecture may recur to them in 
their sleep, and constitute the burden of their pro- 
phetic dreams ! 



RECAPITULATION. 295 



CHAPTER III. 

RECAPITULATION, FOR THE PURPOSE OF REVIEWS. 

Introduction. Methodology of Mental Philoso- 
phy. Difference between Mathematical and Men- 
tal Science, p. 13-20. 

Mental Philosophy is that science which discusses 
the properties and operations of the human soul, p. 
21. Various names have been attached to this sci- 
ence, such as Metaphysics, Anthropology, Psychol- 
ogy, p. 21, 22. 

The proper materials of this science doubtless 
are, not the supposed faculties, of which we know 
nothing directly, but the known phenomena of the 
mind, and all those other entities, or existences, 
which exert an influence upon these phenomena, or 
are concerned in their production, p. 22, 23. 

In the classification of mental operations, various 
systems have been adopted. The 'first, and most 
generally received in the English philosophical 
world, is that into Nine Faculties of the Mind : viz., 
Perception, Consciousness, Conception, Judgment, 
Memory, Reasoning, Conscience, Feeling, and Vo- 
lition, p. 23, 24. 

Dr. Reid, adopting in the main this classifica- 
tion, separates these faculties or powers into two 
general classes, viz., Intellectual Powers and Active 
Powers. 



296 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Mr. Stewart adds to these a third general class, 
viz., Social Powers. 

Dr. Brown's celebrated division is into two class- 
es : External and Internal Affections or States of the 
Mind, p. 25, 26. 

The German division into three faculties, Sensi- 
bilities, Understanding', and Will. Professor Up- 
ham's view, p. 26. 

Unable, after mature deliberation, to adopt either 
of these divisions, we propose another, founded, not 
upon the unknown and supposed faculties or es- 
sence of the mind, but upon those mental phenom- 
ena which are known to us. It is a threefold di- 
vision, into Cognitive Ideas, Sentient Ideas, and Ac- 
tive Operations, p. 27. 

Difference between this and the German system. 
(a.) In its principle, (b.) In its lines of division, 
(c.) In the contents of the different parts, p. 29. 

On the extent of the several parts of this divis- 
ion, p. 30. 

I. The Cognitive class embraces Perceptions, 
Acts of Consciousness, Conceptions, Judgments, 
Recollections, Results of Reasoning, and the Dic- 
tates or Decisions of Conscience, p. 31. 

II. The Sentient class embraces Sensations, Emo- 
tions, Affections, and Passions, p. 34. 

III. The Active class embraces Volitions, Pro- 
cesses of Reasoning, the Act of Memorizing, the In- 
tellectual Act of communicating our thoughts to 
others, and some other processes, p. 36. 



RECAPITULATION. 297 

PART I. 

COGNITIVE IDEAS. 

Cognitive Ideas are acquired by the mind through 
the medium of certain parts of the body called or- 
gans of sense, when these organs are brought into 
a particular relation to external objects, and from 
the operations and powers of the mind of which we 
are conscious. In this acquisition we distinguish 
three things, p. 38, 39. 

First. The external entity, or object of knowl- 
edge ; 

Secondly. The knowledge itself; and, 
Thirdly. The process by which the knowledge 
is obtained. 

CHAPTER I. 

OF OBJECTIVE ENTITIES AS SUBJECTS OF OUR KNOWL- 
EDGE, p. 39. 
SECTION I. 
Of the different classes of Entities, p. 40. 
We constitutionally judge external entities to be 
possessed of real objectivity, i. e., to have an ac- 
tual existence out of our minds. An entity is any- 
thing whatever, of which we can have an idea, p. 39. 
The reality of the material universe, in general, 
is proved by the testimony of our senses, which we 
constitutionally judge to be true. 

No reasoning is necessary on this point ; nor could 
it make the testimony of our senses more certain. 



298 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The universe, as known to us, consists of nothing 
else than various combinations of properties. 

Each of these combinations, as found in nature, 
is individual, and in some respects different from 
all others. 

There are, nevertheless, gradations of similarity 
in these properties, which form a just basis for 
classification. 

On such classification human language is framed, 
having words not for each individual substantive 
object, but {a) for the different properties, (b) for the 
relations subsisting between them, and (c) for the 
different classes of substantive objects, more or less 
generic, as stone, tree, quadrupeds, &c. 

All objects known to us in the universe are 
either substantive objects, that is, objects to which 
several coexisting properties appertain, or they are 
individual properties, or relations between them. 

All substantive objects maybe referred to the fol- 
lowing classes : 

Solids, Liquids, Gases, the Ethereal or Incoerci- 
ble Fluids, such as Light, Caloric, Electric Fluid, 
and the Magnetic Principle ; Mind, Spirit, Glori- 
fied Bodies, Deity ; together with Time, Space, 
and Number. 

The relation of the properties of mind to mind 
itself is not different from that of the properties of 
other objects to their substratum, the objects them- 
selves. Supposed plastic power rejected. Our 
knowledge of the Divine Being, how acquired, its 
nature. 

The peculiarities of Time, Space, and Number : 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY, 299 

as three universal, fundamental entities created by- 
God, of entirely peculiar properties, in which, or in 
the forms of which, all other created entities exist, 
p. 55. 

No one denies that we have ideas relating to all 
these classes of entities. 

Not all are agreed as to the question whether 
they are ideas of reality, many supposing them to 
be mere ideas of the mind, without anything in na- 
ture corresponding to them, or causing them. 

SECTION II. 
Division of these Classes, p. 56. 

All these classes of entities may be referred to 
two generic kinds, viz., Absolute and Concrete En- 
tities. 

Absolute are those of which we can conceive 
without reference to the concrete class. They are 
Space, Time, and Number. 

Concrete are those of which we cannot conceive 
except as existing in the absolute class, or being re- 
lated to it. They are all the others except Space, 
Time, and Number. 

SECTION III. 
Subdivision of Individual Entities, p. 57. 
Entities may be subdivided into Substantive, Ad' 
jective, and Composite. 

A Substantive Entity is that to which any num- 
ber of coexisting properties appertains. 

An Adjective Entity is any one property of a sub- 
stantive entity. 



300 RECAPITULATION. 

A Composite Entity consists of two or more ad- 
jective entities, viewed in regard to some relation 
existing between them. 

SECTION IV. 
Relations of Entities, 

1. Of Absolute Entities, p. 61. 

(a.) Equality, diversity, antecedence, subse- 
quence, &c, of Time. 

(b.) Equality, difference, progression or ratio, 
plurality, minority, &c, of Number. 

(c.) Equality, diversity, contiguity, remoteness, 
superiority, and inferiority of Space. 

2. Of Concrete Entities to each other, 
(a.) Similarity and diversity. 

(&.) Contiguity or remoteness, as to space, time, 
and number. 

(c.) Fitness, physical, intellectual, and moral. 

(d.) Analogy. 

(e.) Causation or agency, (a.) Mechanical, ei- 
ther uniform or contingent; (b.) Instinctive; and 
(c.) Moral. 

3. Between Absolute and Concrete Entities. 
These, (a.) in regard to number, are Addition, 

Multiplication, Subtraction, and Division ; which 
are active relations of agency performed by the con- 
crete entity man on our ideas of the absolute entity 
number, (b.) Space, (c.) Time. 

These Relations are, (a.) Transitive or Intransi- 
tive. 

(6.) Absolute or Hypothetical. 

(c.) Retrospective, Present, or Prospective. 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 301 

CHAPTER II. 

OF OUR COGNITIVE IDEAS, OR MENTAL REPRESENTA- 
TIVES OF ENTITIES. 
SECTION I., p. 69. 
Of the exact Mature of those of our Ideas which are 
Knowledge. 
They belong to the class of entities termed Mind, 
but are distinct from the mind, and are, with cer- 
tain qualifications, representatives of things actual- 
ly existing. 

SECTION II. 

Of the Criteria by which the Cognitive Class of Ideas is 
distinguished, p. 70. 

I. The Cognitive Ideas have for their objects en- 
tities existing out of the mind, or some mental op- 
eration of our own or other minds. 

II. The Cognitive Ideas are dependant for their 
character on the entities themselves. 

III. The Cognitive Ideas presuppose the previ- 
ous existence of the entities, from which they are 
derived. 

SECTION III. 

On the Nature and Sources of Error in our Cognitive 
Ideas, p. 74. 
In order to obtain a correct view of this extremely 
important subject, it is necessary first to make some 
remarks upon the nature and divisions of truth. 
All truths may be divided into three classes ; viz., 
I. Real or Objective Truths; that is, objective 
entities existing in nature. 
C c 



302 



RECAPITULATION. 



II. Idealistic or Subjective Truths ; i. e., correct 
mental representatives of objective Entities. 

View of the ancient Realists and Nominalists, and 
of modern German Realism and Idealism ; Trans- 
cendental Idealism of Kant. 

III. Nominal Truths; i. e., correct mental repre-? 
sentatives expressed by proper words. 

1. Sources of Involuntary Error, p. 80. 

1. Incorrect original mental representatives of en- 
tities. These may arise, 

(a.) From a hasty, superficial inspection of en- 
tities. 

(b.) From forgetfulness of the exact mental rep- 
resentative originally obtained, and a consequent 
misstatement of it. 

(c.) From listening to one part of a statement, 
and neglecting to listen to the whole. 

II. Incorrect selection of sounds and written words, 
to express to others the true mental representative 
which we really have. 

III. The real imperfection of language, which 
does not furnish words to express our ideas exactly 
on all subjects. 

IV. Mistakes in judging of the motives of others. 

V. Unintentional illogical reasoning. 

VI. Misapprehension of a correct sentence, through 
ignorance of language. 

2. Sources of Voluntary Error, p. 82. 

I. Intentional misstatement of entities, simple or 
composite. 

II. Indulgence in the habit of mere high colouring , 
without directly stating a falsehood. 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 



303 



III. Errors resulting from voluntary ignorance, 

IV. The indulgence of prejudice in regard to per- 
sons or things. 

V. The indulgence of passion. 

SECTION IV. 
Division of our Cognitive Ideas, p. 84. 
They may be divided in two ways : 
First, into Individual and Relative ; and, 
Secondly, into Retrospective, Present, and Pro- 
spective. 

I. Individual Knowledge. To this class belongs 
our knowledge of every individual substance in na- 
ture, and also of every individual property belong- 
ing to any entity. 

II. Relative Knowledge. To this class belongs 
our knowledge of composite entities ; the greater 
part of our conceptions ; geometrical axioms ; the 
relations of numbers ; metaphysical axioms ; moral 
abstract propositions ; and belief, immediate and 
acquired. 

I. Retrospective Knowledge, p. 89. This is our 
knowledge of all our former cognitive, sentient, and 
active ideas, and is usually termed memory. 

It may be divided into spontaneous and voluntary. 

The extent of our spontaneous retrospective 
knowledge depends on, 

(a.) The natural aptitude of the mind for this ex- 
ercise ; i. e., the natural retentiveness of memory. 

(b.) The different degrees of logical accuracy with 
which our knowledge is arranged on paper, or in 
the mind, according to the different relations them- 
selves which subsist between the entities. 



304 



RECAPITULATION. 



(c.) The frequency with which the knowledge to 
be retained was reviewed by the mind, and the in- 
terest which was felt in it. 

Our retrospective knowledge will be increased by 
the following methods : 

(a.) By thinking frequently of the ideas intended 
to be recollected. 

(£.) By reviewing those ideas together which we 
wish to recollect together, and in the very same or- 
der in which we wish to remember them. 

(c.) By connecting them, in the act of memori- 
zing, with some idea which we will be sure to rec- 
ollect at the intended time. 

(d.) By the habit of studying subjects rather than 
books. 

(e.) By interesting our feelings in the subject. 

Cases of extraordinary memory in persons in 
health, Kepler, Des Mesmes, Pascal, Cyrus, The- 
mistocles. 

There is reason to believe that the soul of every 
man naturally possesses a degree of mnemonic pow- 
er, equal or greater than was exhibited by these 
distinguished men ; but this power is restrained by 
our bodily organs. Yet in eternity it will be re- 
leased from the shackles of these organs, and will 
develop its expanded powers. 

Remarkable cases in proof. A man in St. 
Thomas hospital. 

Case cited by Dr. Pritchard ; another remarkable 
case cited by Coleridge : 

Probable inference, that thought is indestructible, 



RECAPITULATION. 305 

and will be a prominent ingredient in the future 
retribution of the righteous and wicked. 

Mnemonics ; different systems. 

The inventor of the earliest system, Simoni- 
des. Cicero's account of him. Account of the 
system. 

The greater part of modern systems are based on 
the same principle. 

Numerical mnemonics, Feinagle's system and 
table. 

Dr. Niemeyer's directions to teachers and pupils 
for the improvement of memory. 

Case of Rev. Mr. Uhlhorn, as an example of a 
well-trained memory. 

II. Present Knowledge, p. 99. 

III. Prospective Knowledge, p. 100. This is all 
our knowledge of the probable future existence of 
entities and their relations. 

(a.) The Subject of our prospective knowledge is 
always a composite entity ; viz., the relation between 
a present entity and a supposed future entity, 

(6.) The Bases of prospective knowledge are 
Analogy, Causation, and Revelation. 

CHAPTER III. 

OF THE ORGANIC PROCESS BY WHICH WE OBTAIN OUR 
IDEAS, p. 105. 

The influence of entities upon the mind is exert- 
ed either through the medium of every part of the 
Cc2 



306 RECAPITULATION. 

body, such as shape, &c. ; or through particular 
parts of the body, called organs of sense. In alV 
cases, actual contact of some kind is necessary. 

Nervous connexion between the different organs 
and the brain. Phrenology, its results, when once 
fully settled, will not conflict with a correct system 
of mental philosophy. 

The Eye : description of its constituent parts, the 
sclerotica, choroid, cornea, optic nerve, pupil, &c. 

The eye affords us knowledge of colour, local di- 
rection, and expansion. Light is the medium, or, 
rather, the object of vision. The different colours. 
Distance not an original object of vision, but ac- 
quired. 

Proof that extension is an original object of vision. 

Solid shape is not originally perceived by sight, 
though peripheral shape is. 

Apparent and relative, but not actual size, is 
taught by the eye. The distinctness of objects af- 
fords some indirect criterion of their distance. The 
image formed on the retina of the eye, inverted. 

The objects of our perceptions are also excitants 
of feeling. 

Variety and different degrees of feelings excited 
by the works of nature. 

Attention necessary to the recollection of our 
perceptions. 

The connexion between the image on the retina 
and the perception of the mind unknown. 

The Ear : description of its parts, the external 
ear, the auditory passage, the tympanum, the audi- 
tory nerve, &c. 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 307 

The atmosphere is the principal medium of sound ; 
other elastic bodies. Sound is an idea of the mind, 
caused by the vibrations or pulsations of the agita- 
ted air upon the tympanum of the ear. 

The various feelings attending our perceptions of 
sounds. 

Sound the exclusive original result of our audi- 
tory organs ; yet by practice we learn also to judge 
of local direction and distance. Of echoes. Im- 
provement of the sense of hearing in the blind. 

Organ of touch is the whole body, especially the 
hands. By this organ we acquire a knowledge of 
the solidity or fluidity of bodies, their shape, exten- 
sion, smoothness or roughness, heat or cold ; together 
with the feelings accompanying these perceptions. 

Feeling of exhaustion from violent effort does 
not belong to the sense of touch. The idea of exter- 
nity is the result of touch. Improvement of this 
sense, especially in the blind. Examples, Sander- 
son, &c. Method of printing for the blind. 

The organ of Taste : description of its parts. 
Benevolent location of this organ. Different fla- 
vours ; cognitive and sentient results of this sense. 

Organ of Smell : description of it. Different 
odours — emitted by all objects that can be smelled. 
Knowledge of odour alone is the original cognitive 
result of smell ; but by experience we learn to rec- 
ognise different objects by their odour. Improve- 
ment of this sense. Quotation from Dr. Reid. 

The different theories on the mode of the recipro- 
cal influence of the body and the soul upon each 
other in general. 



308 RECAPITULATION. 

The theory of Occasionalism. Theory of pre- 
established harmony by Leibnitz. 

Theories to account for a part of this influence, 
viz., in sensation through the bodily organs. Des 
Cartes's theory ; Newton's view ; Dr. Hartley's 
theory of nervous vibrations. The last-named the- 
ory is that of ideas, as something material, as films, 
or images, or phantasms, emanating from outward 
objects and passing through the medium of the or- 
gan of sense to the brain, and there perceived by 
the mind. Malebranche's account of this theory. 
This view charged on Mr. Locke by some writers, 
and denied by others. Result : no theory can ex- 
plain this subject. The facts we know, and must 
admit — the mode we must refer to the great Au- 
thor of our being. 

PART II. 

SENTIENT IDEAS, p. 146. 

Feelings are those sentient states of the mind me- 
diately or immediately excited by entities, simple 
or composite. 

Feelings are known by the following criteria : 

I. They have no object beyond themselves. 

II. Our feelings are not so absolutely dependant 
for their character on entities without us, as our 
knowledge is. 

III. Feelings are always preceded by a cogni- 
tion of the entity which mediately or immediately 
produces them, p. 147. 



RECAPITULATION. 309 

CHAPTER I. 

CLASSIFICATION OF OUR FEELINGS, p. 148. 

All Feelings are either, 

I. Individual ; viz., those which have reference 
exclusively to ourselves ; or, 

II. Relative; viz., those which have a relation to 
some other sentient being, or other object. 

1. Sensations; feelings accompanying the 
perceptions of sight, touch, smell, &c. 

2. Some Emotions : (a.) Intellectual emo- 
tions, of the sublime, beautiful. (6.) Moral 
emotions, connected with conscience. 

3. Some of the Affections : (a.) Pleasant. 
(b.) Unpleasant. 

4. Feeling attending the bodily Appetites. 
Benevolent feelings : love, friendship, grati- 
tude, veneration, &c. 

"■§ ;3 . Malevolent feelings : hatred, malice, anger. 
Sympathetic feelings : condolence, pity, &c. 
Antipathetic feelings : envy, grudging, and 
what the Germans term Schadenfreude. 



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Remarks on the Analysis of Feeling's. 

CLASS I. 
INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS. 

1. Of Sensations. Twofold use of the term, both 
cognitive and sentient. The latter use preferred, 
and perception for the cognitive result. 

2. Emotions are those transient excitements of 
feeling which are consequent on mental operations, 



310 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

direct or reflective, other than perceptions through 
the organs of taste, smell, or touch. Emotions suc- 
ceed cognitions or active operations ; and some- 
times are succeeded by desires or volition. 

(a.) Intellectual emotions — of the sublime, its na- 
ture, objective and subjective ; beautiful; ludicrous; 
wit ; burlesque ; mock-heroic — -surprise, wonder, as- 
tonishment, amazement. 

(b.) Moral emotions are those individual feelings 
of the mind which are consequent on the cognition 
of moral truth, conduct, or character. Moral emo- 
tions are the sentient part of acts of conscience. 
It is consequent on the cognitive or judicial ingre- 
dient of conscience, and precedes the impulsive. 

They are either pleasant or painful, and, in pop- 
ular language, termed feelings of approval or dis- 
approval, though, strictly speaking, the approval or 
disapproval is judicial and cognitive. 

Our moral emotions, in reference to particular 
acts, change if our judgment concerning them does. 

3. The Affections. By affections we mean those 
habits, or habitual states of feeling, which are more 
durable than sensations or emotions. 

They are either pleasant, as joy, cheerfulness, 
contentment ; or painful, as penitence, discontent, 
sadness, despair. 

4. Feelings connected with our bodily appetites, 
such as hunger and thirst. 

CLASS II. 
RELATIVE FEELINGS. 

1. Benevolent feelings : those feelings which are 
favourable to the object on which they terminate. 



RELATIVE FELLINGS. 311 

Importance of these feelings to piety and social hap- 
piness. Benevolence ; love, parental, filial, conju- 
gal ; gratitude, friendship, respect, confidence, &c. 
Love to God, adoration. 

2. Malevolent, or defensive feelings, are those 
painful relative feelings which involve hostility, and 
a disposition to injure the beings on which they ter- 
minate. These affections were, before the fall, pure- 
ly defensive and good : in our fallen state, often of- 
fensive and sinful. 

3. Sympathetic feelings are those relative affec- 
tions of the mind, which imply similarity or conge- 
niality to the feelings of the being on which they 
terminate. They are either pleasant or painful. We 
sympathize most freely with those whose feelings 
are similar to the prevailing state of our own minds 
at the time. They are such as compassion, pity, 
commiseration. 

4. Antipathetic feelings are those relative feelings 
which, though they have reference to some other 
being, imply only opposition of feeling, but not in- 
tention of action, such as envy, jealousy, disgust, 
grudging, fear, dread, horror, &c. 

Feelings may also be divided into Sensuous, In- 
tellectual, and Moral ; and into Present, Retro- 
spective, and Prospective. 

CHAPTER II. 

OF ENTITIES AS EXCITANTS OF FEELING, p. 178. 
SECTION I. 

All feeling, like knowledge, may be traced, me- 
diately or immediately, to entities without the mind, 
p. 178. 



312 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

SECTION II. 

Entities of every class possess some tendency, 
though very different in degree, to excite feeling in 
the mind, p. 180. 

SECTION III. 

The degrees in which different entities possess 
this exciting power are very different, and can be 
accurately learned only from experience ; nor can 
any organ originally afford us this information, ex- 
cept the one through which the feeling is produced, 
p. 181. 

I. The strongest influence is exerted by entities 
when they are brought into contact with their ap- 
propriate organ. 

II. The next strongest, when we have a prospect- 
ive knowledge that we shall, at some future time, 
probably be the subjects of their influence. 

III. The next strongest, when they excite retro- 
spective feeling. 

IV. Sympathetic feeling is weaker than its cor- 
responding direct feeling. 

V. The least influence is exerted by them, when 
we view merely their abstract tendency to produce 
feeling. 

SECTION IV. 

Entities of the classes of solids and liquids ex- 
cite more feeling, and exert more motive power 
when near, than when far off, p. 183. 

SECTION V. 
The manner in which entities act in exciting feel- 



RECAPITULATION. 313 

ing, seems to be very similar to that observed in 
the production of knowledge, p. 183. 

SECTION VI. 

In feeling, as in knowledge, two things are ne- 
cessary ; viz., 

I. The action of the entity on its appropriate or- 
gan ; and, 

II. The attention of the mind to that organ, p. 
184. 

CHAPTER III. 

SUSCEPTIBILITY OF THE MIND FOR FEELING, AND LAWS 
OF FEELING. 

First law. Sensation, no less than cognition, is an 
attribute of the mind and not of the body, p. 185. 

Second law. The original susceptibility of differ- 
ent minds for feeling is very different in degree. 
Influence of temperament : phlegmatic, choleric 
&c, temperament, p. 186. 

Third law. Excepting this diversity, which re- 
sults from the different temperaments, the relative 
degree of susceptibility for the influence of different 
entities is in all minds naturally the same, p. 187. 

Fourth law. Feeling is, in a great measure, in- 
voluntary at the time, p. 188. 

Fifth law. But we can add to or subtract from 
the duration or intensity of the feeling, by confining 
our attention to the exciting object, or directing it 
to another, p. 188. 

Sixth law. When any one feeling or purpose be- 
comes dominant and habitual in the soul, all others 
inconsistent with it are impaired, p. 188. 
Dd 



314 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Seventh law. The two constitutional inclinations 
of the soul exert an influence upon the tendency 
of entities to excite feeling in the mind, p. 189. 

Eighth law. Entities always exert a greater in- 
fluence when first presented, on account of their 
novelty, p. 190. 

Ninth law. Feelings produced in the same per- 
son, by the same entity, at different times, may be 
different, p. 190. 

Tenth law. The susceptibility for feeling is in- 
creased by attentive practice, p. 191. 

Eleventh law. Intense and long-continued feel- 
ing exhausts and fatigues the system, p. 192. 

Twelfth law. Susceptibility for feeling declines 
with age and with the decline of the constitution, 
though that be premature, p. 192. 

Thirteenth law. A negligent review of entities 
diminishes their tendency to produce feeling, p. 192. 
Fourteenth law. Time wears off retrospective 
feeling, p. 192. 

Fifteenth law. Feeling is, in general, not in- 
stantly excited, as knowledge is, p. 194. 

Sixteenth law. The feelings connected with the 
gratification of our periodical appetites are pecu- 
liar, p. 194. 

I. They are stronger in proportion to the length 
of previous abstinence, unless that be extreme. 

II. They are increased by the frequent attention 
of the soul to the entities capable of gratifying those 
appetites. 

III. This feeling is diminished, and eventually 
suspended, by gratification. 



RECAPITULATION. 315 

IV. It is interrupted by the debility and increas- 
ed by the vigour of the body. 

(a.) From the preceding considerations, it fol- 
lows that we are responsible in a great degree for 
our individual feelings, as also for the habitual state 
of our feelings or affections, p. 194. 

(b.) That feelings are individual, and transient, 
and continue no longer than the attention of the 
mind is directed to the entity or to the cognitive 
idea with which they are connected, p. 195. 

(c.) By the state of our affections or feelings, is 
meant the increased or diminished degree of habit- 
ual susceptibility for feelings of any particular kind, 
produced by continued voluntary practice, and also 
the increased or. diminished tendency to the spon- 
taneous recurrence of the ideas of the entities, which 
produce the feelings in question, p. 195. 

PART III. 

ACTIVE OPERATIONS. 

Active Operations constitute the most important 
feature of our character as beings responsible to 
God, p. 198. 

The criteria by which they are known : 

I. Knowledge and feeling are inward effects pro- 
duced from without. Active operations are out- 
ward effects, or operations tending ad extra, pro- 
duced from within. 

II. Knowledge and feeling require the entities 
exciting them to have a previous existence ; but the 
active operations contemplated by our volitions, are 
future. 



316 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

III. The character of our active operations de- 
pends but little upon the entities upon which they 
are exerted. 

The materials on which our active operations are 
performed, p. 201. 

I. The external objective entities of the different 
classes. 

II. Past mental operations of every class. 

III. The natural signs by which these represent- 
atives are expressed. 

CHAPTER I. 

DIVISION AND DISCUSSION OF THE ACTIVE OPERATIONS 
OF THE SOUL. 

All active operations are alike as it respects mere 
activity, but differ in regard to the end contempla- 
ted ; in the operation performed ; in the results of 
the action ; and in the objects on which they ter- 
minate, p. 202. 

SECTION I. 
Of Inspection. 
Inspection is that active operation in which the 
attention of the soul is directed to some entity, sim- 
ple or composite ; prospective, present, or retro- 
spective, with a view to acquire some knowledge 
concerning it, p. 203. 

The specific object of inspection, in present enti- 
ties, may be, 

I. To obtain more correct mental representatives 
of the properties of entities, p. 205. 

II. To give more vividness to our mental repre- 
sentatives of them. 



RECAPITULATION. 317 

III. To ascertain their relations. 
In retrospective entities, it may be, 

I. To revive their representatives, p. 206. 

II. To view their relations to each other. 
Inspection embraces the voluntary operations of 

Perception, Consciousness, Conception, Judgment, 
Recollection, Analytic Reasoning, and Conscience. 

The Act of Memorizing explained. 

Analytic reasoning explained. 

In all our reasonings we proceed on the implica- 
tion of certain laws of human belief, which are ad- 
mitted and acted on by all men. 

Fundamental Laws of Human Belief. 

1 . That the testimony of our senses, clearly as- 
certained, is true. 

2. That the testimony of conscience can be re- 
lied on. 

3. That memory, as far as it is distinct, may be 
relied on. 

4. The other operations of the mind, such as 
reasoning and judgment, may be relied on, with a 
certainty proportioned to the circumstances of the 
case. 

5. That all men will naturally speak the truth, 
when they have no motive to practise deception. 

6. That every act of consciousness presupposes 
a conscious being, the soul. — Case of Rev. Dr. 
Brown. 

7. That every act of memory, or succession of 
aets of consciousness, implies our personal identity. 
Other truths universally implied in reasoning. 

Dd2 



318 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

8. That the laws of nature and known properties 
of entities will continue unchanged. 

On the uniformity of these laws the enterprise 
of man and the business of life in general de- 
pend. 

9. That different kinds of truth possess different 
kinds and degrees of evidence, producing different 
degrees of belief. 

SECTION II. 
Arrangement, p. 217. 

Arrangement is that active operation of the soul 
by which we select some from among the mass, ei- 
ther of external entities themselves, or of our mental 
representatives of them, and place them, as wholes 
or units, in a particular order, with a view to a spe- 
cific purpose. 

The purposes of this arrangement, and the prin- 
ciples upon which it may be made, are various : 

I. We may arrange them according to any one 
of the various relations of entities to each other ; 
sameness, diversity, &c. 

II. We may arrange them according to any prin- 
ciple of genus, species, &c. 

III. We may arrange them according to the pro- 
bative relation of entities to a given proposition, or 
to the human mind. 

Here is included all syllogistic reasoning. 

SECTION III. 
Modification. 
Modification is that active operation of the sou] 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 319 

by which we take some from among our mental 
representatives of real entities (rarely the objective 
entities themselves), and bring them into such forms 
or combinations as do not correspond to realities, 
p. 225. 

This operation differs from the preceding ; be- 
cause, 

I. The operations of Inspection and Arrange- 
ment are performed as frequently on objective en- 
tities themselves as on our mental representatives 
of them ; whereas, that of Modification is conver- 
sant chiefly about our mental representatives. 

II. The former two operations take our mental 
representatives of substantive entities as wholes or 
units, and leave them such throughout all the pro- 
cess of their influence ; but Modification changes 
them from their natural state, and brings them into 
forms and combinations which do not actually cor- 
respond to real entities. 

Modification embraces, 

I. The process of Abstraction or Generalization, 
Among the results of this are, {a.) Geometrical 

axioms ; {b.) Metaphysical axioms ; (c.) Mathemat- 
ical truths; {d.) Moral general principles. 

Objection to Kant's view of these truths, as 
knowledge a priori. 

II. Fictitious combinations of ideas. 

(a.) Fictitious simple entities : (b.) Fictitious 
composite entities or relations, imagination, fancy, 
wit, burlesque, painting, sculpture. 



320 RECAPITULATION. 



SECTION IV. 



Mental Agency concerned in the production of Physical 
Action. 

This embraces all voluntary control over the en- 
tire muscular system, by which alone motion is pro- 
duced in any part of the body, p. 233. 

The mode of this influence, of the action of mind 
on muscle, is inexplicable. 

In all cases of voluntary physical action, we can 
distinguish the following mental processes : 

I. The volition to exert the bodily organ. 

II. The attention of the soul to that organ. 

III. The inspection of the material on which the 
operation is to be performed. 

IV. The active process of the mind conducting 
and regulating the physical action. 

SECTION V. 
Intellectual Intercourse. 

This process consists in exciting in others the 
ideas which they themselves have already obtained 
from those entities on which we wish them to think, 
and exciting them in such order, and in such com- 
binations, and with such adjective properties an- 
nexed, as we wish them to entertain, p. 235. 

This process is carried on in different ways : 

I. By speaking, or expressing our ideas by ar- 
ticulate sounds. 

We do not, however, by speaking, excite in oth- 
ers identically the same ideas which we connect 
with our words, but such ideas as they formerly at- 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 321 

tached to the words which we utter. Every idea 
of a speaker is succeeded by the following operations 
before it accomplishes its design, p. 240 : 

(a.) The idea of the speaker himself. 

(6.) The recollection of the idea of the sound for- 
merly associated with that idea by the speaker. 

(c.) His volition to articulate a similar sound. 

(d.) The articulating action of his organs on the 
expiring breath, to produce a similar sound. 

(e.) The hearer's idea of the sound produced by 
the speaker's voice. 

(/.) The hearer's recollection of the similar sound 
which he himself had often made. 

(g.) The recurrence of the idea which he for- 
merly connected with the similar sound made by 
himself. 

The structure of the human articulating organs 
is such, that all men naturally make certain ele- 
mentary sounds; alphabetic sounds are, therefore, 
substantially the same in all languages, p. 241. 

II. By gestures and muscular action of the coun- 
tenance, p. 242. Pantomime. 

III. By written signs. 

{a.) Alphabetical letters ; (b.) Arithmetical fig- 
ures and signs; (c.) Musical notes. 

SECTION VI. 

Composition. 

Composition is not a distinct active operation, but 
is complex, consisting of voluntary inspection and 
arrangement of ideas of entities, simple or compos- 



322 



RECAPITULATION. 



ite, together with the act of expressing the ideas 
thus arranged, by signs, on paper, p. 243. 

What are called new or original ideas are mere- 
ly old relations, for the first time viewed by the 
mind. 

SECTION VII. 
Attention, p. 245. 
Attention is likewise not a distinct operation ; be- 
cause, 

I. We cannot conceive of it as acting by itself, 
but only in connexion with some other operation 
of the mind. 

II. It does not give us any results of its action, 
distinct from those of the active operation with which 
it is combined. 

III. It is common to all the active operations. 

IV. It seems only to be a property of the active 
operation, conducted at the time. 

Attention is the energy of the soul exerted on some 
active operation. 

The causes which excite attention appear, in 
general, to be these : 

I. A volition to bestow attention on the perform- 
ance of some active operation. 

II. The present interest or pleasure felt in the op- 
eration itself. 

III. Some impression from without made through 
the bodily organs. 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 32 3 



CHAPTER II. 



THE MODE OF OCCURRENCE OF THE FIVE ACTIVE OP- 
ERATIONS. 

Active Operations are either Voluntary or Spon- 
taneous, p. 248. 

SECTION I. 
Of the Voluntary Occurrence of the Active Operation. 

The active processes of the soul are voluntary, 
when undertaken from deliberate choice, p. 249. 

Do we perform acts of choice ? 

Yes ; the certainty of our performing such acts 
rests upon the same basis with the certainty of our 
other mental operations, such as knowledge and 
feeling. 

What is the nature of acts of choice ? 

I. All men agree that acts of choice differ from 
acts of necessity. 

II. It is only for such actions that we accuse or 
excuse ourselves. 

III. All men agree that only for their own acts 
of choice, and the consequences of them, can they 
really and justly be held responsible, either by God 
or man. 

IV. Every reflecting man, who has attained ma- 
ture development of mind, is conscious of the fact 
that he can and ought to regulate the voluntary ac- 
tions of his life according to certain fixed rules and 
principles, p. 250. 

But the soul is not left entirely free from bias in 
the performance of these acts of choice. There 



324 



RECAPITULATION. 



are two constitutional inclinations by which it is 
materially influenced. 

I. The inclination to Action in accordance with 
the fitness of things, moral, intellectual, and physical. 
This inclines us naturally to speak the truth, and to 
do whatever is right. Crimes are the only excep- 
tion to the observance of this constitutional inclina- 
tion. This sense of obligation is universal. It em- 
braces in it the impulsive part of 

The Operations of Conscience. 

The operations of conscience are complex, in- 
cluding a judicial, a sentient, and an impulsive in- 
gredient. 

Conscience, in its impulsive feature, is an original 
faculty. Each of its features is treated of in its ap- 
propriate part of this work. 

The structure of all languages implies the ex- 
istence and operations of conscience. 

All men judge the authority of conscience to be 
supreme. 

Conscience essential to our character as moral 
agents. 

The influence of this constitutional inclination, 
like that of every other power of the soul, can be 
increased by obedience to its dictates and dimin- 
ished by disobedience. 

II. The inclination to Well-being, or the enjoy- 
ment of pleasure, present and ultimate, and the 
avoiding of pain. This embraces, 1. Love of 
Life : this is universal, and of great utility in its 
effects. On this principle is based the right of 



RECAPITULATION. 325 

self-defence when unjustly assailed by personal vi- 
olence. 

The case the same in principle, whether the as- 
sailant be a serpent or ravenous beast, or a robber 
or murderer. 

2. Love of esteem or power. Proper use of this 
principle. Its abuse. 

3. Love of property or possession. Its use and 
abuse — avarice. 

4. Love of novelty — curiosity. 

5. Sensuality. 6. Love of Science. 7. Social 
Inclination, &c. 

These inclinations are not faculties, nor mental 
operations, nor habits, but natural characteristics 
of the soul. 

The first of these inclinations is evidently the 
more noble ; but in the natural state of man the 
second preponderates. 

These inclinations do not act irresistibly. The 
soul is secondly influenced by 

( 1. Our own bodies, acting upon us 
External j through the bodily appetites. 
Entities, j 2. All other entities in the universe, p. 
[ 264. 

But these entities act not with irresistible force, 
else men would be compelled always to act vir- 
tuously, since God has made the inducements to 
virtue stronger than those to vice. Men can and 
do resist these motives. 

Desires — their nature. 

The native activity of the soul prompts us to ac- 
tion. 

E E 



326 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The constitutional inclinations of the soul deter- 
mine the general character of the ends, or results, 
at which we aim. 

Our knowledge presents to us the various entities 
with their different and relative properties, by ac- 
tive operations upon which the proposed end may be 
attained in various ways and in different degrees. 

The different entities exert a motive power pro- 
portional to their relative adaptation to accomplish 
the end proposed ; and, finally, in view of all these 
circumstances, the soul freely determines in its 
choice of the different means of attaining the de- 
sired end. Our definition therefore is, 

The Will is that power of the soul by which it 
freely determines, in view of motives, either now 
or hereafter, absolutely or conditionally ', to perform 
or not to perform some one or more of the five active 
operations, p. 270. 

SECTION II. 

Of the Spontaneous Occurrence of the Active Opera- 
tions, p. 273. 
There are two marks of difference between Vol- 
untary and Spontaneous active operations. 

I. The former are the result of volition in their 
commencement : the latter, not. 

II. The former are carried on with much more 
attention and energy than the latter. 

We are responsible to God for all our spontane- 
ous actions. 

I. Spontaneous Inspection, p. 278. 

In the spontaneous inspection of entities or their 



RECAPITULATION. 



327 



mental representatives, the mind is found to pro- 
ceed in several uniform ways : 

1. It seems to follow the relations of the entities 
which are the subjects of its inspection ; especially 
sameness, contrariety, contiguity, and causation. 

2. It has a tendency to pursue the train of those 
entities, which have most frequently been the sub- 
jects of its voluntary attention. 

3. It more readily recurs to those objects which 
have lately been the subjects of its attention. 

4. It pursues more frequently those entities which 
excite the most pleasant feelings, and gratify the 
second constitutional inclination. 

5. It is diverted from its spontaneous operations 
by the immediate action of some entities through 
the bodily organs. 

6. It is interrupted by volition. 

II. Spontaneous Arrangement, p. 281. 

This operation is sometimes carried on spontane- 
ously. Every figure of comparison consists of 
spontaneous arrangements according to the relation 
of similarity expressed in words. 

III. Spontaneous Modification, p. 282. 

This occurs very seldom, especially in persons 
of veracity. 

IV. Mental Process regulating our Physical Ac- 
tion, p. 282. 

This is very often exercised spontaneously. All 
habits of bodily action are spontaneous operations 
of this kind. But some actions apparently sponta- 
neous are instinctive. 

V. The Process of Intellectual Intercourse, p. 



328 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

283, is sometimes carried on spontaneously in a 
revery ; as is evident from our making articulate 
sounds, in the same spontaneous manner, to express 
our ideas. 



PRAGMATIC VIEW, &c. 

I. When a superabundance of animal and men- 
tal vigour has been accumulated during sleep, we 
make a transition from the sleeping to the active, 
conscious, waking state. 

II. The moment we make the transition from the 
sleeping to the waking state, the mind begins to 
act, and the body, particularly the muscles and or- 
gans of sense, becomes subservient to the mind. 

Its first action is generally spontaneous, but this 
soon gives way to, 

III. The voluntary actions of physical agency ; 
which are performed in accordance with the prin- 
ciples laid down in part iii., chap, ii., sect. i. 

IV Other voluntary operations of various kinds 
are undertaken ; and the interval between them 
filled up by such as are spontaneous. 



DREAMS. 



Dreams are those spontaneous trains of mental 
operation which occur when sleep has in a great 



SCHMUCKER'S MENTAL PHILOSOPHY, 

DESIGNED FOR ACADEMIES AND COLLEGES. 

PUBLISHED BY HARPER & BROTHERS. 



From the American Biblical Repository, 
in a review of the work by Rev. Dr. 
Kratjth, President of Pennsylvania 
College. 

The Psychology of Dr. Schmucker 
comes before us with peculiar preten- 
sions, and raises, in consequence of 
them, peculiar expectations. It propo- 
ses to be the product, not of the study 
of the patriarchs of the science, but 
of original examination of the mind ; 
or, to express it in the wonted phra- 
seology of the craft, the exercise of 
consciousness in regard to the author's 
mental operations. The propriety and 
the value of this method all the initi- 
ated will concede. Its difficulty has 
deterred many from undertaking it, 
and but few comparatively have push- 
ed it to any great extent. But, not- 
withstanding the magnitude of the 
undertaking, our author has, during 
years of patient study, ventured inde- 
pendently to analyze his own mental 
processes. The history of his pro- 
cedure, and the classification of our 
mental actions, are here given us. 
Such a contribution from such a mind 
ought to be regarded as a present of 
no inconsiderable value. . . . The au- 
thor of this book, in the true spirit of 
the Baconian philosophy, discards for 
the time the labours of others, and 
engages in proper efforts of induction, 
to obtain a firmer footing. In pursu- 
ing this course he has not failed. 
Those who read his book — and we 
venture to predict that it will be exten- 
sively read — will not fail to perceive 
that he has planted his standard in ad- 
vance of his predecessors. He takes 
his place among the original and in- 
dependent thinkers, and deserves to 
be enrolled — an honour which we 
would not allow to the mere compi- 
ler or teacher of mental philosophy 
— among metaphysicians, with such 
men as Kant, Heinroth, Schubert, in 
Germany; Locke, Reid, Stuart, and 
Brown, in Great Britain. Our author 
divides all mental phenomena into 
three classes : 1. Cognitive ideas ; 2. 
Sentient ideas ; and, 3. Active opera- 
tions. The remarks on the cognitive 
class of ideas are admirable. The 
details of their extent is very accu- 
rately given. In connexion with cog- 
nitive ideal, we have a statement of 



the sources of error, the careful study 
of which cannot but be of great use 
to every one who would have clear 
mental representatives of external 
things or an accurate acquaintance 
with truth. We think the subject of 
feeling has been placed in a clear and 
comprehensive light. The pages on 
this subject cannot be read without 
the conviction that the author was 
not moving in the beaten track; that 
he has studied carefully the evolution 
of feeling, and has exhibited it in such 
a manner as to render his labours 
worthy of high praise. A slight com- 
parison of the systems of metaphy- 
sicians will render it evident that a 
reforming hand was needed in this 
part of mental science. We see it, 
and we seek it here; and, without 
claiming for this part of the work per- 
fection, we give it our decided appro- 
bation. The third and last part of 
the work we take up with the feel- 
ing that it would require much space 
to do it justice. Had the author done 
nothing else, his account of the ac- 
tive operations would entitle him to 
the praise which we have accorded, 
and give to his contributions to meta- 
physics the claims of originality and 
depth. We challenge for this part of 
the work no ordinary interest. It is 
interesting to the man of letters, to 
the metaphysician, to the orator, to 
the theologian, and to the expounder, 
in the sacred desk, of the Gospel of 
the Son of God. The whole subject 
of the freedom of the will is discussed 
in a very satisfactory manner, and the 
account of the constitutional incli- 
nations by which we are influenced 
presents the whole matter in a novel 
light, and renders this part of the 
work peculiarly instructive. It en- 
ables us to solve the manifestations 
of man's moral structure, and shows 
clearly the source of the light and shade 
of human character. We leave this 
work with sincere respect for the 
abilities of the author, gratitude for 
his labours, which have been brought 
to so successful an issue, and with 
the determination to make use of his 
labours in our future efforts to teach 
ingenuous youth the philosophy of the 
noblest part of God's creation, the im- 
mortal mind of immortal man. 



SCHMUCKER S MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 



Commendatory Letters — continued. 



From Rev. D. M'Conaughy, D.D., 
President of Washington College, Pa. 
I have read with much interest Dr. 
Schmucker's late work on mental sci- 
ence. It seems to me to exhibit an 
accurate and intelligible development 
of the phenomena of mind. They are 
all included in his divisions, and all 
are assigned to their proper classes. 
Those classes are entirely distinguish- 
able and distinct. The-cbjects which 
give rise to the various mental phe- 
nomena are well defined ; and the re- 
sulting knowledge, feeling and action, 
are explained in a manner which is 
verified by the consciousness of every 
man who attentively reads the histo- 
ry of his own mind. Accustomed to 
terms and phrases which seem almost 
consecrated by their long association 
with psychological subjects, the new 
nomenclature strikes the reader as 
singular, but in import it is precise 
and significant. I congratulate the 
author upon having presented to the 
literary world a volume embracing so 
much useful information upon the 
constitution, laws, and operations of 
the mind, and I hope that its benefi- 
cial influence will be widely felt, and 
its merit be duly appreciated. 

From Rev. S. Boyer, A.M., Principal 
of the Academy in York, Pa. 
I concur in the opinion of Dr. 
M'Conaughy, believing the work of 
Dr. Schmucker to be a production of 
much merit, and well adapted not 
only for intelligent popular readers, 
but also for use as a text-book in col- 
leges and academies. 
Extract of a letter from Rev. M. Cald- 
well, Professor of Metaphysics and 
Political Economy in Dickinson Col- 
lege, Carlisle, Pa. 

I have examined and re-examined 
the work of Dr. Schmucker on Men- 
tal Philosophy, and, I must say, with 
increased satisfaction. I am pleased 
with the spirit in which the author 
has conducted his investigations, and 
doubt not but many of his original 
views will be adopted by future wri- 
ters on the human mind. Notwith- 
standing the forbidding terminology 
adopted in the work, its truly philo- 
ophical character will cause "it to be 
read with interest by every lover of 
mental science. 

From the Rev. Dr. Morris, of Balti- 
more. 
. .It has long been known that the 
learned author contemplated the pub- 



lication of his system of Psycholo- 
gy ; and from the representations of 
its character by his pupils, to whom 
it has been taught for some years, it 
has been looked for with impatience. 
We are aware of his fondness for such 
investigations and his metaphysical 
acumen, and we had a right to expect 
a work of uncommon character and 
of an original cast — hence we have a 
new and original system. This work 
presents an admirable specimen of 
rigid analytical induction. It is all 
close, solid, massive argumentation. 
The lines of division are distinctly 
drawn — the whole subject is nicely 
dissected — each part is separately laid 
before you, and then, again, its con- 
nexion with the whole plainly demon- 
strated. 
From the Methodist Quarterly Review. 

. . .Designing the work, as the title 
intimates, for a text-book in colleges 
and academies, Dr. Schmucker has 
judiciously confined himself to a rigid 
outline of his system, leaving detailed 
illustration chiefly to the viva voce in- 
structions of the teacher. This is a 
feature of the work which pleases us 
much. We are presented, as it were, 
with an anatomical skeleton, which 
shows us clearly the connexion and 
ramification of the operations of the 
mind ; with a chart of our road, which 
may guide us safely as Ariadne's clew 
through the labyrinthine windings of 
the darksome way. Perhaps the most 
interesting and valuable portion of the 
volume is the third part : that treats 
of the active operations of the mind 
under five heads, inspection, arrange- 
ment, modification, mental direction 
of physical action, and the process of 
intellectual intercourse between dif- 
ferent minds. We are convinced that 
those who have most deeply studied 
the constitution of the human mind 
will here find much matter for profit- 
able reflection. We cannot conclude 
this review without a hearty recom- 
mendation of the work to the atten- 
tion of instructers. 

From the American Biblical Repository, 
in an editorial notice. 

Dr. Schmucker, if we mistake not, 
has accomplished a valuable work by 
the clearness and simplicity of his di- 
vision of the elements of this science. 
There is no affectation of novelty ; but 
the author, having thoroughly studied 
the works of others, has carefully sub- 
jected every principle to the test of his 



schmucker's mental philosophy. 



Commendatory Letters — continued. 



own experience. The result is the 
suggestion of what he regards some 
important modifications and improve- 
ments in the arrangement and classi- 
fication of the materials of the sci- 
ence ; and which, as a system, may 
perhaps with some propriety be de- 
nominated new. This system has been 
constructed with great care and thor- 
oughness. It is sufficiently conden- 
sed in the volume before us, and is 
stated and illustrated with unusual 
precision and clearness. It is in these 
respects well adapted for use as a 
text-book in academies and colleges. 
The difference between the principles 
of this system and those of others is 
only occasionally referred to, and the 
work is wholly free from that polem- 
ical aspect which has too mch af- 
fected most philosophical discussions. 
On the whole, we anticipate a favour- 
able reception of this new system, as 
a concise, intelligible, and convenient 
class-book of mental science. 



From a review of the work in the New 
World. 
. . . Casting away the trammels of 
authority, Dr. Schmucker has dared 
to be an original and independent 
thinker. Those who read the book 
will not fail to perceive that it is not 
the sole product of the study of the 
patriarchs of the science, but that 
its original features give the author 
a place alongside those patriarchs, 
Locke, Reid, Stewart, and Brown. 
Dr. Schmucker has given us a new 
analysis of the mental operations, by 
which their synthesis is illustrated 
and rendered more intelligible. The 
antagonism of his system to transcen- 
dentalism is decided. The friends of 
the German or transcendental school 
may naturally be expected to resist Dr. 
Schmucker's publication, which, be- 
longing to the school of Locke and 
Reid, was professedly and fairly con- 
structed by inductive investigations. 



From the Lutheran Observer. 
Dr. Schmucker's work bears the 
same relation to the present stage of 
mental science which was sustained 
by the immortal essay of Locke to the 
systems by which it was surrounded. . . 
The great incantation by which Locke 
wrought such wonders was not that 
he produced anything positively new, 
nor that his system advanced facts 
before unheard of; but that he re- 
modelled, simplified, and stated with 
more correctness, and a reduction to 
truer principles, what had long been ac- 
knowledged as truth. ... It is in these 
important particulars that we trace 
the resemblance between Locke's Es- 
say on the Human Understanding and 
Dr. Schmucker's Psychology. The 
great (might I be allowed the expres- 
sion), the transcendent merit of this 
Psychology, is its new division and 
its accurate definition. Completeness 
and order are the characteristics alike 
of the mind and writing of its author. 
... To the Psychology, the cherished 
product of years of careful investiga- 
tion, those qualities belong in an em- 
inent degree, and moral evidence be- 
neath his pen has assumed almost the 
simplicity of element, and clearness 
of mathematical demonstration. ... In 
our opinion this work presents the 
clearest, most intelligible, and satis- 
factory view which has yet been fur- 
nished of the workings of the inner 
man. 



From the Southern Literary Messenger 
of May, 1842. 
. . . For purposes of education, we 
know of no book more available than 
a concise and well-arranged treatise 
on Psychology, or a system of Mental 
Philosophy founded on consciousness 
and common sense, by one of the able 
theological professors at the Gettys- 
burg Institution. It is expressly de- 
signed for the use of academies and 
colleges, and we commend it to the 
attention of teachers and all interested 
in education. 

From the Philadelphia Observer. 
... It gives us pleasure to commend 
this work to the attention of the pub- 
he. It contains the results of long- 
continued thought and inquiries of a 
distinguished scholar and able writer 
on a science which is intimately con- 
nected with the progress of truth in 
almost every department of knowl- 
edge We consider the work emi- 
nently worthy of the attention and 
study of ministers, students, and intel- 
ligent popular readers. 



K7 In addition to the above, nu- 
merous notices, equally favourable, 
of Schmucker's Psychology, have 
been received from the most respect- 
able sources, from some of which the 
publishers may hereafter present brief 
extracts. 



RECAPITULATION. 329 

measure suspended that self-control through reason 
and volition, which we possess, and ordinarily ex- 
ercise, when awake. 

Dreams can have nothing ominous or prophetic 
in them, unless they are miraculous. 



THE END. 



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